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2 
Abstract 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated in numerous reports that unless 
urgent action is taken to curb the emission of greenhouse gases, irreparable damage will be done to the 
Earth’s ecosystems, with major implications for human rights. The IPCC’s reports also demonstrate 
that developing nations are most severely affected by the consequences of climate change, whereas 
developed nations have reaped the most benefits from the greenhouse gas-producing activities that led 
to climate change. This thesis considers the relevance of international human rights law to this equity 
challenge, paying particular attention to the inter-relationship between international human rights law, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the general law of 
State responsibility. The rules of attribution contained in the general law of State responsibility are 
used to explain how action and inaction that contributes to climate change can be attributed to States. 
The analysis of substantive rules leads us to believe that the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol provide 
minimum standards of protection against dangerous climate change, the breach of which is likely to 
interfere with the enjoyment of human rights. Accordingly, a breach of the substantive provisions of the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol could highlight a violation of human rights obligations related to 
climate change. The integrative approach presented in the thesis potentially enhances the effectiveness 
of each framework, as it leads to more specific standards of care for individual States as well as a 
broader framework for enforcing obligations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The rule of law is dependent upon a government that is willing to abide by the law. Disrespect 
for the rule of law begins when the government believes itself and its corporate sponsors to be 
above the law. 
 
 
         Tim de Christopher1 
    
 
 
  
                                                
 
1 Pre-sentencing statement in Salt Lake City District Court, Salt Lake City, USA on 26 July 2011. 
 
 
 
 
2 United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Address to High-Level Event on Climate Change’, 24 Sept. 2007. See 
also, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (Human 
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1.1 The Relationship between Climate Change and the Enjoyment of Human 
Rights 
 
Climate change has been characterised as one of the defining challenges of our time.2 The Nobel Prize 
winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated unequivocally in numerous 
reports that greenhouse gas-emitting human activities are causing global warming and associated 
damage to natural and human systems.3 The Earth has now warmed by about 0.85 degrees since pre-
industrialization, and this is mostly attributable to the fossil fuel combustion that facilitated the 
economic development of what are now high-income countries from around 1750 onwards.4 Carbon 
dioxide stocked in the atmosphere is currently at an approximated level of 1,900 billion tonnes, a level 
unprecedented in at least 800,000 years.5 The IPCC has indicated that as a result of these existing 
stocks, many aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries even if 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped today.6 However, greenhouse gases have not 
been stopped and instead the flow of global emissions is expanding, partly as a result of increasing 
contributions from countries that have relatively recently embarked on carbon-intensive pathways of 
economic growth. This expansion leads to an accelerating increase of the atmospheric stocks of 
greenhouse gases which, if it continues, could have catastrophic consequences for human populations. 
The IPCC’s reports make it clear that the adverse effects of climate change are already posing 
significant threats to human life, livelihoods and traditional cultures, especially in developing countries 
with a limited capacity to adapt.7 For example, inhabitants of low-lying coastal zones and small islands 
                                                
 
2 United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Address to High-Level Event on Climate Change’, 24 Sept. 2007. See 
also, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (Human 
Development Report 2007/2008) 8. 
3 See, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report’ in Thomas F Stocker et al. (eds), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (CUP 2013) 
Section D.3, 2.2, 6.3, 10.3–6, 10.9 (finding that ‘It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of 
the observed warming since the mid-20th century’).  
4 Ibid 12. 
5 Ibid 5.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report’ in 
Vicente R Barros et al. (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (CUP 2014) 13. See also, 
United Nations Development Programme (n 2) 8 (pointing out that of the 262 million people affected by climate disasters 
annually in the period 2000–2004, over 98 per cent lived in developing countries). 
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are facing an increased risk of death, injury, ill-health and disrupted livelihoods due to storm surges, 
coastal flooding and rising sea levels. Poor populations in rural and urban areas face the risk that 
continuing rises in temperature, changing precipitation patterns and the increased occurrence of 
drought, extreme weather events and flooding will cause the breakdown of food systems on which they 
rely for sustenance. Urban populations are exposed to an increased risk of mortality and morbidity 
during periods of extreme heat; and fishing communities in the tropics and the Arctic are already facing 
climate change-induced water scarcity and irreversible degradation of marine and coastal ecosystems, 
all of which puts their traditional livelihoods at risk.8 It has been established with a relatively high 
degree of certainty that these specific impacts are attributable to climate change (see Section 1.3). An 
important premise of the thesis is that this attribution has normative consequences under existing 
international human rights law. 
It is also significant that there is evidence that provides insight into the consequences of various 
emission scenarios and the sort of actions needed to alleviate the risks of future climate change. The 
IPCC’s latest Physical Science Report carries a strong warning that without additional mitigation 
efforts, and even with adaptation, by the end of the twenty-first century warming will lead to a ‘high to 
very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally’.9 Pathways that are likely to 
limit warming to below 2  Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels would require substantial emission 
reductions over the next few decades and near zero emissions by the end of the century, while 
pathways to limit warming to lower levels associated with lower risks to human life, health and 
traditional cultures will require deeper and more rapid cuts.10 In relation to emission pathways, the 
IPCC’s Mitigation Report stresses that mitigation and adaptation capacity differ immensely between 
countries, and that mitigation pathways that impose too heavy a burden on developing countries could 
reduce the resilience of populations to the impact of climate change and other causes of environmental 
stress.11 The International Energy Agency’s finding that 1.3 billion people are still without access to 
electricity and 2.6 billion people are without clean cooking facilities (over 95 per cent of them in sub-
                                                
 
8 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report’ (n 7) 13. 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report’ (n 
3) 5 (stating that ‘most greenhouse gases (GHGs) accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., 
individual, community, company, country) affect other agents’). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group III to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report’ 
in Ottmar Edenhofer et al. (eds), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change (CUP 2014) 5. 
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Saharan African or developing Asia) illustrates the IPCC’s recommendation that effective global 
mitigation pathways must involve international cooperation to create or facilitate sustainable 
development pathways in all regions.12  
 International human rights law is prima facie relevant in this case because climate change and 
its associated impacts have an adverse effect on the enjoyment of internationally recognised human 
rights. In the mushrooming literature on climate change and human rights, it has sometimes been 
suggested that climate change as such violates human rights.13 This proposition could have some 
rhetorical force, but disregards the doctrinal point that human rights violations result from the actions 
of States. This doctrinal point would seem to underpin much of the scepticism regarding human rights 
and climate change. Bodansky, for example, sustains that despite the overwhelming body of evidence 
about the man-made causes of climate change and its adverse effects on the enjoyment of human rights, 
‘Legally, climate change no more violates human rights than does a hurricane, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, or meteor impact’.14 Bodansky’s conclusion, although legally accurate, sits uncomfortably 
with the premise that the purpose of human rights law is, to quote the European Court of Human 
Rights, ‘[to guarantee] not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective’.15 Furthermore, the underlying presumption that international law allows States to permit or 
perform greenhouse-gas emitting activities begs for a critical examination of legal norms. 
 This thesis will demonstrate that reconciling the lofty principles of international human rights 
law with the realities of climate change is, in principle, possible. Existing norms of international law 
are sufficient to establish State responsibility for acts and omissions that lead to dangerous climate 
change and associated violations of human rights. This will be demonstrated through a legal analysis of 
                                                
 
12 Ibid 5. 
13 Simon Caney states, ‘it is clear that anthropogenic climate change violates [the right to life]’, citing factual evidence of 
severe weather events and heatwaves that will lead to loss of life. Simon Caney, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral 
Thresholds’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (CUP 2009) 77. See also, Sumudu Atapattu, 
‘Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive this Onslaught?’ (2008) 20 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. 
& Pol'y 35, 47 (similarly basing her conclusion on factual evidence).  
14 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues’ (2010) 38 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 511, 
519. See also, Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E 
Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (CUP 2012) 232 
(suggesting that ‘aggregate problems of increased emissions, temperature rise, increased acidification of the seas, melting of 
permafrost, droughts, floods, and extreme weather events, such as cyclones and tsunamis’ and ‘disparate and multifarious’ 
harms that are spread broadly over vast geographic areas’). 
15 See, for example, Airey v Republic of Ireland (1979) Series A no 32, 2 EHRR, 305. See also, Stephen Humphreys, 
‘Introduction: Human Rights and Climate Change’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (CUP 
2010) 11 (suggesting that the absence of a remedy for climate change victims would significantly undermine the hegemonic 
status (or aspiration) of human rights law). 
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three frameworks of international law and the way they are interrelated: international human rights law, 
the lex specialis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),16 and 
the general law of State responsibility. The relevance of the UNFCCC lex specialis for interpreting 
human rights norms follows from the observation that this law not only has significant limits on States’ 
discretion to permit or perform activities that contribute to climate change, but also requires action that 
reflects States’ differing historical responsibilities for climate change and their capabilities to respond 
to it. An examination of the rules of attribution derived from the general law of State responsibility will 
shed light on the wide range of climate change-related joint and individual conduct that could be 
wrongful if it breaches a State’s obligations under international human rights law. The reliance on the 
general rules of attribution links the thesis with a small but significant body of international legal 
scholarship that has examined the relevance of the general law of State responsibility for climate 
change damage.17 This thesis focuses on the rights of individuals and peoples as beneficiaries of 
international human rights obligations, which allows us to draw conclusions about the circumstances in 
which State action connected with climate change amounts to a wrongful act or acts under international 
human rights law. 
 Conceptually, the thesis builds on the idea that international human rights law is intrinsically 
linked with the concept of State sovereignty; and is a ‘key organising concept’ in general international 
law,18 and incorporated into the lex specialis of climate change.19 Although human rights lawyers have 
considered it to be a potential shield against human rights accountability, the thesis focuses on its 
                                                
 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 19 June 1993) 1771 
UNTS 107 (UNFCCC). 
17 See, for example, Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’ (2008) 77 Nordic J Int'l L 1, 2 
(considering that the relevance of the law of State responsibility for climate change consists for a significant part in 
‘providing injured States with a right to restitution and compensation’). See also, Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage 
and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff 2005), Richard SJ Tol and Roda 
Verheyen, ‘State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages: a Legal and Economic Assessment’ 
(2009) 32 Energy Policy 1109; Christian Tomuschat, ‘Global Warming and State Responsibility’ in Holger Hestermeyer et 
al. (eds), Law of the Sea in Dialogue (Springer 2011), and René Lefeber, ‘Climate Change and State Responsibility’ in 
Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Elgar 2012). 
18 James R Crawford, ‘Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole’ (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 303 
12. See also, Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 Eur.J.Int'lL. 599, 599 and Christopher G 
Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 38 (‘Whether we like it or not, the sovereign state 
system provides the basis of current international law’). 
19 UNFCCC, Preamble (‘Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate 
change’). 
 
 
 
 
20 
potential to function as ‘a common denominator for the world’s manifold cultures and traditions’.20 
More specifically, State sovereignty may be understood in terms of international law that ‘not only 
[serves] to place certain limits on the nature and scope of governmental authority but also [contributes] 
to the development of a justifiable basis for that authority’.21 In the context of human rights, it is the 
States’ sovereign power, including its capacity to legislate, that makes the State best suited to create the 
conditions for the enjoyment of internationally protected human rights.22 Similarly, States’ sovereign 
capacity to regulate public and private actors’ emission-producing activities provides a potential basis 
for obligations to protect the human rights of those affected by climate change. Emission-producing 
activities affect human beings everywhere, and it is worth noting that the limits of a State's territory are 
not the limits of its legal power: as the Permanent Court of International Justice found in the Lotus 
case, States have ‘a wide measure of discretion [...] to extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory’.23 This does not mean 
that sovereignty entitles a State to do as it pleases: it was implicit in Lotus that the sovereignty of other 
States and international law itself must be respected.24 The extent to which States’ obligations to 
respect and ensure human rights are confined by territorial or jurisdictional considerations is explored 
in detail in Section 2.2.2. 
Sovereignty not only underpins States’ obligations to protect the human rights of people at 
home and abroad, but also entitles them to cooperate internationally as equals and to invoke the 
responsibility of other States for breaches of their international obligations for injury caused to its 
nationals,25 in accordance with Vattel’s doctrine where: ‘Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends 
                                                
 
20 Crawford (n 18) 308. See also, Weeramantry (n 18) 112, 138 (‘The old view of sovereignty held that the manner in which 
a sovereign dealt with his own subjects was that sovereign’s exclusive concern. No longer can any sovereign state plausibly 
take up such a position, and no longer is the world public opinion prepared to accept such an attitude. [The] breach of the 
walls of sovereignty which human rights doctrine has thus effected is a major factor conditioning both states and peoples 
into the frame of mind that sovereignty is not absolute but must yield to certain universally accepted norms and standards’ 
[...] If state sovereignty is to continue into the indefinite future it can only be on the basis of a progressive enlargement of 
the obligations attendant on sovereignty’).  
21 Matthew Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law’ (2000) 11 
Eur.J.Int'lL. 489, 519. 
22 See, for example, Brigit Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2001) 169 (noting that States’ obligations related to the right to health result from the States’ sovereign capacity to 
provide ‘the basic conditions under which the health of the individual is protected and possibly even enhanced’).  
23 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10. 
24 See also, Crawford (n 18) 308 (describing how international law has moved away from freedom from law or legibus 
solutes). 
25 Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Report of the International Law Commission  on the Work of its 58th Session, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, 58th Session, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006) (ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
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the state, which is bound to protect his citizen’.26 Today the law of State responsibility reflects this 
doctrine, but recognises that peoples and individuals, and not States, are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
human rights obligations.27 An example of how sovereignty may function as a vehicle for the 
protection of human beings against climate change and associated impacts is provided by the landmark 
climate change case Massachusetts v EPA.28 Here the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
argument submitted by a dozen states in the U.S., American Samoa, the District of Columbia, the cities 
of New York and Baltimore and several non-governmental organisations that the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles fell within the mandate of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The most significant part of the Court’s decision sets out the 
basis for standing against the defendants: standing was recognised based on the states’ sovereign 
capacity ‘to have the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air’.29 Section 2.3 of the thesis demonstrates that at the international 
level, States can, in a similar vein, invoke the international responsibility of other States that act in 
breach of their international obligations with regard to climate change to protect the right of their 
people. On various occasions in the past some Small Island Developing States have expressed their 
desire to raise the issue of climate change with the International Court of Justice.30  
 We should also note that the link between climate change and human rights has been articulated 
in multilateral forums, by various human rights treaty bodies,31 and by the Conference of the Parties 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Protection) Art 1 (referring to ‘diplomatic protection [consisting] of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or 
other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful 
act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility’, ibid 24). This definition was recognised as reflecting customary international law in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Preliminary Objections), [2007] ICJ Rep 582, para 39. 
26 Vattel, Le Droit des Gens (1758, Anon tr 1797) II vi, para 71. See also, James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public 
International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 607 (noting that there is no widespread recognition in general international law that 
harm done to a State’s citizens triggers an obligation, not just an entitlement, to take international action under the law of 
diplomatic protection). 
27 See generally Dinah L Shelton, ‘Litigating a Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change’ (International Conference on 
Human Rights and the Environment, Tehran, 13–14 May 2009).  
28 Massachusetts v EPA 549 US SC 497 (2007). 
29 Ibid 14 (quoting from another landmark environmental case, Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co. 206 US SC 230 (1907)). 
30 See Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, ‘Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United 
States in the International Court of Justice’ (2005) 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J 103 and UN Press Release, ‘Palau Seeks UN 
World Court Opinion on Damage Caused by Greenhouse Gases’, 22 Sept. 2011, available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39710&Cr=pacific+island&Cr1 (accessed 12 July 2014). 
31 See, for example, UN CEDAW, Statement of the CEDAW Committee on Gender and Climate Change, adopted at 44th 
Sess held in New York, USA, from 20 July to 7 August 2009. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
‘Climate Change and the Need to Study Its Impacts on Africa’, ACHPR/ Res153 (XLVI)09, adopted at the 46th Ordinary 
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(COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).32 The first 
attempt to link human rights and climate change in an international agreement was made in November 
2007, when several Small Island Developing States (SIDS) convened a conference on the human 
impacts of climate change in order to stimulate concern about the human rights impacts of climate 
change at the international level. The Small Island Conference led to the adoption of a document that 
outlined the ‘clear and immediate impacts’ of climate change on human rights.33 Several months later 
the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 7/23 on human rights and climate change, initiated 
by a ‘core group’ composed of the Maldives, Costa Rica and Switzerland. The resolution recognises 
that climate change ‘poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Session (25 Nov 2009); Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, Press Release entitled 'IACHR Concludes Its 141st 
Regular Session', Press Release No. 28/11 (1 April 2011), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/28-11eng.htm (accessed 13 September 2014); Petition to the Inter 
American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts 
and Omissions of the United States, availabe at http://www.earthjustice.org (accessed 13 June 2012). The Inuit petition was 
not considered on admissibility: The Commission merely wrote a letter to the Petitioners advising them that the 
Commission ‘will not be able to process your petition at present […] The information provided does not enable us to 
determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration’ 
A.C. Revkin, ‘World Briefing Americas: Inuit Climate Change Petition Rejected’ New York Times (16 Dec. 2006) 9. 
However, the IACHR held a hearing on climate change and the petition triggered significant public and scholarly attention. 
See Earthjustice Press Release entitled ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold Hearing on Global 
Warming’, (6 Feb. 2007) available at http://www.earthjustice.org (accessed 1 July 2012; Elisabeth Caesens and Maritere 
Padilla Rodriguez, Climate Change and the Right to Food: A Comprehensive Study (Heinrich Boll Stiftung Publications 
Series on Ecology, Vol. 8, 2009) 92 (calling the Commission’s rejection of the petition a ‘missed opportunity to bridge the 
gap’ between the climate change and human rights regimes) and Stephen Humphreys, Climate Change and Human Rights: 
A Rough Guide (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2008) 43 (arguing that ‘[p]ioneering cases such as the Inuit 
case will play an important part in creating space for innovation, assisted by a widening understanding of the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change and its potential to injure’). Similar arguments in Hari M Osofsky, ‘The Inuit Petition as a 
Bridge? Beyond the Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples' Rights’ (2005) 31 American Indian Law Review 
675; Marguerite Middaugh, ‘Linking Global Warming to Inuit Human Rights’ (2007) 8 San Diego Int'l L.J. 179; Hari M 
Osofsky, ‘The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance’ (2006) 83 
Washington University Law Quarterly 1789 and Sara C Aminzadeh, ‘A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications 
of Climate Change’ (2006) 30 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 231. Cf Jessie Hohmann, ‘Igloo as Icon: 
A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change for the Inuit?’ (2009) 18 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 295 (discussing 
the risk of creating simplistic images of a traditional culture) and Joanna Harrington, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and 
the Right to Be Cold’ (2007) 18 Fordham Envtl.L.Rev. 513, 526 (arguing that ‘The Commission’s decision to reject the 
[Inuit] Petition on preliminary grounds is admirable, because although there is no doubt that human activities are 
contributing to global warming, it is not clear that the State bears all responsibility for these activities’). 
32 UNFCCC and Decision 1/CP.16 (adopted 10 Dec. 2010), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) preambular 
para 7 (quoting from UN HRC Res. 10/4) and ch I, para 8 (stating that ‘States should, in all climate change-related actions, 
fully respect human rights’). For a general overview of international discussions on climate change and human rights, see 
Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Mac Darrow and Lavanya Rajamani, Human Rights and Climate Change: a Review of the 
International Legal Dimensions (World Bank Study no 61308, 2011); for an account of the role of human rights law in 
international climate negotiations see Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based 
Perspectives in the International Negotiations on Climate Change’ (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental Law 391. 
33 Small Island Conference, Malé, Maldives, 13–14 Nov 20007, Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global 
Climate Change (14 Nov 2007) para 2. 
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world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights’.34 It also requested the Office of the 
High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) to undertake a detailed analytical study of the 
relationship between climate change and human rights.35 The OHCHR replied to the request from the 
Council by submitting a thirty-two page report to the Council’s 10th Regular Session.36 This report was 
based on OHCHR research and submissions from more than thirty States, thirteen inter-governmental 
organisations and seventeen non-governmental organisations.37 The report details the implications of 
climate change impacts and risks for the enjoyment of a range of human rights, including the rights to 
life, adequate food, safe drinking water and sanitation, the highest attainable standard of health, 
adequate housing and self-determination.38 In addition, it notes that ‘Industrialized countries, defined as 
Annex I countries under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, have historically 
contributed most to manmade greenhouse gas emissions’ while the impacts of climate change 
‘disproportionally [affect] poorer regions and countries, that is, those who have generally contributed 
the least to human-induced climate change’.39 It states that human rights standards and principles can 
‘inform debates on equity and fair distribution of mitigation and adaptation burdens’ by ‘[focusing] 
attention on how a given distribution of burden affects the enjoyment of human rights’,40 and also 
explicitly mentions that States’ obligations to address climate change include obligations owed to non-
nationals located outside a State’s territory.41 Another key finding is that ‘International human rights 
law complements the [UNFCCC] by underlining that international cooperation is not only expedient 
but also a human rights obligation and that its central objective is the realization of human rights’.42 Yet 
the report fails to take these points to their logical conclusion, stating that ‘The physical impacts of 
                                                
 
34 Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23, Human Rights and Climate Change (UN Doc A/HRC/7/78, 14 July 2008) 
preambular para 1. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate 
Change and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 (15 Jan. 2009). The report comments on five thematic areas: (a) the 
relationship between the environment and human rights; (b) implications of the effects of climate change for the enjoyment 
of specific rights; (c) vulnerabilities of specific groups; (d) human rights implications of climate change-induced 
displacement and conflict; and (e) human rights implications of measures to address climate change. 
37 For discussions of the report, see John H Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations’ 
(2009) 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 and R. Dudai, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Practice: Observations on and around 
the Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and 
Human Rights.’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 294. 
38 OHCHR Report on Climate Change and Human Rights (n 36) paras 20-41.  
39 Ibid para 10. 
40 Ibid para 88. 
41 Ibid paras 27, 33, 41, 74. 
42 Ibid para 99. 
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global warming cannot easily be classified as human rights violations, not least because climate 
change-related harm often cannot clearly be attributed to acts or omissions of specific States’.43 It also 
suggests that it is difficult to establish climate change-related human rights violations because it is 
‘virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships linking historical greenhouse gas 
emissions of a particular country with a specific climate change-related effect, let alone with the range 
of direct and indirect implications for human rights’.44 These two claims tend to confuse questions of 
evidence with legal issues of State responsibility: it is the conduct of States, and not the occurrence of 
weather-related impacts or the existence of causal relationships per se, which has the potential to 
produce legal consequences under existing international law. This confusion is unfortunate because the 
evidential complexity of climate change as a legal human rights issue begs for more, rather than less, 
rigour in expert legal analysis. In any event, citing this complexity cannot replace such legal analysis.45 
 Despite these shortcomings, the report appears to have consolidated a political consensus about 
the existence of a link between climate change and enjoyment of human rights.46 This consensus is 
reflected in Resolution 10/4, adopted by the Council at its 10th Regular Session held in March 2009. 
Here too it was initiated by the Maldives, Costa Rica and Switzerland. The resolution lists specific 
rights that are implicated by climate change, building on the OHCHR report: ‘inter alia, the right to 
life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to 
adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations related to access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation’.47 Climate change has since remained on the Council’s agenda: it held a 
panel discussion on the relationship between climate change and human rights in 2009,48 a meeting of 
the Council’s annual Social Forum which focused entirely on climate change in 2010,49 and a two-day 
seminar on ‘addressing the adverse impacts of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights’ in 
                                                
 
43 Ibid para 96. 
44 Ibid para 70. 
45 See also, Knox (n 37) 5 (stating that ‘The greatest shortcoming of the OHCHR report is that it says very little about the 
content of states’ duties concerning climate change’). 
46 Consolidating this consensus seems to have been the main objective of the initiators of the resolution. For a discussion, 
see Marc Limon, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action’ (2009) 33 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 1 445. 
47 Human Rights Council Resolution 10/4, Human Rights and Climate Change (UN Doc A/HRC/10/L.11, 12 May 2009) 
preambular para 7. 
48 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Summary of Discussion of Human Rights Council Panel 
Discussion on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights held on 15 June 2009 at Palais des Nations in 
Geneva, Switzerland (2014)16, para 103. 
49 United Nations, Report of the 2010 Social Forum of the Human Rights Council (Geneva, 4–6 Oct. 2010), UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/62 paras 12, 43 and 60a. 
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2012.50 At the 26th Regular Session Bangladesh and the Philippines tabled a draft for a fourth resolution 
on human rights and climate change, which resulted in the adoption of Resolution 26/27 on 23 June 
2014.51 This resolution again calls for a panel discussion,52 perhaps reflecting its co-sponsors’ 
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the Council’s recognition of States’ obligations concerning 
climate change.53 Then on 17 October 2014, during the intercessional climate change negotiations prior 
to the 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in December 2014 in Lima 
(COP20), Human Rights Council Special Procedure mandate holders issued an Open Letter stating that 
‘There can no longer be any doubt that climate change interferes with the enjoyment of human rights 
recognised and protected by international law’54 and calls on all States to ensure full coherence 
between their human rights obligations and their efforts to address climate change.55 
 In view of the continuing uncertainty about the relationship between international human rights 
law and the lex specialis of climate change, the thesis’ analysis of States’ existing human rights 
obligations devotes specific attention to this relationship. Actual and potential synergies between the 
two respective frameworks and the general law of State responsibility will also be explored. It is hoped 
that this analysis not only highlights in what circumstances States may be internationally responsible 
for climate change-related human rights violations, but also provides insight into the potential role of 
the UN Human Rights Council and other human rights bodies in addressing the impact of climate 
change. 
 
   
                                                
 
50 Human Rights Council Resolution 18/22, Human Rights and Climate Change (UN Doc A/HRC/18/ 22, 28 Sept. 2011) 
para 2. 
51 Human Rights Council Resolution 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change (UN Doc A/HRC/26/27, 23 June 2014). 
52 Ibid para 6. 
53 The text of Resolutions 10/4, 18/22 and 16/27 is very similar, with the crucial paragraph on the relationship between 
climate change and specific human rights evolving from ‘Noting that climate change-related impacts have a range of 
implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights’ (10/4) via ‘Emphasizing’ the same 
(18/22) to ‘Emphasizing that the adverse effects of climate change have a range of implications, both direct and indirect, for 
the effective enjoyment of human rights’ (16/27, italics added). 
54 'Open Letter from Special Procedures mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to the State Parties to the UN 
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1.2 Methodology  
The thesis takes its methodological starting point from legal scholarship on the relationship between 
poverty and human rights; namely that some factual situations may indicate that human rights are being 
violated even if internationally wrongful conduct is not immediately evident.56 Such factual situations 
then prompt further analysis to establish violations (or to conclude that there are none) and, in the event 
of violations, to restore the enjoyment of rights. This analysis necessarily involves the identification of 
potentially responsible actors, as the non-enjoyment of a human right does not, in itself, amount to a 
human rights violation.57 It also involves a legal analysis of the scope and content of international 
human rights obligations. The focus of this thesis on States’ obligations and State responsibility, 
because States remain the primary subjects of international law - despite the expanded role of non-State 
actors in the international legal system. As Section 2.1.2 explains, States are categorised in 
international climate change law as either ‘developed countries’, ‘developing countries’ or ‘economies 
in transition’. 
 To set the stage for the legal analysis, a general overview of relevant facts is provided in 
Section 1.3, complemented by brief factual discussions in Sections 3.3.1–3.3.4 in relation to specific 
human rights. Against this factual background, the thesis examines the content of States’ obligations to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and associated adverse effects 
on the enjoyment of human rights. The Introduction has already alluded to the notion that a human 
rights violation involves an act attributable to at least one State that breaches an international obligation 
                                                
 
56 See, for example, Thomas Pogge, ‘Are We Violating the Human Rights of the Poor?’ (2011) 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. 
L.J. 1; Margot E. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International 
Law (OUP 2007); Polly Vizard, Poverty and Human Rights: Sen's Capability Perspective Explored (OUP 2006) and JC 
Mubangizi, ‘Know Your Rights: Exploring the Connections Between Human Rights and Poverty Reduction With Specific 
Reference to South Africa’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 32. See also, Philip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in 
the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium 
Development Goals’ (2005) 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 755, 786 (observing that the maxim that poverty violates human rights is true 
in legal terms ‘to the extent that a government or other relevant actor has failed to take measures that would have been 
feasible [...] and that could have had the effect of avoiding or mitigating the plight in which an individual living in poverty 
finds him or herself’) and David Kinley, Civilising Globalisation (CUP 2009) 27 (arguing that ‘the incidence of poverty is a 
reliable sign of attendant human rights problems. The asymmetry in the distribution of wealth between rich and poor 
countries, and between the rich and poor within countries, is indicative [...] of the relative enjoyment of human rights’).  
57 Velásquez Radríguez v Honduras Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 4 (1988); 95 ILR 232, 291 para 
175. 
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that is binding on the State at the time the act was committed.58 This understanding of a human rights 
violation as an internationally wrongful act is explained in Chapter 2, and is the basis for this thesis. 
Accordingly, the thesis asks whether it is possible, as a matter of principle, to find one or several States 
responsible for violations of human rights in climate change-related actions based on existing 
international laws. I suggest that answering this question requires not only an analysis of the content of 
States’ obligations under international human rights law, but also an analysis of States’ common and 
differentiated obligations to address climate change under the UNFCCC and the inter-relationship 
between the two. Thus, after setting out the legal framework of international human rights law in 
Section 2.1.1, Section 2.1 identifies provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol59 that are 
relevant for human rights protection and which may be instrumental in assessing States’ compliance 
with their human rights obligations. Section 2.1 also discusses the significance of the no-harm rule for 
the interpretation of States’ human rights obligations related to climate change. Together, Sections 
2.1.1–2.3.3 contain the substantive legal norms that are central to the thesis’ legal analysis.  
 The presentation of the normative framework is followed by a clarification of rules and 
principles of general international law that inform the legal analysis. These are used to address what is 
perhaps the greatest methodological challenge connected with the thesis topic, namely the absence of 
international human rights jurisprudence dealing with climate change (or transnational problems with 
similar features). This jurisprudential gap means that it not clear how open-textured provisions of 
human rights treaties must be interpreted in the context of climate change. It is worth noting here that 
most legal research on human rights and climate change has dealt with this challenge by analysing 
existing human rights jurisprudence resulting from claims brought by individuals against their national 
State, followed by an analysis to establish to what extent States’ obligations are limited by a presumed 
‘territorial scope’ of human rights obligations.60 This territorial scope is often explored by reference to 
                                                
 
58 For a discussion on the correlations between human rights, climate change and poverty see Thomas Pogge, ‘Poverty, 
Climate Change, and Overpopulation’ (2010) 38 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 525; Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Climate Change and 
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59 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 Dec. 1997, entered into 
force 16 Feb. 2005) 2303 UNTS 148. 
60 See, for example, John H. Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 50 Virginia Journal of International 
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of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 411, 26 and Maarten Den Heijer and 
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human rights jurisprudence concerning extraterritorial conduct of States. The problem with this 
approach is that it misses an important point: emission-producing activities that are known to cause 
climate change occur primarily, if not solely, within the territories and jurisdictions of States. The 
picture becomes even more blurred where reference is made to admissibility decisions to clarify the 
content of substantive human rights obligations. For example, some scholars try to explain the content 
of States’ obligations in addressing climate change by reference to the ECtHR’s admissibility decision 
in Bankovic et al. v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States,61 concerned with the alleged 
responsibility of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for violations of the 
ECHR resulting from NATO bombing in Belgrade in 1999. The analysis leads to an unusual line of 
reasoning: the scope of States’ obligations to address climate change would be narrow because ‘if 
dropping bombs on a city does not amount to “effective control” of its occupants, the less immediate 
and drastic measure of allowing pollution to move across an international border would be unlikely to 
constitute such control’.62 Subsequent jurisprudence indicates that the ECtHR’s reasoning on 
‘extraterritorial’ obligations in the Bankovic case was flawed.63 All this emphasises the need for a 
methodology that is more firmly rooted in existing rules and principles of international law, including 
rules and principles pertaining to interpretation, whereby jurisprudence can serve as additional material 
for analysis.  
 The thesis thus adopts a different methodology, namely one which interprets international 
human rights law in its broader context of general international law. In doing so, it attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Rick Lawson, ‘Extraterritorial Human Rights and the Concept of 'Jurisdiction'’ in Malcolm Langford et al. (eds), Global 
Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP 2012). 
On climate change specifically, see for example Edward Cameron and Marc Limon, ‘Restoring the Climate by Realizing 
Rights: The Role of the International Human Rights System’ (2012) 21 RECIEL 204 (stating that ‘the possible 
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61 Bankovic et al. v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (Admissibility), App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 Dec 2001). For 
discussions see Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(Intersentia 2004) and Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (OUP 2011) 
62 McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani (n 32) 41. For a similar line of argument with a less definite conclusion see 
Knox (n 60) 202. 
63 See Al-Skeini v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), paras 136–7 and Al-Jedda v United Kingdom 
App no 27021/08 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011). See further Marko Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (2012) 23 
EurJ.Int’lL 121. 
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accommodate Norgaard’s point that the existence of rights or responsibilities should be kept 
analytically separate from the question of their justiciability.64 This doctrinal point is important for 
addressing the human rights dimension of what the IPCC calls ‘a collective action problem at the 
global scale’.65 First of all this is because the legally binding nature of human rights obligations 
evidently does not depend on their justicability.66 We should recall that international law is a legal 
system that emerged largely in the absence of institutions and accordingly developed as a system based 
on the recognition of States as ‘political entities equal in law, similar in form [...] the direct subjects of 
international law’.67 Enforcement of these obligations was traditionally, as Crawford puts it, ‘[if] short 
of war, by way of moral opprobrium or by reciprocal denial of benefits’.68 International law has 
developed significantly, both normatively and institutionally, but it still lacks a compulsory jurisdiction 
and a law-making authority.69 This does not mean, however, that international law is not effective: 
Dame Rosalyn Higgins, for example, has convincingly argued it is most accurately characterised as a 
‘continuing process of authoritative decisions’70 that ‘provides normative indications for States in their 
relations with each other’.71 Sir Malcolm Shaw points out that ‘Law is that element that binds the 
members of the community together in their adherence to recognised values and standards [...] 
regulating behaviour, and reflecting to some extent, the ideas and preoccupations of the society in 
which it functions’.72 Based on this understanding, international human rights law may be significant in 
dealing with climate change irrespective of whether or not victims of climate change can enforce this 
law through litigation. The lack of scholarly work on the opportunity to enforce international human 
rights law ‘as between States’ as a method of compelling compliance with obligations to protect the 
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Earth’s climate system (and vice versa) is another reason for allocating a central role to the law of State 
responsibility in the thesis’ methodology and argument.  
 Chapter 2, Section 2 prepares the legal analysis by discussing how to interpret the substantive 
norms set out in Section 2.1, irrespective of who does the interpreting. Section 2.2.1 explains the 
significance of general principles of interpretation for the analysis of States’ human rights obligations. 
Section 2.2.2 highlights the importance of an ends-oriented interpretation for clarifying the obligations 
of States vis-à-vis non-nationals who reside outside the State’s territory but are affected by its action or 
non-action related to climate change. This rests on the understanding that the object and purpose of 
human rights law is ‘the protection of basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their 
nationality’.73 The examination of the general characteristics of human rights obligations further 
suggests that the these obligations limit States’ discretion in the enactment of legislation, the 
formulation of policies and international relations and cooperation.74 This is a conclusion which sets 
the stage for the analysis of specific obligations related to climate change. It is also what distinguishes 
international law most clearly from national civil liability regimes, which may be less well equipped to 
address climate change than the international legal system.75  
Still on a preliminary note, Section 2.2.3 discusses how the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, 
as forms of lex specialis, relate to States’ international human rights obligations. More specifically, the 
doctrinal question addressed concerns the role of human rights law in the international legal system 
where lex specialis is already in place and appears to create parallel obligations and fora for discussion 
and cooperation. It is important to note that some authors have argued that the UNFCCC is an 
exemplary instrument that does not impose binding obligations on State Parties. Tomuschat, for 
example, writes that the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC) is ‘intended to convey the idea that humankind as a whole has a moral duty to 
                                                
 
73 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the ACHR (Articles 74 and 75) (1982) 2 Inter-AmCtHR (Ser A), 
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ensure the continued existence of natural conditions that permit its survival’76 and ‘does not carry the 
usual meaning as denoting a binding obligation under international law’.77 Bodanksy and Rajamani 
maintain that the UNFCCC ‘does not impose strong substantive commitments on countries’ but instead 
‘puts in place a long-term, evolutionary process to address the climate change problem that: enunciates 
the regimes ultimate objective and guiding principles; establishes an infrastructure of institutions and 
decision-making mechanisms; promotes the systematic collection and review of data; and encourages 
national action’.78  
The argument that a legally binding treaty could be premised on nothing more than moral duties 
does not stand up to analytical scrutiny. Indeed, by virtue of being a treaty, the UNFCCC has 
immediate legal effects including its own enforcement potential. The principles of the UNFCCC are 
contained in the operational part of the treaty and its provisions, especially those relating to developed 
country parties, are framed in imperative terms.79 Treating such treaty provisions as non-binding 
contradicts the duty of performance and the principle of pacta sunt servanda.80 Verheyen and Voight 
have come to the same conclusion based on a legal analysis of UNFCCC provisions and the Kyoto 
Protocol in accordance with the general law on treaties. They acknowledge that although the emission 
of greenhouse gases per se is not prohibited under the UNFCCC,81 a State’s failure to take preventive 
measures in accordance with its differentiated obligations under the Convention could give rise to a 
breach of obligation for which the State would be internationally responsible.82 It is worth stating the 
obvious, namely that the level of compliance with States’ obligations under the UNFCCC is an 
unreliable indicator of the treaty’s relevance for human rights protection. Furthermore, it is worth 
highlighting that abstract legal principles are capable of producing concrete obligations trough a 
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process of interpretation.83 The development of international human rights law shows how the 
disagreement among States as regards the scope of their legal obligations does not negate their 
obligation or justify its violation. Instead it creates a need for an independent and impartial judge to 
determine the existence or scope of a specific legal obligation.84 Since the UNFCCC does not create a 
judicial process, the legal interpretation of its provisions probably depends on the jurisdictional 
capacity and willingness of other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.85 This stresses the need to 
understand to what extent international human rights law and the law of State responsibility can 
function as ‘adjoining fields’86 to the international climate change regime. In particular, a potential for 
‘systemic integration’ of UNFCCC norms and the Kyoto Protocol into other fields of law is already 
apparent from recent cases brought before national and regional courts.87 
 Building on this point, the final part of Chapter 2 explores how international human rights law 
and the general law of State responsibility relate to one another. The law of State responsibility 
contains ‘the general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for 
wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom’.88 Accordingly, the 
law of State responsibility may be called ‘the general secondary law of international obligations, in the 
same way that the Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties] provides the general secondary law of 
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treaties’.89 However, its relevance to the international human rights regime—a regime that gives effect 
to non-reciprocal obligations—is worth analysing.90 We should recall that during the protracted 
drafting of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARS), 
the diversity (and volume) of substantive norms of international law increased significantly, with a 
proliferation of obligations with third-party beneficiaries and obligations concerning common areas, 
including outer space, the high seas and the Earth's climate system.91 The ARS reflect these 
developments and accommodate for obligations that are owed to the ‘international community as a 
whole’ into the general law of obligations, marking a departure from the ‘classical bilateralism of the 
duty/right paradigm’.92 Section 2.3.1 explains that part of the relevance of the law of State 
responsibility still consists of the doctrine expressed by the Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów 
case that ‘it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of 
an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’,93 but highlights that the law of State 
responsibility is not a liability system with the primary or exclusive goal of providing injured persons 
with compensation. As Sections 2.3 (State responsibility), 3.1 (attribution of conduct) and 3.3 
(substantive norms) will explain, wrongful conduct can be established even when no-one has been 
injured as a result of the wrongful act. This means that (in contrast to what some scholars have 
suggested) it is evidently not necessary to ‘disentangle the cobweb of individual acts by States and 
societal forces’94 in order to establish the wrongful nature of certain climate change-related conduct. 
 Having set the stage for the main legal analysis, Section 3.1 explorers how human action and 
inaction leading to climate change can be attributed to States under the general rule of attribution. It 
first examines general rules and then specifically explores how these rules apply to different scenarios 
of wrongful conduct involving multiple States acting jointly or collectively. This is followed by an in-
depth analysis of substantive norms of international human rights law in Section 3.3, which focuses on 
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the scope of States’ obligations related to the exercise or non-exercise of their regulatory capacity and 
their capacity to cooperate with other States. Because States’ obligations under international human 
rights law are to a large extent rights-specific,95 it considers obligations derived from four specific 
rights: the right of self-determination; the right to life; the right to enjoy culture; and the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health. The conclusion that international human rights law imposes 
standards of care on each State that can be ascertained through an analysis of facts and environmental 
standards that are already binding on the State opens the door to an analysis of the relevance of States’ 
existing obligations under the UNFCCC for clarifying the content of human rights obligations of States 
with differing responsibilities for climate change and different capacities to address it. The Conclusion 
makes final remarks about the potential role of the law of State responsibility in strengthening the legal 
protection offered by international law to peoples and individuals affected by climate change. 
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1.3 The Science 
The scientific evidence on climate change is largely interrelated with the international norms discussed 
in this thesis, and the role of the IPCC in the development of these norms requires closer examination. 
The function of the IPCC is to ‘provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the 
magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and 
realistic response strategies’.96 This is achieved by reviewing and assessing ‘the most recent scientific, 
technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate 
change’.97 The IPCC has grown into a body that involves thousands of scientists assessing climate 
change and the damage it can cause. Its first Assessment Report on climate change was published in 
1990, and played a key role in the drafting and adoption of the UNFCCC: the treaty reflects recognition 
of a causal link between human activities that lead to the emission of certain greenhouse gases 
(primarily CO2) and climatic changes which produce ‘adverse effects’. It contains a legal definition of 
climate change (Art. 1), which defines it as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’.98 States’ obligations 
under the treaty relate to an ‘ultimate objective’ of achieving, ‘in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (Art. 2). 
Climate change and its ‘adverse effects’ are acknowledged as ‘a common concern of humankind’, and 
‘adverse effects’ are defined as ‘changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate 
change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of 
natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health 
and welfare’.99 The adequacy of States’ obligations is subject to review by the Conference of the 
Parties ‘in light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its 
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impacts, as well as relevant technical social and economic information’,100 which in practice is 
provided by the IPCC. 
The IPCC produced follow-up reports in 1996, 2004, 2007 and 2014, and a large number of 
technical papers, meeting reports, and regular conferences. In all these reports, the IPCC has confirmed 
that the observed phenomenon of climate change is largely man-made and caused by the excessive 
emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases since industrialisation. In 1996 the IPCC found ‘stronger 
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last fifty years is likely to be attributable to 
human activities’.101 In its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC confirmed, based on observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising 
global average sea level that ‘Warming of the climate system is unequivocal’.102 The Summary for 
Policymakers of the Fifth Assessment (2014) confirms again that ‘Human influence on the climate 
system is clear’ and ‘evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, 
positive radiative forcing [i.e that has a warming effect on the climate], observed warming, and 
understanding of the climate system’.103 It states that ‘It is extremely likely that more than half of the 
observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the 
anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together’ 
and that ‘Greenhouse gases contributed a global mean surface warming likely to be in the range of 
0.5°C to 1.3°C over the period 1951 to 2010, with the contributions from other anthropogenic forcings, 
including the cooling effect of aerosols, likely to be in the range of −0.6°C to 0.1°C’. Thus 
anthropogenic influence on the climate system is plainly distinguishable from natural forcings: ‘the 
contribution from natural forcings is likely to be in the range of −0.1°C to 0.1°C, and from natural 
internal variability is likely to be in the range of −0.1°C to 0.1°C’.104 The Fifth Assessment Report also 
clarifies the influence of humans on specific adverse effects of climate change, finding that 
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‘Anthropogenic influences have very likely contributed to Arctic sea ice loss since 1979’105 and to the 
global mean sea level rise since the 1970s.106  
The most recent IPCC report on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability provides evidence of 
‘risks of climate change that warrant consideration’, including ‘potentially severe impacts relevant to 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” as described in Article 2 of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’ which ‘can involve potentially large or irreversible 
consequences, high probability of consequences, and/or limited adaptive capacity’.107 The report 
expressed ‘high confidence’ that ‘key risks that span sectors and regions’ include the following: 
 
i. Risk of death, injury, and disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and Small 
Island Developing States, due to rising sea levels, coastal flooding, and storm surges; 
ii. Risk of food insecurity linked to warming, drought, flooding and precipitation 
variability, particularly for poorer populations; 
iii. Risk of severe harm for large urban populations due to inland flooding; 
iv. Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to water scarcity and reduced 
agricultural productivity, particularly for farmers and herders with minimal capital in 
semi-arid regions; 
v. Risk of breakdown of infrastructure networks and essential services (such as water, 
electricity and health services) as a result of extreme weather events; 
vi. Risk of loss of marine ecosystems and consequent coastal livelihoods, especially for 
fishing communities in the tropics and the Arctic. 
vii. Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems and the services they provide for 
livelihoods. 
viii. Risk of mortality, morbidity, and other physical harm during periods of extreme heat, 
particularly for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors.108  
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The report notes that due to the time lapse between the emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
and the effects on the climate system, ‘Projected global temperature increase over the next few decades 
is similar across emission scenarios’.109 However, it finds that ‘Mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
over the next few decades can substantially reduce risks of climate change in the second half of the 
twenty-first century’,110 and provides a range of emission scenarios with associated likelihood of 
keeping temperature increases below 2º C.111 It clarifies that, ‘A lower warming target, or a higher 
likelihood of remaining below a specific warming target, will require lower cumulative CO2 
emissions’.112 The IPCC pointed out earlier that, ‘The array of potential adaptive responses available to 
human societies is very large’, but that ‘Adaptation alone is not expected to cope with all the projected 
effects of climate change, and especially not over the long term as most impacts increase in 
magnitude’.113 It also found that ‘the projected impacts of climate change can vary greatly due to the 
development pathway assumed’ and that differences in regional population, income and technological 
development are often a strong determinant of the level of vulnerability to climate change.114 It is likely 
that the pace of progress towards sustainable development in low-income countries is slowed down 
‘either directly through increased exposure to adverse impact or indirectly through erosion of the 
capacity to adapt’.115  
 Section 3.1 deals with attribution and emphasises that one of the most relevant questions 
regarding potential legal claims under international law is to what extent anthropogenic climate change 
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can be traced back to State conduct. Here it is worth highlighting the range of potential evidence that 
could be used to establish attribution—either directly or in the context of an obligation to regulate or 
otherwise influence the conduct of private actors. For example, a recent study focused on private and 
State-run entities that produce emissions within the jurisdictions of States, showing that ‘nearly two-
thirds, 63 per cent, of all industrial carbon dioxide and methane released into the atmosphere can be 
traced to fossil fuel and cement production by just ninety entities: investor-owned companies, such as 
Gazprom and Saudi Aramco; and solely government-run industries, such as in the former Soviet Union 
and China (for its coal production)’.116 Other examples are studies that focus on the influence of States’ 
energy policies on climate change, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA)’s World Energy 
Outlook 2013 which argues that the development and use of renewable forms of energy ‘hinges on 
government support’.117 The World Energy Outlook 2012 more specifically concluded that to remain 
below 2º C, ‘money alone will not do the job’ and that ‘Adequate government policies and planning, 
regional and sectoral target setting, monitoring and evaluation, training and capacity building for 
engineers and local workforces (for implementation, maintenance and repair) are needed’.118 It is 
evident from climate science (see Section 1.1), that preventing dangerous climate change would also 
require scaled-up international cooperation and assistance to States with limited technological or 
financial capacity to make the transition to low-carbon development pathways.  
 Another question of attribution (in the factual sense) that has received much attention in legal 
literature on climate change is the level of probability with which causation between climate change on 
the one hand, and specific harm or injury on the other, can be established. The general principle here 
seems to be that probabilities are higher when the harm is the result of long-term adverse effects (such 
as coastal erosion, rising sea levels and melting icecaps), and lower when it is the result of sudden-
onset events (such as heatwaves, hurricanes, storm surges and very heavy rainfall).119 However, the 
science of attribution is evolving rapidly and even for sudden-onset events it is sometimes possible to 
establish a link with anthropogenic climate change with high levels of probability and precision. One 
example is scientific research on the effect of climate change, in terms of probability, to the 2003 
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heatwave in Europe and the consequences of this event for human beings. It was established that 
approximately 22,000 to 35,000 deaths were attributable to the heat, and that 75 per cent of those who 
died would probably have survived for more than a year without the heatwave.120 Human activities had 
generated a tenfold increase in the risk of such weather.121 Consequently, the argument that attributing 
specific weather events to GHG emissions is by definition impossible is no longer a ‘truism’.122 The 
IPCC report on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability also reflects progress in the scientific 
understanding of attribution. It notes, for example, that ‘Each degree of warming is projected to 
decrease renewable water resources by at least 20% for an additional 7% of the global population’.123 
Findings such as these allow us to estimate the contribution of anthropogenic climate change to the 
likelihood that specific human rights grievances occur, or were caused by, climate change.  
 In relation to factual attribution, it is worth noting that conclusions have been drawn from IPCC 
reports in a range of national cases. These indicate that IPCC reports can be used as conclusive 
evidence for establishing a link between greenhouse gas-emitting activities on the one hand and 
damage or risks affecting human beings on the other. For example, in Australia a local government 
council was forced to consider the likely consequences of environmental impact of greenhouse gas 
emissions from a power plant when considering a planning application for its continued operation.124 
Pollution caused by the plant was considered a potential threat to the quality of life of human beings 
everywhere, including those in the locality of the council. Furthermore, the Verwaltungsgericht in 
Berlin, Germany, found that the government had a duty to publicly disclose government supported 
projects which increase greenhouse gas emissions based in part on the argument that greenhouse gas 
emissions in due course threaten the lives of human beings.125 In Massachusetts v EPA, the Supreme 
Court relied on the evidence contained in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report to establish that the 
                                                
 
120 Myles Allen et al., ‘Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate’ (2007) 155  U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1353. 
121 Ibid and Peter A. Stott et al., ‘Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003’ (2004) 432 Nature 610. 
122 Gerrard (n 119) 139 (suggesting that attributing specific weather events to GHG emissions is impossible because 
‘hurricanes, droughts, and heatwaves […] occurred long before the industrial era; there has always been natural 
variability’). 
123 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 
(2013)’ (n 3) 8. 
124 Australian Conservation Foundation v Minister for Planning [2004] VCAT 2029 (29 Oct. 2004). 
125 Bundes fur Umwelt- und Naturschutz Deutschland et al, v Bundesrepublik Deutschland Case No. VG 10 A 21504 (10 
Jan. 2006) Verwaltungsgericht, Berlin. 
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risk of rising sea levels was sufficiently ‘real’ to grant the state of Massachusetts standing,126 referring 
to the ‘enormity of the potential consequences associated with man-made climate change’.127 This point 
is mentioned in Chapter 4, which discusses causation.  
 On a final note, we must acknowledge that responsibility for climate change inevitably raises 
normative questions, even if it is seen as a purely scientific exercise (and not as an application of legal 
norms). In an innovative study, Elzen et al. have demonstrated how methodological choices that are 
ultimately normative can lead to extremely different conclusions regarding the links between climate 
change and specific States. For example, they point out that the relative contribution of developed 
States as a group to climate change can be ‘as high as 80% when excluding recent emissions [which do 
not yet affect the climate], non-CO2 GHGs, and changes in land use and forestry CO2; or about 48% 
when including all these emissions and discounting historical emissions for technological progress’.128 
Elzen distinguishes between States’ contributions to climate change and their responsibility for it, the 
latter being a broader concept that includes ‘ethical aspects such as the “basic needs” principle’.129 The 
methodology for calculating ‘responsibility’ involves discounting emissions that have been used to 
meet quantifiable basic needs, such as heating and cooking.130 Because of the correlation between basic 
needs and a range of internationally recognised human rights, methodologies such as these could be 
used to produce evidence that sheds light on the limits of States’ mitigation obligations under 
international human rights law (based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities (CBDRRC), see Section 2.1.2) and the extent to which there is a case of 
conflicting rights (see Section 3.4). Furthermore, it could be used to determine appropriate 
contributions for reparations in cases of climate change-related damage where multiple States are 
responsible for the same internationally wrongful act (see Chapter 4). I hope that this thesis will 
provide further insight into the normative framework of international law and its relevance to the facts 
set out in this section.  
  
                                                
 
126 Massachusetts v EPA at 1438, 1455–56. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Michel G.J. Elzen et al., ‘Countries’ contributions to climate change: effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, 
recent trends, basic needs and technological progress’ (2013) 121 Climatic Change 397. 
129 Ibid 399 (fn. omitted). 
130 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2: Legal Framework 
 
 
 
 
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the 
requirements of international life. 
 
     
        International Court of Justice131 
  
                                                
 
131.  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, para 8. 
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2.1 Sources 
International legal norms, like any legal norms, are determined on the basis of widely shared criteria,132 
which establish how rules become law.133 In international law, the common point of reference for these 
criteria is Article 38 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. This identifies treaties, custom and general 
principles of law as the three main sources of international law, with judicial decisions and teachings of 
the most highly qualified jurists as subsidiary means for interpreting the rules of law.134 The lack of 
‘tertiary rules’ (rules that determine how rules related to ascertaining norms are created or modified)135 
means that the sources of international law can be broad-based in character, influence each other in 
practice and often overlap.136 What international lawyers and tribunals tend to agree on when it comes 
to the theory of sources of international law is that, in the words of Crawford, ‘its emphasis on general 
acceptance [by States] is right’.137 Taking this theory of sources as the starting point for the thesis will, 
                                                
 
132 For a thorough study on the question of ascertainment of rules of international law and a plea for a uniform approach see 
Jean d'Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (OUP 
2011). 
133 Jonathan I Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 Am.J.Int.Law 529, 533. 
134 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945) 892 UNTS 199. The 
provision finds its origins in State practice, arbitral decisions and legal scholarship and is nearly identical to Art 38 of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See also, Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in 
Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 98 (pointing out that the clause in the first paragraph of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice was added to emphasise that ‘the sources mentioned in those sub-paragraphs 
constitute recognized sources of international law, and (presumably) the sole sources of that law’). 
135 Thirlway (n 134) 115. He illustrates this inter-dependency through the example of the legal status of a UN General 
Assembly resolution: if one would want to argue that UN General Assembly resolutions have become a source of 
international law as and of themselves, the most plausible basis for one’s argument would be a body of evidence 
demonstrating that States have consistently accepted these resolutions as reflecting international law. One would then 
essentially rely on a new rule of customary international law to prove that a new source of law had come into existence. 
Thirlway concedes that this situation may be more accurately understood as resolutions having been included in ‘the scope 
of custom’. 
136 The systematic reliance on the theory of sources by international lawyers and tribunals is perhaps because, rather than 
despite its malleability. See Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (n 26) 20. See also, Thirlway (n 
134) 99 (pointing out that the definition contained in Art 38 has been characterised as ‘inadequate, out of date, or ill-adapted 
to the conditions of modern international intercourse’, but that ‘no new approach has acquired any endorsement in the 
practice of States, or in the language of their claims against each other; and the International Court has in its decisions 
consistently analysed international law in the terms of Article 38’). 
137 Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (n 26) 23. Cf Philip Allott, ‘Language, Method and the 
Nature of International Law’ (1971) 45 British Yearbook of International Law 79, 133 (celebrating the theory of sources 
based on its ‘relative and highly convenient certainty, its remarkable flexibility and sensitivity over time, and, above all, [...] 
the strength which it gains from being found by men but created by international society itself’. 
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it is hoped, avoid confusion between international norms and norms derived from national legal orders 
which have as such no binding force under international law.138 
 Understanding the various sources of international law and the way they interrelate is not only 
essential for ascertaining norms but also for interpreting them. For example, Jørgenson has pointed out 
that general principles of law are an independent source of international law that is capable of ‘[filling] 
gaps or weaknesses in the law’ and providing ‘a background of legal principles in the light of which 
custom and treaties have to be applied’.139 McAdam has noted that where a human rights norm has 
become a general principle of law, it can ‘modify the application of treaty or custom, since it has the 
same status [...] as those two sources of international law’.140 And Simma and Alston have highlighted 
the importance of general principles of law as a method for reconciling value-based principles with a 
consensualist conception of international law.141 The underlying doctrinal point here is that human 
rights norms derived from different sources of law may be substantively similar, but maintain a 
separate identity. 142 These considerations must be born in mind when reading Section 2.2, which 
focuses on one source of law, namely treaties.  
 The present section analyses international human rights law and the legal framework of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as sources of legal obligations. In addition, it 
explores the no-harm rule as a rule of customary international law. The sources of substantive human 
rights obligations are also set out in relation to four specific human rights: the right of self-
determination and the rights to life, culture and to the highest attainable standard of health, analysed in 
Chapter 3. Questions of interpretation are addressed in Section 2.2. The importance of understanding 
the full spectrum of sources of international human rights obligations and their inter-relationship is 
highlighted in Section 2.2.2, which discusses the territorial and personal scope of human rights treaties, 
and Section 2.2.3, which examines the relationship between the UNFCCC and international human 
rights law. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are presented in Section 2.3, which discusses the 
                                                
 
138 The need for doctrinal rigour in the identification of such principles is apparent, for example, in relation to the question 
of joint responsibility (see Section 3.2). 
139 Nina HB Jørgenson, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (OUP 2003). 
140 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (OUP 2012) 263, fn 178. 
141 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ 
(1988–1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 105 (referring to South West Africa (Second Phase) (Judgement) 
[1966] ICJ Rep 6 34).  
142 Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (n 26) 35. 
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relevance of the general law of State responsibility for the substantive norms discussed in the present 
section.  
  
2.1.1 The International Human Rights System 
The corpus of international human rights law has primarily emerged from a large number of treaties, 
and is continuously expanding, both normatively and institutionally. The UN Charter contains more 
than a dozen references to human rights, proclaims the realisation of human rights as one of the main 
purposes of the Organisation and provides that Member States shall cooperate to take joint and separate 
action with the UN to promote respect for and observance of human rights.143 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) can be understood as an authoritative interpretation of the 
substantive rights referred to in the UN Charter, based on its preambulary recital ‘Whereas Member 
States have pledged themselves to achieve in co-operation with the United Nations the promotion of 
universal respect for and observance of human rights’ and ‘Whereas a common understanding of these 
rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge’ and the 
proclamation of the UDHR as providing ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations’.144 The UDHR may also be understood as constituting ‘subsequent agreement between the 
                                                
 
143 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct. 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. Art 1 of the Charter mentions the four 
purposes of the United Nations. According to Art 1(3) the purposes of the United Nations include ‘To achieve international 
co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion’. In addition, Art 55 of the Charter provides: With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems, and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 56 or the Charter provides that ‘All Members pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 
55’. 
144 See also, Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 
May 1968, UN Doc A/CONF. 32/41 3 (stating that the UDHR ‘states a common understanding of the peoples of the world 
concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for all 
members of the international community’). See also, Olivier de Schutter et al., ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 Hum. Rts. Q. 1084, 
1092 (adding that the UDHR also expresses general principles of law) and Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of 
Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence (CUP 2002) 30. 
 
 
 
 
47 
parties’ to the Charter regarding its interpretation or the application of its provisions.145 Furthermore, 
the parallel existence of human rights norms in a great number of national legal systems has the 
potential to make those norms binding under international law as general principles of law, and thus as 
a separate source of international law that can modify the application of treaty or custom.146  
 When considering States’ obligations under international human rights law, it is important to 
recall that human rights obligations derived from the UN Charter include civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural rights. This reflects the axiom that human rights are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent, interrelated and inalienable rights of all human beings.147 The specific human rights 
provided in the UDHR have also been codified in the two International Covenants adopted in 1966 
which form, together with the UDHR, the International Bill of Human Rights. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)148 has 167 State parties, which include all States listed 
in Annex I to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and dozens of States 
located in areas where climate change is forecast to have serious negative impacts on human life and 
livelihoods.149 The vast majority of States have also ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),150 with 160 State parties.151 There are many other widely ratified 
international human rights treaties, including conventions that protect rights of particular categories of 
people.152 The number of ratification of these treaties has risen rapidly in recent years, with all UN 
Member States except one (South Sudan) having ratified at least one core human rights treaty and 80 
per cent having ratified four or more.153 The effect of the consolidation of human rights norms through 
various sources of international law is that the norms contained in the UDHR are applicable across 
                                                
 
145 VCLT Art 31(3)(b). See also, Jayawickrama (n 144) 30 (arguing that whether as an authoritative interpretation of the 
Charter or as subsequent agreement between the parties, the UDHR ‘is acknowledged today as the legitimate aid to the 
interpretation of the expression ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Charter of the United Nations’). 
146 McAdam (n 140) 263. 
147 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1(5), UN Doc 
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) Art 5.  
148 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
149 For ratification status, see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 14 
November 2014). 
150 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) 
993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
151. For ratification status, see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 14 
November 2014). 
152 Categorisation from Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (n 26) 638. 
153 See website of the UN OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx 
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different fields of international law as customary norms binding on all States.154 This was recognised 
by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, where it noted the existence of a great many rules of humanitarian law ‘so fundamental to the 
respect of the human person’ that all States must observe them ‘whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them’ because ‘they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law’.155  
 International human rights treaties are authoritatively interpreted by human rights treaty bodies 
with quasi-judicial functions. In the international human rights system there are ten such treaty bodies 
composed of independent experts, which monitor compliance with the nine core human rights 
conventions and optional protocols with reporting procedures. Seven acting human rights treaty bodies 
are currently reviewing individual complaints,156 and two other bodies will soon follow suit.157 Six 
treaty bodies also possess a mandate to consider State-to-State complaints,158 and one is about to obtain 
it.159 Yet to date these mandates have not been used. The interpretation of human rights treaties occurs 
as part of the State reporting procedures, through General Comments, or quasi-judicial litigation 
processes.160 
 The United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’ or ‘Committee’), is the body of 
independent experts expressly mandated under the treaty to interpret the provisions of the ICCPR and 
                                                
 
154 See also, Margot E Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation, and the Law of International Cooperation’ in Malcolm Langford 
et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
International Law (CUP 2012) 304 (arguing that 'Today, the existence of a customary international law principle to respect 
and observe human rights in the main, which can be said to apply to basic socio-economic rights, is increasingly difficult to 
refute). See also, ED Kinney, ‘The International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean For Our Nation and 
World?’ (2001) 34 Indiana Law Review 1457, 1467. Cf Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (n 26) 
21 (suggesting that some norms contained in the UDHR have obtained the status of customary international law). On the 
difficulty of distinguishing within a treaty between norms that are an expression of existing custom on the one hand and 
norms only created by the treaty on the other see Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ 
(1983) 77 The Am.J.Int.Law 413, 428. See also, Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human 
Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd edn, OUP 2007). 
155 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Reports 241, para 79. 
156 The Human Rights Committee, Committee Against Torture (CAT), Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) and the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
157 Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
158 The Human Rights Committee, CERD, CAT, CMW, CED, CEDAW and CESCR. 
159 The CRC. 
160 See, for example, Michael O'Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
(2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 1 (on State reporting procedures) and Jayawickrama (n 144) 131. See also, Theodor 
Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations (OUP 1986) 10 (pointing out that the interpretative practice of 
treaty bodies affects the reporting obligations of States as well as their domestic and international practice). 
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monitor its implementation.161 The interpretative practice of the HRC consists of reviews of State 
reports submitted by State Parties in accordance with Article 40(1)(a) of the Covenant162 and General 
Comments, which it is mandated to make under Article 40(4) of the Covenant, including on Article 6 
(the right to life), Article 1 (the right to self-determination) and Article 27 (the rights of minorities). In 
addition, it interprets Covenant provisions when reviewing individual complaints under the Optional 
Protocol,163 which has led to a significant body of jurisprudence that sheds light on the attributes of 
rights protected under the ICCPR and on States’ obligations to respect and ensure those rights. The 
ICCPR provides for an inter-State complaint procedure under Articles 41 and 42, subject to the States 
involved having made a declaration recognising the competence of the Committee to consider inter-
State complaints. As of today, only forty-eight States have made such a declaration164 and, remarkably, 
no State has ever used the procedure.165 This has led the HRC to stress the ‘potential value’ of the 
procedure in a recent General Comment—a significant potential if States try to pursue international 
claims based on alleged breaches of human rights law linked to acts and omissions that cause climate 
change.166 However, the inter-State complaint procedure can presumably be used in cases where it is 
difficult or impossible to identify specific victims of alleged breaches of the Covenant, (unlike the 
individual complaint procedure) as it does not require that complaints be brought by victims of an 
alleged human rights violation.  
                                                
 
161. ICCPR Arts 28–45. 
162. Art 40(1)(a) requires an initial report to be submitted within one year of ratification of the Covenant and, in Art 40(1)(b), 
submission of further reports at the request of the Committee. The latter requirement has been interpreted as requiring 
submission of reports every five years. See HRC, Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee (1981–2) Vol. I, SR 303 11–6, 
para 2. 
163 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 Dec 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 302 (Optional Protocol to ICCPR) . 
164 See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 14 December 2014). 
165 For a discussion, see Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1st edn, N.P. 
Engel Publisher 1993) 585. See also, HRC, General Comment No. 31 para 2 (encouraging States to make a declaration 
under Art 41 and/or avail themselves of the procedure under Art 41). 
166 HRC, General Comment No. 31. For a hypothetical example, see Margaretha Wewerinke, ‘Climate Change: Human 
Rights Committee, Ad Hoc Conciliation Commission’ in Mark Gibney and Wouter Vandenhole (eds), Litigating 
Transnational Human Rights Obligations: Alternative Judgments (Routledge 2013). In contrast with the individual 
complaint procedure established under the Optional Protocol, the inter-State procedure is aimed at the amicable settlement 
of disputes between the State Parties involved. The procedure becomes potentially quasi-judicial only in the second 
instance, when a so-called ‘Ad hoc Conciliation Commission' has been appointed and the State Parties involved fail to reach 
an amicable solution (Art 42(1)(a)). At this stage, the Conciliation Commission would produce a report containing its 
findings on ‘questions of fact’ and ‘its views on the possibilities of an amicable solution of the matter’ (Art 42(7)(c)). This 
could presumably involve formulating views resembling judicial decisions on the merits, as the HRC has done under Art 
5(4) of the Optional Protocol. See further Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engel Publisher 2004) 613. 
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The compliance of State parties with the ICESCR is monitored by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). This is a body of independent experts established under 
ECOSOC Resolution 185/17 of 28 May 1985167 to carry out the monitoring functions assigned to the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Part IV of the ICESCR.168 Although it is not 
established under the treaty which it monitors, the CESCR has gradually developed into a quasi-
judicial body resembling the HRC169 and eventually obtained a treaty basis for its work with the entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. The Protocol mandates the Committee to receive 
and consider communications,170 and provides that these may be submitted ‘by or on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals’,171 and also creates a procedure for inter-State communications.172 
The authoritative weight of the Committee’s General Comments as interpretations of the Covenant 
provisions is supported by the fact that these General Comments are included in its annual reports to 
ECOSOC, which are in turn considered by the General Assembly.173  
                                                
 
167UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Res. 185/17 (adopted 28 May 1985), UN Doc E/1985/85, at 15. 
168 ICESCR Arts 16–25. 
169 Particularly significant in this regard is ECOSOC Resolution 1987/5, which invited the Committee ‘to consider again at 
its next session the compilation of recommendations in the summary records of the Committee relating to its future work, 
paying particular regard to practices followed by other treaty bodies, including the preparation of general comments by the 
Human Rights Committee’. This invitation was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly. See ECOSOC Resolution 
1987/5: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (14th Plenary Meeting, 26 May 1987) para 7 
(emphasis added) and General Assembly Resolution A/Res/42/102 (93rd Plenary Meeting, 7 Dec. 1987) para 5. The 
Committee followed-up with a decision to ‘adopt, at the end of its consideration of each report, concluding observations 
reflecting the main points of discussion and indicating issues that would require a specific follow-up’ and to ‘[convey] the 
views of the Committee on the implementation of the Covenant by that State Party’. See UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the 7th Session UN Doc E/1993/22, Supplement No. 2, paras 264 and 265. As 
Matthew Craven notes, this endorsement by the General Assembly, in combination with the fact that General Comments are 
part of the State reporting process, result in the General Comments of the Committee carrying significant legal weight. 
Craven also notes that no objection has ever been made to the Committee's practice of producing General Comments (at 90) 
and that the Committee is, and remains, the sole authoritative body or procedure mandated to authoritatively interpret the 
provisions of the ICESCR (at 91). See Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: a Perspective on its Development (OUP 1995) 91. 
170 See GA Res 832, UN GAOR, 63rd Session, UN Doc A/RES/63/117 (2008). See also, Arne Vandenbogaerde and Wouter 
Vandenhole, ‘The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Ex Ante 
Assessment of its Effectiveness in [the] Light of the Drafting Process’ (2001) 10 Human Rights Law Review 207. 
171 OP-ICESCR, Art 2. 
172 OP-ICESCR, Art 10. This procedure is subject to declarations made by the relevant States under the article. 
173 ICESCR. Arts 16–25. 
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In addition to treaty bodies, the UN human rights system includes a Charter-based human rights 
body, the UN Human Rights Council, which is a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly174 
consisting of forty-seven UN Member States elected by the General Assembly.175 The Council holds a 
mandate to ‘[promote] universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’176 and to ‘promote the effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights 
within the United Nations system’.177 The resolutions adopted by the Council are not legally binding 
and (due to the relatively small number of Council Members) probably not as relevant to the creation of 
customary international law as resolutions that are adopted by the General Assembly. The thesis 
nonetheless argues that the Council, as the United Nations’ primary human rights body, is in an ideal 
position to consider what is needed to address climate change in accordance with human rights 
obligations, and to promote compliance with States’ obligations to prevent dangerous climate change in 
accordance with existing legal obligations.  
 
2.1.2 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The UNFCCC is one of several multilateral environmental agreements concluded since the early 1970s, 
most of which have similar institutional arrangements. It establishes ‘a conference or meeting of the 
parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers, a secretariat, and one or more specialist subsidiary 
bodies’.178 There are currently 195 parties to the UNFCCC (194 States plus the European Union),179 
which include all 193 UN Member States.180 In order to understand the origins of the Convention, we 
need to bear in mind that climate change was placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in 
September 1988 under the agenda item—submitted by Malta—‘Declaration proclaiming climate as 
                                                
 
174 The Council was created by the General Assembly on 15 March 2006 and replaced the former UN Commission on 
Human Rights. See UNGA Res. 60/251: Human Rights Council, adopted 15 March 2006, UN Doc A/RES/60/251 (3 April 
2006), para 1. 
175 Ibid para 7. 
176 Ibid para 2. 
177 Ibid para 3. 
178 Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International law’ (2000) 94 Am.J.Int.Law 623. 
179 See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (accessed 1 Sept. 2013). 
Niue, a self-governing State in free association with New Zealand, is a Party to the UNFCCC but not a member of the 
United Nations. 
180 See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-2&chapter=1&lang=en (accessed 1 Sept. 
2013). 
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part of the common heritage of mankind’.181 The item led to discussions and the adoption of a 
consensus resolution entitled ‘Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind’,182 in which States expressed concern ‘that certain human activities could change global 
climate patterns, threatening present and future generations with potentially severe economic and social 
consequences’ and noted with concern ‘that the emerging evidence indicates that continued growth in 
atmospheric concentrations of “greenhouse gases” could produce global warming with an eventual rise 
in sea levels, the effects of which could be disastrous for mankind if timely steps are not taken at all 
levels’.183 The resolution called on ‘Governments and intergovernmental organizations to collaborate in 
making every effort to prevent the detrimental effects on climate and activities which affect the 
ecological balance, and also calls upon non-governmental organisations, industry and other productive 
sectors to play their due role’.184 In the last instance the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’ was 
not mentioned in the resolution: agreement had been reached to refer to a new concept, ‘common 
concern of mankind’.185 According to commentators, this concept ‘is generally seen as being oriented 
to the fight specifically against ecological dangers threatening human survival’.186 Through the 
resolution, the General Assembly also endorsed the establishment of the IPCC by the World 
Meteorological Organisation and the UN Environment Programme,187 and urged governments, and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to implement programmes and research to 
enhance the understanding of climate change and its causes.188  
 It took another year for States to agree to adopt a legal framework specifically designed to 
address climate change, through another resolution again entitled ‘Protection of Global Climate for 
                                                
 
181 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ (1993) 18 Yale J. 
Int'l L. 451, 465 
182 Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA Res. 53 (6 Dec. 1988) UN Doc 
A/43/39. 
183 Ibid Preamble. 
184 Ibid para 9. 
185 Ibid para 1. Daniel Bodanksy notes that most Member States were reluctant to invoke the ‘common heritage’ concept in 
the context of climate change. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ 
(n 181) 465. 
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Present and Future Generations of Mankind’.189 The resolution urged governments, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations and scientific institutions to ‘collaborate in efforts to prepare, as a 
matter of urgency, a framework convention on climate and associated protocols containing concrete 
commitments in the light of priorities that may be authoritatively identified on the basis of sound 
scientific knowledge, and taking into account the specific development of developing countries’.190  
 When the UNFCCC was adopted three years after the 1989 Resolution, the Preamble stated that 
‘Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of 
humankind’.191 The UNFCCC establishes both general principles that States must respect in their 
actions to address climate change,192 as well as specific commitments that States must undertake in 
relation to mitigation, public information, education, financial resources and technology transfer.193 
The relevance of the UNFCCC for the protection of human beings is perhaps most evident from its 
ultimate objective enshrined in Article 2, which is ‘to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system [...] within a 
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change [...] and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’.194 This objective must be read in the light 
of the Preamble, where the first paragraph reads ‘Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and 
its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’.195 ‘Adverse effects are defined in Article 1 as 
‘changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant 
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or 
on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare’.196 All States commit to 
take precautionary measures ‘to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and 
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mitigate its adverse effects’ to achieve the ultimate objective,197 in accordance with the principle of the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC).198  
 Article 3(3) specifies that ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures’,199 reflecting (again) 
the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is generally interpreted as pressing for 
precautionary regulation or action when there is no conclusive evidence of a particular risk scenario, 
when the risk is uncertain, or until the risk is disproved.200 This principle is widely considered to be 
part of customary international law in the environmental field based on ‘the importance of preventive 
action in environmental governance’.201 This customary law status of the precautionary principle has 
since been confirmed by numerous findings of international courts and tribunals which unequivocally 
found the principle to be part of international law, despite some differences as to its exact meaning.202 
A recent interpretation of the principle was by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) in its first Advisory Opinion, which cited it as a principle of customary international law.203 
The precautionary principle is also gradually gaining acceptance in social and economic fields, 
especially in international health law,204 and attempts have been made in human rights scholarship to 
demonstrate that human rights treaty bodies could invoke the precautionary principle to achieve 
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environmental protection.205 As Birnlie, Boyle and Redgwell note, the consequences of applying the 
precautionary principle largely depend on the specific  normative context.206 
 As regards the specific context of the UNFCCC, it is important to recall that Article 3(1) 
expressly states that the precautionary principle must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of 
CBDRRC. This principle is an extended version of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CBDR), which appears in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development207 and was subsequently incorporated into a large number of international treaties dealing 
with natural resources, many of which refer explicitly to States’ common responsibilities and the need 
to take account of differentiated circumstances.208 The principle of CBDR or CBDRRC is best 
understood as an application of the general principle of equity in international law. This acquires a 
specific meaning through the notion of ‘common heritage of mankind’209 or, in case of the UNFCCC, 
the notion of ‘common concern of humankind’. As Sands explains, the CBDR principle ‘entitles, or 
may require, all concerned States to participate in international response measures […]. Second, it 
leads to environmental standards which impose differing obligations on States’.210 This produces 
higher standards of achievement for ‘developed’ countries than for developing countries.211  
 In the UNFCCC, the inclusion of ‘respective capabilities’ as a marker of differentiation 
indicates that ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ are distinct from ‘capabilities’ and thus 
principally based on States’ individual responsibility for contributions to accumulated greenhouse 
gases in the global atmosphere.212 The Preamble clarifies that States’ obligations are differentiated 
based on the understanding that ‘the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing 
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countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing 
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs’.213 The principle of CBDRRC 
expressed in the UNFCCC thus embodies the understanding that ‘developing’ (non-Annex I) countries 
have reaped fewer benefits from historic emissions than ‘developed’ (Annex I) countries, and have a 
lower capacity for addressing climate change.214 Scott and Rajamani are correct in arguing that ‘The 
fact that [CBDRRC] is a fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime 
also implies [...] that state parties are obliged not just to interpret current obligations and fashion new 
ones in keeping with the CBDRRC principle, but also to take this principle into account in their 
unilateral actions vis-à-vis other parties’.215 
 The principle of CBDRRC is reiterated throughout the Convention and reflected in its 
substantive provisions. States’ common obligations proceed from the Conventions’s ultimate objective, 
which requires all State parties to cooperate and to participate in response measures, including through 
reporting to the Conference of the Parties about their emission levels and, when applicable, measures 
taken to mitigate climate change and to adapt to the adverse effects.216 The UNFCCC operationalises 
CBDRRC by imposing different obligations on Annex I and non-Annex I Parties,217 based on the 
explicitly stated principle that ‘developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change’218 while ‘the specific needs and circumstances of developing country parties, especially those 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially 
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developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention, should be given full consideration’.219 Article 4 contains specific commitments for 
developed country parties, and obliges them to take action, including the adoption of national policies 
to help cut their emissions and to protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs in a way that 
‘will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in 
anthropogenic emissions’.220 This entails an obligation for these parties to periodically submit detailed 
information on such matters with a view to lowering their anthropogenic emissions to 1990 levels. This 
information has to be reviewed periodically by the Conference of the Parties (COP).221  
 Developed country parties and other developed parties listed in Annex II are also obliged to 
provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ to offset developing country Parties’ implementation 
costs,222 and to assist any developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change as regards meeting the costs of adaptation to those effects,223 ‘taking into 
account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds’.224 The same States are obliged 
to ‘take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access 
to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country 
Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention’ whereby developed country 
Parties must ‘support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of 
developing country Parties’.225 The commitments of developing country parties under the Convention 
are conditional on the provision of financing by developed country parties: Article 4(7) states that the 
extent to which developing country parties implement their commitments under the Convention will 
depend on the effective implementation of developed country parties’ obligations in terms of financial 
resources and technology transfer, and repeats the provision in the Preamble that this ‘will take fully 
into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of developing country Parties’.226  
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 The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC is, as ‘the supreme body of' the 
UNFCCC’,227 responsible for the Convention's implementation. The COP resembles institutional 
arrangements established under the other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that have 
been made since the early 1970s. Like most MEAs, it establishes not only ‘a conference or meeting of 
the parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers’ but also a secretariat and several subsidiary 
bodies.228 The purpose of these institutional arrangements is ‘to develop the normative content of the 
regulatory regime established by [the agreement] and to supervise the states parties’ implementation of 
and compliance with that regime’.229 As regards the legal status of the COP and MOP, Churchill and 
Ulfstein explain that these bodies are ‘not intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in the traditional 
sense’ because of their ad hoc nature.230 At the same time, the COP and MOP are created by treaties, 
possess law-making powers and compliance mechanisms, and are therefore ‘more than just diplomatic 
conferences’.231 It is also clear that the COP is, like any body created by a treaty, bound by the terms of 
its constituting treaty as well as by obligations conferred on States under international law.232 Indeed, 
the State parties to the UNFCCC have not agreed to exempt the COP from the general rules of 
international law, and Article 7 makes it expressly subject to the international law created in the 
UNFCCC.233 
Article 7 authorises the COP ‘to make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote 
the effective implementation of the Convention’. In addition, COP decisions are one of the ways in 
which it exercises its power to ‘exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under the Convention’.234 COP 
decisions are thus not legally binding per se and cannot themselves give rise to new substantive 
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obligations that are not already contained in the Convention.235 Technically, COP decisions constitute 
‘subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions’,236 and this makes them relevant for interpreting the treaty.237 Rajamani has pointed 
out that the COP nonetheless has ‘indirect law-making powers’, on the basis that ‘it is authorized to 
negotiate amendments and Protocols to agreements’ which ‘require ratification by Parties’.238 In 
addition, Rajamani explains that the COP has ‘direct’ or ‘genuine’ law-making powers because ‘it is 
authorized in some cases to develop rules, as for instance for emissions trading, and these rules, 
although not legally binding, have mandatory force’.239 
 
2.1.2.1 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol240 has been ratified by 191 States plus the European Union.241 It was negotiated 
pursuant to an agreement reached at the first session of the COP held in Berlin in 1994. It was agreed 
that pledges by developed country parties to stabilise emission levels to 1990 levels by 2000 would fall 
short of achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.242 At COP1 in Berlin, it was also agreed that 
developing country parties would not undertake new commitments but would instead focus on the 
implementation of their existing commitments under the UNFCCC with assistance from developed 
country parties.243 The Protocol is thus an operationalisation of the provisions of the UNFCCC and 
based on the principle of CBDRRC. Its stated objective is to pursue the ‘ultimate objective of the 
Convention’.244  
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 In order to achieve its objective, the Protocol sets legally binding quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments for developed country parties based on an aggregate reduction target.245 It 
also establishes a more rigorous reporting system and a Compliance Committee with the power to 
sanction non-compliance, thus representing what Bodansky and Rajamani refer to as a ‘progressively 
harder approach’ to mitigation than the UNFCCC.246 The aggregate targets for developed country 
parties are for specified commitment periods, the first of which set an aggregate target of reducing 
emissions by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels between 1997 and 2012.247 Developing country 
parties are expressly required to meet existing commitments under Article 4(1) of the Convention in 
order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account developed country obligations to provide 
assistance in the form of finance, technology transfer and capacity building.248 The Protocol also sets 
up a range of market-based mechanisms to facilitate developed country parties’ compliance with their 
mitigation obligations under the Protocol.249 The concept of emission trading as a mitigation strategy 
remains controversial for a number of reasons. These include the apparent inadequacy of existing 
legally binding targets, uncertainty as to future targets, and the lack of effective national and 
international mechanisms for monitoring, verifying and compelling compliance with procedural rules 
designed to safeguard the environmental integrity of the system (i.e. the existence of ‘loopholes’).250 
The significance of international human rights law to make these mechanisms function has been 
explored elsewhere,251 and the focus has mainly been on procedural rights and the negative impacts of 
sponsored projects on local communities. The controversies surrounding the market mechanisms 
indicate that we cannot assume that the Kyoto Protocol as an instrument automatically benefits the 
protection of human rights. However, this leaves open the possibility of exploring specific features of 
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the Protocol, namely quantified emission reduction targets and provisions related to compliance, from 
an international human rights law perspective.  
 In accordance with the Protocol’s provision that ‘commitments for subsequent commitment 
periods shall be established’,252 negotiations on new commitments started in 2005 under the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).253 
This culminated in a decision of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) to set an aggregate target of reducing developed country Parties’ overall 
emissions by at least 18 per cent below 1990 levels in the period 2013–2020.254 However, Japan 
indicated that it ‘does not have any intention to be under obligation of the second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012’;255 New Zealand did not undertake any new commitments despite 
indicating that it would remain party to the Protocol;256 and the Russian Federation indicated that it did 
‘not intend to assume a quantitative emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second 
commitment period’.257 Parties that did undertake new commitments agreed to review their 
commitments by 2014 at the latest,258 but without undertaking to ensure that their commitments would 
be brought in line with an aggregate science-based target.259 The CMP nonetheless declared the 
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mandate of the AWG-KP fulfilled260 and went on to adopt a decision requiring all parties to work 
towards ‘nationally determined contributions’,‘without prejudice to the legal nature of 
contributions’.261 It appears that this decision paves the way for a so-called ‘pledge-and-review’ system 
under the UNFCCC, in which each State party chooses a target for itself without prior consideration of 
an aggregate target and without being subject to the accountability provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The nature of a future agreement remains subject to ongoing negotiations, which should be concluded 
in 2015.262  
 
2.1.3 The No-Harm Rule 
It is widely believed, and supported by authority, that under general international law all States are 
under an obligation to prevent transboundary environmental damage (the ‘no-harm rule’).263 This 
obligation was first articulated in the Trail Smelter (1907), where the arbitral tribunal stated that: 
 
Under the principles of international law... no state has the right to use or permit the use of 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another of the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.264 
 
Although the arbitral tribunal in Trail Smelter specifically referred to injury caused by fumes, the 
principle expressed in this case has a more general application to all sorts of environmental damage. It 
is also thought to apply to the world’s common spaces, in addition to damage that is inflicted by one 
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State on the environment of another.265 The scope of the principle has been extended to include cases 
where damage is inflicted on parts of the environment in which all States have an interest. This 
development is specifically stated in the Stockholm Declaration, which provides that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.266 
The rule was expressed in almost identical wording in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development267 and, importantly, is restated in the Preamble to the UNFCCC.268 The 
International Court relied on the principle in its Advisory Opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons that ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction’.269 The Court restated this formulation, in almost identical terms, in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project.270 And in Pulp Mills, the Court found that customary international law requires a 
State ‘to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or 
in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State’.271 It 
is clear from these formulations that basically, the no-harm rule limits the sovereign rights of a State to 
perform, or to authorise third parties to perform, damaging activities within its own territory.272 The 
key element here is to balance States’ sovereignty and their territorial integrity in ‘[protecting] within 
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the territory the rights of other states, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and 
war’.273 
 To determine the scope of States’ obligations under the no-harm rule, it is important to 
understand what threshold of damage will trigger the rule.274 The arbitrators in the Lac Lanoux 
arbitration made reference to ‘serious injury’275 in a similar way. The ILC incorporated these 
statements into its Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (‘ILC 
Articles on Prevention of Harm’) and its Commentaries, both completed in 2001.276 In its 
Commentaries, it refers to a ‘threshold’ of ‘significant damage’. It defines ‘significant’ as ‘something 
more than detectable but [...] not at the level of “serious” or “substantial”’.277 It adds that ‘The harm 
must lead to a real detrimental effect on matters such as, for example, human health, industry, property, 
environment or agriculture in other States’.278 Verheyen and Voigt have argued that climate change 
damage meets the threshold referred to by the ILC, with Verheyen arguing that ‘almost all injury 
expected to result from or already resulting from climate change is more than de minimus or 
insignificant’.279 Here we argue that this would necessarily be the case when ‘damage’ involves 
interferences with internationally recognised human rights.  
An important point to note here is that despite the emphasis on damage, State responsibility 
arises not as a result of damage, but as a result of wrongful conduct.280 The Commentaries to the ARS 
provide implicit support for the proposition that the no-harm rule is actually a preventive obligation. 
Trail Smelter is taken as the single authority for the rule, understood as a rule of customary 
international law, that ‘The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given 
event occurs when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the event continues 
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and remains not in conformity with that obligation’,281 based on the understanding that the obligation in 
Trail Smelter ‘was breached for as long as the pollution continued to be emitted’.282 This suggests that 
the term ‘harm’ must be understood in the context of risk prevention. 
The existing authorities suggest that the relevant standard of care that States must uphold to 
avoid incurring responsibility for a breach of the rule is one of ‘due diligence’or ‘best efforts’.283 It is 
worth noting that the principle of ‘due diligence’, as a principle of international law, has a common 
origin with the general law of State responsibility and international human rights law: it is derived from 
the laws on diplomatic protection, requiring States to protect the rights of non-nationals in their 
territory.284 The notion is generally considered to originate from the 1872 Alabama case,285 in which 
the arbitral tribunal relied on the notion of due diligence as an international and objective standard that 
imposed obligations on the State to prevent causing damage to another State.286 In Neer (1926)287 and 
Lac Lanoux (1957)288 this interpretation is confirmed in almost identical wording. The understanding of 
due diligence obligations as embodying a precautionary approach is also reflected in various 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that have included the standard.289 In its 2011 Advisory 
Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS 
confirmed that the precautionary approach is ‘an integral part of the due diligence obligation of 
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sponsoring States, which is applicable even outside the scope of the [Nodules and Sulphides] 
Regulations’.290  
The ILC has elaborated on the due diligence standard in its Articles on Prevention of Harm and 
the related Commentaries, which draw extensively on the notion of due diligence as a means of risk 
prevention.291 The Commentaries set out that:  
The duty of due diligence ... is not intended to guarantee that significant harm be totally 
prevented, if it is not possible to do so. In that eventuality, the State of origin is required, as 
noted above, to exert its best possible efforts to minimize the risk.292 
The International Court’s interpretation of the no-harm rule in Pulp Mills confirms that States’ due 
diligence obligations must be understood as ‘best effort’ obligations, and that it ‘entails not only the 
adoption of appropriate rules and measures but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and 
the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring 
of activities undertaken by such operators’.293 The ILC has suggested that under the rule, States are 
obliged to take certain measures, after having consulted relevant scientific evidence of the risks 
resulting from their activities, including ‘first, formulating policies designed to prevent significant 
transboundary harm or to minimise the risk thereof and, secondly, implementing those policies’.294 It 
specifies that this element of the obligation can be met through ‘legislation and administrative 
regulations and implemented through various enforcement mechanisms’.295 The precise standard of 
care for each State should be assessed on the basis of proportionality: ‘the standard of due diligence 
against which the conduct of the State of origin should be examined is that which is generally 
considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk [...] in the particular instance’.296 
The ILC’s Commentaries to the Articles on the Prevention of Harm specify that ‘The economic level of 
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States is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has complied with 
its obligations of due diligence. Nevertheless, a State's economic level cannot be used to dispense the 
State from its obligations [to prevent transboundary harm]’.297 This interpretation of the no-harm rule 
reflects the principle of CBDRRC contained in the UNFCCC: whereas all States have a positive 
obligation to take measures to prevent dangerous climate change, the content of those obligations is 
affected by a State’s level of economic development. The inter-relationship of those norms must be 
considered in light of general rules of interpretation, which are analysed in the next two sections.  
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2.2 Questions of Interpretation 
2.2.1 General Rules of Interpretation 
 
In the words of Rosenne, the provisions of human rights treaties are largely ‘written in axiomatic or 
syllogistic form’ and thus ‘require significant interpretation’.298 This makes it extremely important to 
understand the rules that govern the construction of treaties contained in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT),299 which are generally taken to reflect ‘approximations of the applicable 
rules’ of customary international law.300 The relevance of these general rules has been repeatedly 
confirmed by human rights bodies that are expressly mandated with the interpretation of human rights 
treaties,301 and in human rights scholarship.302 Perhaps the greatest advantage of applying these general 
rules in the human rights context is that it provides objective criteria for interpretation: the frequently 
cited statement that treaty interpretation is ‘to some extent an art, not an exact science’303 illustrates the 
need for ‘meta-rules’ of interpretation that could serve to promote consistency between interpretative 
processes and safeguarding their integrity. Taking into account the nature of international law itself, it 
is, of course, significant that the general rules of interpretation are ‘essentially [...] a projection of the 
(valid) consent [of States]’.304  
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Yet the applicability of general rules of treaty interpretation to international human rights law 
cannot be taken for granted: the rules may need to be modified in order to accommodate the normative 
content of provisions of human rights treaties. After all, the VCLT was drafted as a framework to be 
applied primarily to treaties without a compliance mechanism that contained reciprocal obligations and 
did not directly affect third parties.305 Crawford considers that ‘it is not too much to say that [the 
VCLT] looks at multilateral treaties from the perspective of bilateral treaties’ or that it has a ‘bifocal 
approach’, dealing with the ‘public order’ aspects of multilateral treaties ‘only peripherally [...] and 
then usually indirectly’.306 Human rights treaties are perhaps the clearest example of treaties that 
deviate from the traditional type of treaties: they usually establish their own monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, contain objective rather than reciprocal obligations and have third party 
beneficiaries.307 The implications of the objective nature of treaty obligations for their interpretation 
were recognised by the ICJ in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, where the Court stated: 
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose... [I]ts 
object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the 
other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention 
the contracting States do not have any interest of their own; they merely have, one and all, a 
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison 
d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of 
individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual 
balance between rights and duties.308 
As Craven suggests, treaties of a humanitarian character ‘cannot therefore simply be regarded as the 
accidental data of an otherwise disinterested legal system. [...] [T]o say that they are “only treaties” is 
merely to place them within a highly contingent set of understandings as to the nature of international 
legal relations’.309  
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Turning to the general rules themselves, we find a paradox: it is precisely the rules of treaty 
interpretation agreed upon by States that minimise the relevance of the intention of the drafters of a 
treaty in the interpretative process. The VCLT lists preparatory works as ‘supplementary means of 
interpretation’ that may only be relied upon to determine the meaning of a treaty provision when its 
interpretation in accordance with the general rules ‘leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure’, or leads 
to a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ (Art. 32).310 The IACtHR emphasised the 
subsidiary nature of this rule in its Advisory Opinion on the death penalty, while stressing that devoting 
minimal attention to the intention of the drafters of human rights treaties is compatible with the special 
nature of those treaties. More specifically, it stated that objective criteria of interpretation that examine 
the texts themselves are more appropriate in interpreting human rights treaties than subjective criteria 
that only ascertain the intent of the parties involved.311 Although there is an imperative rule, stated in 
Article 31(4), that ‘A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended’, this rule is unlikely to have much bearing on the interpretation of human rights treaties in the 
context of climate change given that the drafters of such treaties probably did not have an ascertainable 
and uniform intention, and quite possibly no intention at all, as to the meaning of treaty terms in 
relation to climate change. The rule is also unlikely to apply to the interpretation of the principles 
contained in the UNFCCC, given that the intention of the parties about the most crucial treaty terms 
was far from uniform.312  
The most relevant rules for the treaty provisions analysed in this thesis are thus the general rules 
of treaty interpretation contained in Article 31 of the VCLT, which reflect customary international 
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law.313 Article 31(3) expresses the general rule that an international treaty ‘shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in light of its object and purpose’.314 The term ‘context’ refers to the text of the treaty including, when 
applicable, its preamble, annexes and agreements between the parties that relate to the treaty's 
conclusion.315 The interpretative technique of ‘systematic interpretation’316 prevents the interpretation 
of treaty provisions in isolation. The thesis will demonstrate the importance of this technique when 
interpreting the UNFCCC provisions, which acquire a more specific meaning when interpreted in the 
light of Article 3 of the Convention. Another example is the significance of reading Article 1(2) of the 
ICCPR and ICESCR in conjunction with Article 47 of the ICCPR and Article 35 of the ICESCR 
respectively,317 as the latter provisions prohibit an interpretation of individual rights that conflict with 
the right of self-determination. Furthermore, there is the principle that account must be taken of ‘any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’ (Art. 31(3)(b)), as the interpretative practice of human rights bodies may 
itself constitute such practice.318 This rule thus appears to consolidate the authoritative weight of 
human rights jurisprudence and instruments such as General Comments and advisory opinions. 
The most significant feature of the general rule from the perspective of international human 
rights law is, however, that it calls for purposive interpretation. It is widely recognised that due to the 
special nature of human rights treaties the emphasis in their interpretation is, in Nowak’s words, 
‘Essentially [...] on interpreting treaties [...] in the light of their object and purpose’.319 And for human 
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rights treaties ‘naturally the main object is for states parties to protect the rights set out in the 
treaties’.320 The IACtHR has emphasised ‘the purpose of guaranteeing the enjoyment of individual 
human beings of those rights and freedoms rather than to establish reciprocal relations between 
States'.321 Furthermore, in its Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force 
of the ACHR, the Court emphasised:  
Modern human rights treaties in general... are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type 
concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the 
contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of basic rights of individual 
human beings, irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all 
other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various 
obligations.322  
Taking this object and purpose into account allows a ‘dynamic reading’ of human rights instruments, so 
that human rights law retains its relevance in a changing world.323 Often cited is the ECtHR’s 
characterisation of the ECHR as ‘a living instrument which [...] must be interpreted in the light of the 
present-day conditions’. The IACtHR has similarly relied on the notion of ‘evolving American law’,324 
and scholars continue to emphasise that rights protected in international human rights treaties ‘are not 
to be interpreted statically but rather in the light of relevant societal developments’,325 and that States’ 
obligations to protect those rights are affected by ‘changing social and moral assumptions’.326 
In this thesis, it is important to emphasise that the technique of purposive interpretation has led 
to a central role for the principle of effectiveness in human rights jurisprudence. In other words, the 
principle that provisions of human rights treaties should be interpreted and applied in a way that makes 
                                                
 
320 Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (n 302) 65. 
321 Other Treaties Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Article 64 ACHR) (Advisory Opinion) (1982) 1 Inter-
Am Ct HR (ser A), (1982) 3 HRLJ 140. 
322 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the ACHR (Articles 74 and 75). 
323 Although reliance on this technique of interpretation by human rights bodies has sometimes been criticised for 
overstepping their mandates, we can also argue, as Shelton does, that reliance on this technique is an inevitable consequence 
of the generic way in which human rights treaty texts are formulated. See Dinah L Shelton, An Introduction to the History of 
International Human Rights Law (GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 346, 2007) 24. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) XXIV. 
326 David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 53. 
 
 
 
 
73 
its safeguards practical and effective327 (referred to by the ECtHR as ‘effet utile’).328 In Soering v 
UK,329 the principle (first stated in Ireland v UK)330 that ‘In interpreting the Convention regard must be 
had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’331 led the Court to reason that although it agreed with the UK Government that the beneficial 
purpose of extradition in preventing offenders from evading justice cannot be ignored in determining 
the scope of application of the Convention;332 ‘These considerations cannot, however, absolve the 
Contracting Parties from responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of 
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction’.333  
As noted by commentators, the principle of effectiveness is ‘nothing very exotic in international 
law’334 and indeed exists as a cross-cutting principle: in general international law it is known as the 
principle ut res magus valet quam pereat, which means that law should be interpreted in a way that 
makes it effective.335 In international human rights law, however, the principle acquires a specific 
meaning. Its effect on treaty interpretation is generally that in cases of doubt as to the meaning of a 
treaty provision, its interpretation should favour the protection of the substantive rights protected in the 
treaty (in dubio pro libertate et dignitate).336 The principle is also closely related to the maxim Ubi jus 
ibi remedium: where there is a right, there is a remedy337—a maxim that appears in Roman and Dutch 
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law and that has long been recognised in common law systems.338 Illustrations of how this principle 
operates in international human rights law are particularly plentiful in cases involving individuals who 
suffered harm whilst in custody. In Dermit Barbato v Uruguay, for example, the HRC could not reach a 
definite conclusion as to how the victim had died: he could have committed suicide or he could have 
been killed by others. The HRC dealt with this uncertainty by finding that ‘in all the circumstances the 
Uruguayan authorities either by act or by omission were responsible for not taking adequate measures 
to protect his life, as required by Article 6(1) of the Covenant’.339 The significance of this decision is 
that it shows that human rights violations can be established when there is reason to assume that the 
State could have acted to prevent the violation, and that it triggers additional obligations on the part of 
the State to provide a remedy.340 In another case concerning death in custody, the ECtHR Velikova v 
Bulgaria,341 it is even clearer that uncertainty can work in favour of the individual. The applicant, who 
was arrested for alleged cattle theft, had complained that he was not feeling well shortly after his arrest. 
The ECtHR considered the absence of medical evidence about the applicant's condition prior to his 
death not as a weakness of the applicant's case, but as an indication of the State's failure to safeguard 
his health.342 The legal analysis of substantive obligations in Chapter 3 (focusing on the rights to life, to 
the highest attainable standard of health, to enjoy a distinct culture and to self-determination) is largely 
concerned with the question what States are required to do to prevent a violation. The significance of 
purposive construction of human rights treaties is dealt with in more detail below, in relation to the 
territorial and personal scope of human rights treaties. 
 
2.2.2 Territorial and Personal Scope of International Human Rights Treaties 
This section examines the territorial and personal scope of States’ obligations under international 
human rights treaties, taking the ICCPR and the ICESCR as a starting point. The previous section 
highlighted the methodological point that to interpret human rights provisions, the general rule of treaty 
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interpretation with due regard for the special nature of human rights treaties should be used. A first 
point to note is therefore that the personal scope of human rights treaties—with the exception of those 
that protect the rights of specific groups—appears to be unrestricted. Indeed, the texts of human rights 
treaties suggest that the beneficiaries of human rights obligations include, as per the UDHR, ‘all human 
beings’, save for certain rights of political participation that are confined to ‘citizens’ or rights that 
specifically protect ‘peoples’ or ‘minorities’. The presumption that States’ obligations under these 
treaties may be territorially confined comes from the inclusion of jurisdiction clauses in some, but not 
all, human rights treaties. The need to examine this question also results from the prevalence of the 
presumption that most or all human rights treaties have a ‘territorial scope’ in human rights scholarship 
and (albeit to a lesser extent) in international jurisprudence. 
 Turning to the ICESCR first, we note that this treaty does not include a jurisdictional clause.343 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides that States parties to the ICESCR shall ‘take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights’ protected in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.344 A textual reading of this provision leads to the conclusion that ‘the undertaking 
in Article 2(1) “to take steps” in itself, is not qualified or limited by other considerations’.345 This is 
also clear from Article 23 of the Covenant, which provides that: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the achievement 
of the rights recognised in the present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of 
conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the 
                                                
 
343 Opposite conclusions have been drawn from this omission. See, for example, Rolf Kunnemann, ‘Extraterritorial 
Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Fons Coomans and Menno T. 
Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004), 201, and Knox (n 60) 206 
(finding that the obligations are not confined by territorial considerations). See also, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 9 (finding that the 
absence of a jurisdiction clause was due to 'the fact that this Covenant guarantees rights which are essentially territorial'). Cf 
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (finding that State responsibility could arise for acts committed by one State on the 
territory of another because the obligation of States to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide was 'not territorially 
limited by the [Genocide] Convention' in light of the absence of a jurisdiction clause). 
344 ICESCR Art 2(1). 
345 General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2, para 1) (14 Dec. 1990) CESCR, para 2. 
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holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study 
organised in conjunction with the Governments concerned.346 
Further references to international cooperation in the ICESCR are contained in Articles 11,347 15348 and 
22.349 In accordance with these provisions, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) has consistently interpreted the Covenant as imposing international cooperation obligations 
on States.350 In General Comment No. 3 it states that ‘the phrase “to the maximum of its available 
resources” was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a 
State and those available from the international community international community through 
international cooperation and assistance’.351 It goes on to state that it: 
... wishes to emphasise that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions of the 
Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. It is particularly incumbent 
upon those States which are in a position to assist others in this regard.352  
General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
contains an interpretation of Article 12 of the Covenant as providing an entire range of ‘international 
obligations.353 The Committee also mentions a ‘collective responsibility’ on the part of the international 
                                                
 
346 ICESCR Art 23. 
347 Ibid Art 11 (providing an international cooperation obligation with regard to the rights to an adequate standard of living 
and the right to be free from hunger). 
348 Ibid Art 15 (providing that ‘State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields’). 
349 Ibid Art 22, mandating ECOSOC to ‘bring to the attention of other organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs 
and specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of [State reports] which may 
assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to 
contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant’. These monitoring functions are now carried 
out by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in accordance with ECOSOC Resolution 185/17. 
350 See infra for examples on the right to food, adequate housing, water and the highest attainable standard of health. Sigrun 
Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation (Intersentia 2006) 152. 
351 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 13. 
352 Ibid para 14. 
353 The listed obligations are: first, to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries; second, to prevent third 
parties from violating the right in other countries ‘if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political 
means’; third, ‘depending on the availability of resources’ to facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and 
services in other countries, wherever possible and to provide the necessary aid when required; fourth, to ensure that the right 
to health is given due attention in international agreements and that other international agreements do not adversely impact 
upon the right to health; fifth, to ensure that their actions as members of international organisations take due account of the 
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community to address the problem of transmittable diseases and the ‘special responsibility and interest’ 
of economically developed States to assist poorer developing States in this regard.354 In General 
Comment No. 12 the Committee sets out similar international obligations in relation to the right to 
food.355 In passing, we should note that the right of self-determination provided for in Article 1 which 
is common to the two Covenants imposes transnational obligations per se, as ‘peoples’ may comprise 
the entire population of a State—in which case its protection necessarily depends on the conduct of 
other States.356 The HRC highlighted in its General Comment No. 12, stating that States’ obligations 
under Article 1 exist ‘not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not 
been able to exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right of self-
determination’.357  
 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that States must respect and ensure the rights of individuals 
‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’.358 The HRC has insisted that this provision must be 
read in conjunction with Article 5(1) which states that ‘Nothing in the present Covenant may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant’.359 It also emphasises the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
right to health; and sixth, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency with 
contributions ‘to the maximum of [a State’s] capacity’. See General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (Article 12) adopted 11 August 2000, UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 CESCR paras 39–40. See also, Craven, 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: a Perspective on its Development (n 169) 253. 
354 General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) paras 40, 45. 
355 General Comment No. 12: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11) adopted 12 May 1999, UN Doc E/C12/1999/5 CESCR 
paras 36–37. 
356 Knox (n 60) 205. See also, Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2005) (pointing out that ‘Article 1(3) is unusual as it 
imposes duties on States with regard to persons outside their jurisdiction, indeed even if those people are within the 
jurisdiction of another State Party’). 
357 General Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art 1) (13 March 1984) HRC, para 6. 
358 For further discussion see Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (CUP 
2010) 123 (pointing out that the central question addressed in the literature is ‘whether the notion of “jurisdiction” (taken 
separately or in combination with that of “territory”) designates a condition for a finding of State responsibility which is 
distinct from that of attribution, or whether instead the two notion—“jurisdiction” and “attribution”—are in fact 
synonymous and thus interchangeable’). See also, Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of 
State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’ (n 60) 7, 26 (arguing, at 7, that ‘the word “jurisdiction” is meant to denote 
solely a sort of factual power that a state exercises over persons or territory’) and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Jurisdiction: Towards a 
Reasonableness Test’ in Malcolm Langford et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties The Extraterritorial Scope of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP 2012) 218 (suggesting that a reasonableness test could be 
applied to interpret the term ‘jurisdiction’). 
359 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (Communication No. R12/52) para 12.3. 
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need to take account of the object and purpose of the treaty and the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
when considering the scope and nature of States’ obligations,360 and accordingly found that the word 
‘and’ in Article 2(1) must be interpreted disjunctively. Its General Comment 31 it spells out that ‘States 
Parties are required by Article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all 
persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction’.361 This 
disjunctive reading of the word ‘and’ has been endorsed by the International Court of Justice in its Wall 
opinion362 and in the literature.363  
In its General Comment No. 31 the Committee interprets the word ‘jurisdiction’ as implying 
that ‘a State party must respect and ensure the right laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the 
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State 
Party’.364 The Committee has not provided a clear indication of what would amount to ‘power’ or 
‘effective control’.365 In the view of this author, the term ‘power’ is most relevant to the discussion in 
this thesis, as it indicates the importance of considering a State’s capacity to prevent a violation within 
the limits set by international law. The concept of ‘effective control’ may help to address the more 
specific question of whether a State has ‘effective control’ over a private actor outside its territory (and 
thus cases covered by the rule of attribution articulated in Article 8 of the ARS).366 In either case, the 
                                                
 
360 HRC, General Comment No. 31 paras 3 and 5. See also, Frey (n 60) 50. 
361 Ibid para 10. 
362 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, para 111. 
363 Theodor Meron, ‘Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties’ (1995) 89 Am.J.Int.Law 78, 79. 
364 HRC, General Comment No. 31 para 10. 
365 In General Comment 31 the HRC only states, at para 10, that the principle that the enjoyment of rights is not limited to 
citizens of States Parties ‘also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting 
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained’. The notion of 
‘effective control’ is derived from Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 where the ICJ referred to control over military or paramilitary operations in foreign 
territory (paras 105–115). The test was subsequently adopted by the ECtHR, which initially used it to refer to effective 
control over territory, rather than over private actors acting abroad whose conduct was directly attributable to the State 
based on specific circumstances (eg Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections and Merits) App no 15318/89 (ECtHR 22 
July 1989) para 52; Bankovic et al. v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States paras 54–81). This interpretation seems to 
have changed in recent cases (see n 63 and accompanying text). The ICJ’s decision in the Genocide case keeps with the 
original meaning of the concept and emphasised that the rule is embodied in Art 8 of the ILC. See Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro) paras 398–99. For a critical assessment of the ICJ's application of the test see Antonio Cassese, 
‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgement on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18 EurJ.Int'lL. 649, 
651.  
366 The question whether domestic conduct affecting individuals extraterritorially falls within Art 8 ARS has been discussed 
in the literature. Lawson and Den Heijer point out that there is overwhelming authority in European jurisprudence for a 
position that jurisdiction is not an issue in this type of case. See Den Heijer and Lawson (n 60) 203 (with citations). This 
practice appears to reflect an understanding that the obligations of States, both positive and negative, are not dependent on 
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principle that ‘facticity creates normativity’ could be relied upon to determine whether a State has 
violated its obligations under international human rights law.367 This principle is derived from the 
HRC’s practice of perusing a ‘contextual assessment of the state’s factual control in respect of facts and 
events that allegedly constitute a violation of a human right’.368 The best known example is the HRC’s 
decision in Lopez v Uruguay, where it found that a State should not be allowed ‘to perpetrate violations 
of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory’.369 The approach pursued by the Committee essentially considers whether a State has control 
over a situation or instrumentality that interferes with Covenant rights, rather than over individuals 
whose rights are affected. Accordingly, Scheinin has considered that jurisdiction merely ‘serves as a 
shorthand expression for the required factual link between a state and an individual (human rights 
accountability), or between a state's conduct and certain grievances (state responsibility)’.370 This 
approach helps give effect to the object and purpose of human rights treaties, as seen by the ECtHR’s 
finding that the objective character of human rights obligations gives rise to an obligation for States to 
secure these rights and freedoms ‘not only to its own nationals and those of the other [...] Parties but 
also to nationals of States not parties to the Convention and to stateless persons’, as human rights 
obligations are ‘designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from 
infringement by any of the [...] Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the [...] Parties 
themselves’.371 At the same time, it fully recognises that the scope of States’ human rights obligations 
is affected by the limits of their sovereign power.372 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
the geographical location or nationality of beneficiaries. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that attribution is established by 
considering the obligation rather than focusing on a State's control over a private actor. The situation is different in cases of 
private actors acting extraterritorially, because this may fall outside the scope of the obligation. In other words, there is a 
genuine question of attribution in such cases, which could possibly be resolved through the ‘effective control’ test that was 
used in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America). 
367 Martin Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Fons Coomans 
and Menno T. Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004) 76. See also, Den 
Heijer and Lawson (n 60). 
368 Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 367) 76 (emphasis in the 
original). 
369 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay para 12.3.  
370 Martin Scheinin, ‘Just Another Word? Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps of State Responsibility and Human Rights’ in 
Malcolm Langford et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in International Law (CUP 2012). 
371 Austria v Italy 116 et seq. 
372 See also, Dinah Shelton, ‘Remedies and Reparation’ in Malcolm Langford et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The 
Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP2013) 413 (observing that the 
terms ‘jurisdiction and control’ contained in some human rights treaties ‘[reflect] the fact that in most instances States do 
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 In the following chapters, the thesis will build on the premise that the existence of a human 
rights violation allegedly caused by a States’ acts and omissions and that affects people outside the 
State’s territory must be assessed through a contextual analysis.373 This premise is not only compatible 
with the practice of the HRC, but also with the CESCR’s approach of assessing compliance with 
States’ obligations by considering whether all appropriate means have been used to prevent a 
violation.374 In accordance with this premise, normative consequences can be drawn from the factual 
reality that the consequences of climate change affect human beings everywhere,375 while climate 
change mitigation is achieved primarily through national regulation and policies in countries other than 
the countries that are mostly affected by climate change, as well as through international decision-
making, cooperation and perhaps the enforcement of existing legal obligations that require climate 
change mitigation. Conceptually, this approach builds on the understanding that the cumulative norms 
derived from the various sources of human rights law create a web of legal relationships that involves 
all peoples and all nations.376 In this web of relationships the role of sovereign States is to ensure the 
protection of the human rights of those who are actually or potentially affected by the ways in which it 
exercises its sovereign power. It is worth noting that applying this approach in the context of climate 
change does not mean that State responsibility occurs ‘whenever a chain of causation exists between a 
State’s actions and extraterritorial harm’.377 This will become clear in Section 3.2, which discusses the 
attribution of conduct to States, and Section 3.3, which discusses the content of States’ obligations. 
 Finally, it is worth highlighting the CESCR’s position that the requirement of international 
cooperation to realise human rights derived from the UN Charter is relevant to the interpretation of the 
CESCR. This reflects the doctrinal position that norms derived from sources other than a specific treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
not and cannot legally assert power over the exercise of civil and political rights in another State’s territory’). See further 
Austria v Italy 116 et seq. 
373 Cf Wouter Vandenhole, ‘Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?’ (2009) 23 Int'l J 
Child Rts, 23, 23 (implying that no contextual analysis would be needed where a State allegedly breaches obligations to 
‘fulfil’ economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, as the existence of such obligations may be excluded a priori). 
374 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 3. 
375 This point is noted in virtually every academic article on human rights and climate change, but usually sets the stage for 
a discussion on ‘extraterritorial’ obligations. See, for example, Bodansky, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking 
the Issues’ (n 14) 521. 
376 Cf Knox (n 60) 165 (suggesting that ‘human rights may have ethical or moral import without having correlative duties 
under international human rights law’). See however also Bodansky, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the 
Issues’ (n 14) (citing Knox, and concluding that ‘Thus, in considering the connections of human rights and climate change, 
we need to focus as much, if not more, on the nature of the duties involved as the nature of rights’). 
377 Knox, ‘Diagonal Environmental Rights’ in Mark Gibney and Sigrid Skogly (eds), (University of Pennsylvania Press 
2010) 202, fn 187. 
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potentially affect the interpretation of that treaty as ‘relevant rules of international law applicable 
between the Parties’. This interpretative technique of ‘systemic integration’ is discussed further in the 
next section, which will also explain the significance of the no-harm rule and the UNFCCC for States’ 
obligations under international human rights law. 
 
2.2.3 Relationship between International Human Rights Law and the UNFCCC378 
There is another preliminary question to address, namely how the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, as 
forms of lex specialis of international law, relate to States' international human rights obligations. The 
relationship is not easy to assess in relation to the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali (that 
is, special law prevails over general law),379 or the understanding that lex specialis may be used ‘to 
apply, clarify, update or modify as well as set aside’ general law.380 International human rights law 
itself is considered to be a special regime, with norms that ‘express a unified object and purpose’ which 
must be reflected in the interpretation of its norms.381 The doctrinal question at stake here is the role of 
human rights law in the international legal system where lex specialis is already in place and appears to 
create parallel obligations and fora for discussion and cooperation. The precise relationship between 
these regimes involves far-reaching questions about the nature of the international legal order.382 These 
questions can only be answered here by establishing how norms across different regimes, but related to 
one issue, namely the adverse effects of climate change on human beings, are best construed in 
accordance with applicable rules of interpretation. 
The natural starting point for examining this question is the general rule for treaty interpretation 
where in determining the meaning of treaty provisions, account may be taken of ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.383 Clearly, this rule allows us to take 
                                                
 
378 See also Margaretha Wewerinke, ‘The Role of the UN Human Rights Council in Addressing Climate Change’ (2014) 8 
HR&ILD 10, on which this paragraph draws. 
379 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN/4/L.702, 13 July 2006 paras 5, 14. 
380 Ibid para 8. 
381 Ibid paras 12, 13. 
382 For a discussion, see Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in 
International Law’ (2006) 17 Eur.J.Int'lL. 483. 
383 See also, Lindroos and Mehling (n 201) 268 (noting that Art 31(3)(c) is a ‘widely endorsed provision’ which has 
nonetheless received relatively little scholarly attention. 
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human rights norms in the interpretation of the UNFCCC, and vice versa into account.384 This rule was 
indeed considered to be the single most important interpretative device for dealing with relationships 
between different branches of international law in the ILC study ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, 
by Special Rapporteur Martti Koskenniemi in response to the perceived problem that ‘specialized law-
making and institution-building tends to take place with relative ignorance of legislative and 
institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the general principles and practices of international 
law’.385 The study provides a valuable outline of the key principles that allow for interpretative 
relationships and synergies between branches of international law. It has offered doctrinal support for 
the study’s important conclusion that international law must, in principle, be considered as a 
harmonious system.386 Yet it has also been criticised for its formalistic approach to addressing 
relationships between norms and rule-systems almost exclusively in terms of potential conflicts,387 and 
for its over-reliance on the VCLT. Indeed it did not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of ‘the 
loss of an overall perspective on the law’.388 The underlying difficulty is perhaps that it did not 
recognise differences in normativity, except for stating, based on the jus cogens provisions in the 
VCLT, that ‘the lex specialis maxim cannot be used to set aside types of international law that are non-
derogable, such as (but not only) peremptory norms which are expressly recognised as such’.389 The 
ILC considered ‘human rights law’ as a ‘special regime’, whose importance lies in ‘the way its norms 
express a unified object and purpose’ which must be reflected in the interpretation of its norms.390 This 
confirms that, as lex specialis, human rights law may technically limit States’ discretion in the 
                                                
 
384 The view in legal scholarship is that Art 31(1)(c) embodies a customary rule that requires consideration of ‘the wider 
normative environment’ and goes beyond ‘merely affirming the overall applicability of general international law’. See 
Lindroos and Mehling (n 201) 268. 
385 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN/4/L.702, 13 July 2006 11. 
386 Ibid para 4 (‘It is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent 
possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations’). See also, para 9 (proposing 
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387 Sahib Singh, ‘The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’ (2011) 24 Leiden J Int'l L 23 (arguing that 
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interpretation of norms that are contained in the climate change regime or otherwise aid in the 
interpretation of the provisions of the UNFCCC, especially where these provisions are vague.391  
However, the limits to an excessively technical approach to dealing with various regimes 
become evident when considering that the ‘principle of harmonisation’ recognised by the ILC falls 
short of a rule that prescribes systemic integration.392 It has already been noted with regard to Article 
31(3)(c) that it is unclear when or how the provision should be applied.393 I argue that the ambiguity is 
best resolved in accordance with the ILC’s broader observation that ‘whatever their subject matter, 
treaties are a creation of the international legal system and their operation is predicated upon that 
fact’.394 This understanding can explain the relevance of international human rights law as embodying 
norms that constitute intransgressible principles of customary law,395 not all of which are recognised as 
peremptory norms.396 This understanding of the international legal system finds doctrinal support in the 
law of treaties itself: in its Preamble the VCLT emphasises (mirroring Art. 1 of the UN Charter) the 
rule of customary international law that international treaties must be interpreted and disputes settled 
‘in conformity with principles of justice’, including specifically ‘human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’.397 It thus stands to reason that the general rules of treaty interpretation require that 
effect be given to the different branches of international law, not just in a coherent way, but also in 
accordance with ‘principles of justice’ that include human rights. Accordingly, human rights norms can 
also be applied as ‘horizontal’ norms that influence the interpretation of other treaties.398 Article 103 of 
the UN Charter helps consolidate the doctrinal basis for this understanding, as it clarifies that the 
                                                
 
391 McInerney-Lankford (n 14) 234. 
392 See also, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161 
(Separate Opinion of Judge Simma) para 9 (noting that when general principles of international law with a jus cogens 
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human rights obligations derived from the Charter prevail over obligations under any other 
international agreement in the event of a conflict between those obligations. 
One perspective that pushes ‘systemic integration’ of human rights norms to its limits is what 
Mario Prost calls an ‘axio-logical perspective’ on international law, which emphasises the role of 
values in upholding the principle of harmonisation through contextual interpretation. As Prost puts it, 
‘Value-driven unity rests on the idea of a common denominator of fundamental values that transcend 
individual rules and provide the legal order with a general sense of direction’.399 From this perspective, 
fragmentation is not understood as a conflict of norms: ‘It occurs where a regime, a government, or a 
tribunal undermines the axio-logical core of international law, whether this core is already well 
established or simply in the making’.400 Human rights obligations may accordingly be seen as creating 
thresholds of minimum acceptability, or as ‘levels of protection for individual rights which can be 
regarded as the minimum acceptable outcome under given scenarios’.401 In interpreting the rules and 
principles of the UNFCCC the protection of the Earth’s climate as a prerequisite to human life and 
well-being could become a central consideration.402 Conversely, specific value-based norms such as 
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities could strengthen the 
objective of substantive equality that is inherent in human rights law.403 However, this approach is open 
to criticism if the interpreter fails to demonstrate how ‘values’ or ‘axioms’ are embodied in substantive 
norms, or how the existing secondary rules of international law support or require their application.  
The answer proposed here is that substantive norms themselves offer relatively clear guidance 
on the relationship between human rights law and the UNFCCC, as long as the object and purpose of 
the respective substantive norms is taken into consideration. In this context, it is significant that the 
practice of international human rights bodies increasingly builds on the conceptual understanding of 
international law as one legal system, while at the same time emphasising the special nature of human 
rights law,404 and that provisions of international instruments other than human rights instruments may 
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402 See also, John Dernbach, Acting as if Tomorrow Matters: Accelerating the Transition to Sustainability (Environmental 
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be invoked based on the understanding that these provisions enlighten their understanding of the human 
rights in the instruments that they are expressly mandated to apply.405 Furthermore, the principle of 
systemic integration may be considered as intrinsically linked with the principle of effectiveness, both 
in the context of human rights law (for considering when resort may or must be had to climate change 
law) and in the context of international law as a legal system which embodies universally applicable 
human rights norms.406  
 For example, some scholars suggest that the no-harm rule should be relied on to clarify States’ 
obligations under international human rights law vis-à-vis persons outside their own territories. 
Ryngaert argues that States may ‘have a duty to protect human rights outside their territory [...] if their 
rights are violated as a result of an act initiated in those States’ territory, in line with the Trial Smelter 
principle.407 Along similar lines, de Schutter suggests that the no-harm rule and prevention obligations 
under international human rights law could be mutually reinforcing.408 Others have explained that the 
obligation to prevent human rights violations from occurring elsewhere is ‘the logical consequence of 
the duty under general international law not to harm foreign nationals and to make reparations for 
breaches’.409 This view seems reasonable at the outset, as it seems illogical to interpret human rights 
obligations as allowing conduct that interferes with human rights if this conduct is unlawful under the 
no-harm rule. In accordance with this rationale, the no-harm rule could reinforce the argument that 
human rights obligations arise from a State’s capacity to regulate anthropogenic greenhouse gases; a 
pollutant that causes transboundary harm and thereby affects the enjoyment of human rights. However, 
in the light of the lex specialis derogate legi generali doctrine it would seem to be more appropriate to 
rely on the lex specialis of the UNFCCC to highlight the content of States’ obligations to prevent 
transboundary harm resulting from activities that cause climate change, or alternatively to consider the 
more specific obligations derived from the UNFCCC and its ultimate objective in conjunction with the 
no-harm rule as a co-existing norm of customary international law. This thesis argues that the 
provisions of the UNFCCC embody the no-harm rule, but give it a more specific meaning through the 
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ultimate objective of the Convention and the agreed understanding that this objective must be achieved 
in accordance with the principles of equity and CBDRRC. 
 The precautionary principle is another example of a norm contained in the UNFCCC that may 
be relevant to human rights protection. If it is accepted that this principle has a bearing on States’ 
obligations under international human rights law related to climate change, it could help interpret 
international human rights law as requiring States to take preventive action to reduce the risk that the 
adverse effects of climate change have on the enjoyment of internationally protected human rights. In 
the light of the high degree of scientific certainty concerning the causes and consequences of climate 
change, the precautionary principle creates a fairly high threshold that States must overcome to justify 
their actions when their compliance with international human rights obligations is assessed. The 
principle could accordingly ease the evidential burden on claimants in international human rights 
litigation, which is significant given the various evidential obstacles that may arise in claims of climate 
change-related State responsibility. However, the ‘threshold’ of risk that triggers the precautionary 
principle is to a great extent norm-specific and related to the seriousness of the consequences.410 In the 
context of human rights, the principle must therefore be read in conjunction with specific human rights 
norms. The principle is examined in Section 3.3, which discusses rights-specific obligations. 
 It is also worth highlighting the significance of Article 3(4) of the UNFCCC, which provides 
for a right to sustainable development,411 for the substance of States’ obligations under the UNFCCC as 
well as under international human rights law. The right to sustainable development can be understood 
as a modification of the right to development, which has arguably become a norm of customary 
international law through its repeated reiteration by the overwhelming majority of States in the 
international community. The right evolved from a number of UN General Assembly resolutions, in 
particular, the Declaration on the Right to Development that was adopted by an overwhelming majority 
of States in 1986,412 which were based on the ideas of equity, common interest, interdependence and 
international solidarity as the foundation for a nation’s right to development. The UN and other 
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international fora subsequently adopted a number of declarations linking development to human 
rights.413 Further legal basis for the right to development is being provided by widely ratified human 
rights treaties containing a range of substantive rights that are the basis of development of the 
individual. Some human rights instruments, such as the CEDAW and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, even include express provisions on the right to development.414  
 In the context of climate change, the right to development has sometimes been understood as 
allowing developing countries to maintain or increase current emission levels.415 However, this 
interpretation seems rather simplistic and possibly incorrect, as the right acquires a specific meaning in 
the context of the UNFCCC due to its codification as a right to sustainable development in Article 3(4) 
of this treaty. We should bear in mind that the term ‘sustainable development’ is a distinct legal 
concept which is commonly understood in accordance with the definition in the Brundtland Report as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.416 It should also be noted that the text of Article 3(4) suggests—
in line with the CBDRRC principle—that both developed and developing States are required to take 
policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change, which should be 
‘appropriate for the specific conditions of each party and [...] integrated into the national development 
programmes’.417 The phrase ‘taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting 
measures to address climate change’ makes it particularly clear that economic and social development 
and protection of the Earth’s climate system should be considered as mutually reinforcing objectives 
within the framework of the Convention.418 In the light of recent evidence which suggests that the 
realisation of sustainable development in all developing countries requires scaled-up international 
cooperation to ensure access to electricity, clean cooking conditions and other forms of energy to meet 
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3 Sept. 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW), Art 3. 
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basic human and development needs (which correlate with the enjoyment of a range of human 
rights),419 the greatest added-value of the right to sustainable development from the perspective of 
international human rights law is that it requires States to cooperate with each other to enhance 
development for all nations, whilst simultaneously addressing the risks posed by climate change.420 
 To recapitulate: the general rules of interpretation allow for the ‘systemic integration’ of norms 
when interpreting provisions of international human rights law, but preclude interpretations of other 
laws that are inconsistent with the object and purpose of protecting the rights of peoples and 
individuals.421 Indeed, the principle of harmonisation works towards the consideration of human rights 
norms when other norms are interpreted and applied. At the same time, the principle of effectiveness 
works in favour of taking account of relevant obligations of States derived from the principles and 
commitments contained in the UNFCCC which could potentially strengthen the existing provisions of 
international human rights law when applied in the context of climate change. The precautionary 
principle, CBDRRC and the right to sustainable development are examples of provisions that are prima 
facie amenable to interpretation in conjunction with international human rights norms in a way that 
enhances the effectiveness of each regime. The thesis considers the normative synergies between 
international human rights law and the UNFCCC in order to determine when a State is responsible for a 
breach of international human rights law based on action or inaction connected with climate change. To 
set the stage for this analysis, the next section addresses some preliminary issues related to State 
responsibility.  
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2.3 Questions of State Responsibility 
2.3.1 Relevance of the General Law of State Responsibility 
Today the law of State responsibility is stated authoritatively in the ‘Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ produced by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’). This 
body was set up by the UN General Assembly in 1947 and its mandate is ‘the promotion of the 
progressive development of international law and its codification’.422 The topic of State responsibility 
had been on the ILC agenda for almost half a century423 when the ILC adopted the final draft of the 
ILC ARS in 2001. This draft was completed under the ILC’s Special Rapporteur Crawford, and ‘taken 
note of’ by the General Assembly later that year.424 The importance of these rules can be captured from 
the ILC’s Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility Roberto Ago’s remark that ‘if one attempts [...] to 
deny the idea of State responsibility [...] one is forced to deny the existence of an international legal 
order’.425  
 The law of State responsibility is based on the principle of independent responsibility of States. 
This principle basically means that each State is responsible for its own conduct. The principle follows 
from the constituent elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State listed in Article 2 of the 
ARS, which states that a State has committed an internationally wrongful act when an action or 
omission:  
                                                
 
422 GA Res 174 (II), 21 Nov 1947 and Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by the UNGA in Res 174(II) 
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(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and  
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.426 
 
It is important to note that this straightforward principle constitutes a clear rejection of a private law-
oriented model of responsibility based on not two, but three elements: acts, injury and a causal link that 
connects them.427 Shelton suggests that the two elements of an internationally wrongful act encompass 
a range of complex questions that are specific to the international legal system, including ‘the nature 
and range of attributable acts giving rise to responsibility, the standard of care owed, and the nature and 
scope of reparations’.428 This section will clarify that in the context of climate change, these questions 
must be answered by reference to the general rules of attribution (see Section 3.1), the substantive 
norms derived from international human rights law and the UNFCCC (discussed above, and in Sections 
3.3 and 3.4) and the rules governing the content of State responsibility read in conjunction with the 
specific rules that specify the consequences of human rights violations (discussed in the following 
section). 
 In relation to the applicability of the general law of State responsibility, an important point to 
consider is that the ARS are based on a ‘presumption against the creation of wholly self-contained 
regimes in the field of reparation’,429 thus reflecting what Simma and Pulkowski have called ‘a 
universalistic concept of international law’.430 This marks a significant departure from the law of State 
responsibility as originally discussed by the ILC and the League of Nations’ Committee of Experts, 
which was concerned with a specific issue, namely responsibility of States for injuries to aliens.431 The 
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conceptual breakthrough that underpins the law of State responsibility as it is understood today came 
with the second ILC Special Rapporteur on State responsibility, Roberto Ago, who started dealing with 
State responsibility as a generic concept confined to ‘secondary rules’ related to the breach of any 
international obligation, that is, a breach of a ‘primary rule’.432 Ago’s rationale is captured in his 
statement (now cited in the Commentaries to the ARS) that ‘It is one thing to define a rule and the 
content of the obligation it imposes, and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated 
and what should be the consequences of the violation’. This newly introduced generality enabled by the 
distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ obligations, allowed the law of State responsibility to 
evolve into a field of law that ‘covers the field of the responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful conduct’.433 
 Today the law of State responsibility is still largely, if not entirely, premised on the distinction 
between primary and secondary rules.434 The ARS are understood to contain ‘secondary’ rules which 
determine the legal consequences of a breach of a primary (substantive) rule.435 The distinction 
between primary and secondary rules translates into two types of obligations: as Crawford puts it, ‘a 
breach of a primary obligation gives rise, immediately by the operation of the law of State 
responsibility, to a secondary obligation or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation...)’.436 It is 
thus clear that although the concept of State responsibility has ‘a particular substantive content of its 
own’,437 and is as such a ‘legal category’,438 it is only an intermediary category in the analytical sense. 
Indeed, an internationally wrongful act is still understood in accordance with the principles of State 
responsibility reflected in Phosphates in Morocco, namely as a ‘violation of international law’ and a 
‘definitive act which would, by itself, directly involve international responsibility’.439 Although the law 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
See also, Patrick Daillier, ‘The Development of the Law of Responsibility Through The Case Law’ in James Crawford, 
Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP) 39. 
432 The first ILC Special Rapporteur on State responsibility, FV García-Amador, submitted six reports to the ILC which 
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of State responsibility contains rules of invocation, it remains the case that when the act is ‘attributable 
to the State and [...] contrary to the treaty right of another State, international responsibility would be 
established as immediately as between the two States’.440 This follows from the basic principle that 
‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State’.441  
 Despite their generality, the ILC Articles open the door to the exclusion of the general rules of 
State responsibility in Article 55, entitled lex specialis. This article stipulates that the articles do not 
apply ‘where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or 
the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules 
of international law’.442 The Commentaries specify that Article 55 is intended to cover ‘strong’ forms 
of lex specialis, including what are often referred to as self-contained regimes, as well as ‘weaker’ 
forms such as specific treaty provisions on a single point.443 According to its drafter, this provision was 
created to mitigate the difficulties arising from the creation of ‘general legal categories in relation to 
particular regimes’, mentioning trade law as the clearest example of a particular regime with its own 
‘internal economy’.444 Simma and Pulkowski argue that Article 55 accordingly accommodates for the 
notion of self-contained regimes; that is, regimes which exist in normative isolation.445 The effect of 
Article 55 is that the law of State responsibility is presumed to be subordinate to such regimes. 
However, Article 55 also reflects and accommodates a much more nuanced view of how general and 
specific secondary norms interact with each other.446 This is perhaps best understood in the light of 
Crawford’s observation that the ARS allow for special regimes and ‘at the same time [influence] those 
                                                
 
440 Ibid (emphasis added). 
441 ILC ARS Art 1. 
442 For a discussion see Bruno Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ (1985) 16 NED YIL 111 at 115. 
443 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 55 para 5. The notion of self-contained regime stems from the ICJ’s ruling in United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgement) 40, para 86, where the Court held that ‘The rules of diplomatic 
law... constitute a self-contained regime which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the 
facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by 
members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such abuse’. 
444 Crawford (n 18) 305. 
445 Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and 
Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 139. 
446 Lindroos and Mehling (n 201) 253 (arguing that the notion of self-contained regimes reflects an ‘overly simplistic 
appreciation of how [...] regimes interact with each other and with the larger body of international law’). See also, Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsilbility’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of 
International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 47 (stating that ‘The fact that human rights protection has been confined under 
specific treaty regimes does not mean that State responsibility is inapplicable to human rights treaties’). 
 
 
 
 
93 
regimes’.447 The influence of international human rights law on the ARS is made explicit in its 
Commentaries, which make extensive reference to the jurisprudence of international human rights 
bodies.  
 The influence of international human rights law on the general law of State responsibility is 
particularly apparent from the rules expressed in Articles 33 and 42(b) of the ARS. According to these 
the beneficiaries of human rights obligations are the ultimate beneficiaries of rights accrued as a result 
of State responsibility incurred by a rights-violating State. Indeed, the Commentaries to Article 33(1) 
specifically point out that ‘a State’s responsibility for the breach of an obligation under a treaty 
concerning the protection of human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the treaty, but the 
individuals concerned should be regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries and in that sense as the holders 
of the relevant rights’.448 Conversely, the relevance of the general rules of State responsibility to human 
rights obligations has been expressly and widely recognised by international human rights bodies;449 
examples of cases where human rights bodies relied on these rules for the interpretation of human 
rights treaties are increasingly numerous.450 The idea that human rights treaties with inter-State 
procedures constitute self-contained regimes must also be rejected: McGoldrick points out that the 
ICCPR must be understood as providing ‘a modern text, and the HRC a modern institutional forum, in 
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which the principles of State responsibility are applied in an empirical fashion’.451 He emphasises that 
State practice, UN practice and the history of the regime indicate that the ICCPR ‘was not intended to 
be a self-contained regime’.452 And Vierdag notes that ‘Almost all the provisions in [the ICCPR and the 
ECHR] contain elements that have corresponding rules in the law of State responsibility’.453 
 It seems justified to conclude that international human rights law can be interpreted in 
accordance with the general law of State responsibility, while at the same time (as recognised in Art. 
55) adding its own substantive and procedural caveats. The single most important caveat is that under 
international human rights law, a victim’s right to a remedy is a substantive right, which is protected 
under customary international law,454 and expressed in human rights treaties in various forms. Most 
treaties guarantee the right of access to procedures through which claims of human rights violations are 
heard and a substantive right to redress.455 The ICCPR in particular contains comprehensive provisions 
on remedies in three separate articles. The broadest of these is Article 2(3) which spells out the 
obligations of State parties to the Covenant to ensure that any person whose rights are violated shall 
have an ‘accessible, effective and enforceable’ remedy.456 The right to a remedy exists not only ex post 
facto but also when there is a threat of a violation,457 and is intertwined with the principle of 
effectiveness. An example of this is the ACHPR’s understanding that ‘The rights and freedoms of 
individuals enshrined in the [African] Charter can only be fully realized if governments provide 
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456 For a discussion of the evolution of the Human Rights Committee's position on the right to a remedy see generally 
Martin Scheinin, ‘The Human Rights Committee's Pronouncements on the Right to an Effective Remedy: An Illustration of 
the Legal Nature of the Committee's Work under the Optional Protocol’ in Nisuke Ando (ed), Towards Implementing 
Universal Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) (esp. 101–103). See also, Shelton, Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law (n 90) 50. 
457 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 90) 104ff. 
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structures which enable them to seek redress if they are violated’.458 It is a fundamental premise of this 
thesis that the law of State responsibility provides a structure through which redress for human rights 
violations could be obtained by States on behalf of the victims of the violation. This follows from the 
principle of effectiveness; a principle that must be relied upon to give effect to the right of a remedy in 
the light of threats that adverse effects of climate change pose to the enjoyment of human rights. 
Chapter 4 explains this premise and its implications in the context of climate change, based on the 
analysis of attribution and breach examined in Chapter 3. 
 The conclusion that the law of State responsibility is amenable to application in conjunction 
with international human rights law can also be made with regard to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. Drawing this conclusion is particularly straightforward in case of the UNFCCC, because it 
does not contain ‘special rules’ regarding conditions for the existence of a wrongful act nor does it refer 
to the consequences of breaches of obligations under the treaty.459 Moreover, its one article that spells 
out options for enforcing treaty provisions is fully compatible with the assumption that the full body of 
‘secondary rules’ contained in the general law of State responsibility is applicable to the treaty 
regime.460 During their respective ratifications of the UNFCCC, several States including Nauru, 
Tuvalu, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, added the reservation that the provisions of the this treaty ‘shall in 
no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international law concerning State responsibility 
                                                
 
458 Jawara v The Gambia Communications 147/95, 149/96 74. 
459 The framework for addressing loss and damage concluded at COP 19 at Warsaw, Poland, was established under the 
adaptation provisions of the UNFCCC, and did not use terms related to breaches of obligations. This means, in my view, 
that it cannot be plausibly argued that this framework constitutes lex specialis which excludes the applicability of the 
general law of State responsibility. See Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts (22 Nov 2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/L.15. For a discussion on the (then proposed) loss and damage 
mechanism under the UNFCCC see Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss’ in 
Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a 
Changing Climate (CUP 2012). See also, Verheyen, Tackling Loss & Damage: A New Role for the Climate Regime? (2012) 
and Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (n 17). 
460 Art 14(1) of the UNFCCC provides that parties can jointly seek settlement of their dispute ‘through negotiation or any 
other peaceful means of their own choice’; Art 14(2) entitles parties to unilaterally refer a dispute involving the UNFCCC to 
the ICJ or to a binding arbitration, subject to each of the parties having made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
relevant forum over such disputes; and Art 14(6) provides that where resort to the procedures provided for under paras 1–2 
has failed, any party to the dispute can submit the dispute to a conciliation commission that would be created upon the 
request of that party. No State has so far made a declaration under Art 14. Andrew Strauss rightly observes that the lack of 
such a declaration would not affect the jurisdiction of the ICJ under Arts 36(1) and (2) of the Statute of the ICJ as there is no 
need for States to consent to the jurisdiction of the Court more than once. See Strauss (n 79) 343. 
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for the adverse effects of climate change’.461 This can thus be seen as a formal confirmation of an 
existing legal situation. 
 A slightly more complex situation exists under the Kyoto Protocol as a result of the Compliance 
Committee established under the treaty. As noted, this body may instigate sanctions on State parties 
that fail to comply with their treaty obligations, usually consisting of restrictions on parties’ eligibility 
to participate in carbon trading mechanisms.462 This function could be interpreted as creating lex 
specialis pertaining to the legal consequences of violations of the Kyoto Protocol that could, as per 
Article 15 of the ARS, exclude the applicability of (relevant parts of) the general law of State 
responsibility. I argue here that this interpretation is not correct. This thesis maintains that the correct 
approach is to consider the situation as analogous to that of human rights treaties with enforcement 
mechanisms. First, as a result of the principle of effectiveness we can assume that these treaty bodies 
are established to enhance the effectiveness of the treaty regime, and not to weaken it by annulling 
rights and legal consequences that would normally arise from a breach in accordance with the law of 
State responsibility. Second, the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC are expressly concerned with a 
‘common concern of mankind’ and thus, like international human rights treaties, protect the legitimate 
interests of the international community as a whole rather than merely the interests of State parties.463 
For the Kyoto Protocol, this means that it can be safely assumed that neither the existence of the 
Compliance Committee nor its actual practice replaces the rights of State parties to invoke the 
responsibility of other State parties that violate its substantive provisions in accordance with the general 
law of State responsibility to seek an end to the wrongful conduct and reparations for its effects. This 
conclusion makes it clear that breaches of the Kyoto Protocol may be taken into account as part of State 
conduct that is wrongful in the aggregate under international human rights law (see Section 3.1). 
Chapter 4 examines the implications of this point for the legal consequences of such wrongful conduct. 
                                                
 
461 Declarations made by Nauru, Tuvalu, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. See Status of Ratification of the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol, available at http://www.unfccc.int (accessed 16 May 2014). 
462 For a detailed discussion see René Lefeber, ‘Holding Countries to Account: the Kyoto Protocol's Compliance System 
Revisted After Four Years of Experience’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 133, 134. 
463 As argued by Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (n 
17) 266 and Fitzmaurice (n 92) 1020. Cf Tomuschat (n 17) 14.  
 
 
 
 
97 
 2.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter started with a review of the various sources of human rights obligations and proceeded to 
consider their inter-relationships. What is particularly important here is the position of the ILC that 
international law must, in principle, be considered as a harmonious system. This position is based on 
the general rule of treaty interpretation that, in order to determine the meaning of treaty provisions, any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties can be taken into 
account. From the perspective of international human rights law, it is significant that the practice of 
international human rights bodies increasingly builds on the understanding of international law as one 
legal system, despite the emphasis placed on the special nature of human rights law.464 Indeed, human 
rights bodies have made it clear that they may use any instruments that improve their understanding of 
human rights in the instruments that they are expressly mandated to apply.465 However, a nuanced 
approach to systemic integration is needed: both the rule contained in Article 31(3)(c) and the ILC’s 
‘principle of harmonisation’ fall short of a rule that prescribes systemic integration. Moreover, 
international law does not necessarily assume the compatibility of its different branches or the norms 
contained therein; instead, it requires consideration of the wider normative environment when a 
particular norm is applied. For the purpose of this thesis, it is appropriate to conclude that the 
relationship between human rights, the UNFCCC and the law of State responsibility cannot be 
understood a priori or mechanically. Instead, it must be explained through an analysis of the 
substantive norms contained in the two legal regimes and in the light of their objects and purposes.  
A brief examination of specific norms has provided examples of the implications of this 
approach. It is now clear that the no-harm rule is significant from an international human rights law 
perspective. This is because its incorporation into general international law means that the risk that 
climate change will interfere with the enjoyment of human rights in a third country (by definition a risk 
of ‘significant’ and even ‘serious’ harm) triggers positive obligations for States that use or permit the 
use of their territory for activities that cause climate change. The lex specialis of the UNFCCC gives a 
more specific meaning to the no-harm rule by categorising States into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
                                                
 
464 See, for example, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the ACHR (Articles 74 and 75); Austria v Italy 
138–40; and Ireland v United Kingdom.  
465 Marino López et al. v Colombia Case 499–04, Report No. 86/06, Inter-Am CHR, OEA/SerL/V/II127 Doc 4 Rev 1 
(2007), para 42. 
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countries with differentiated obligations. This must be understood in terms of the provisions contained 
in Article 4. These oblige all State parties to cooperate in areas relevant to climate change—including 
the development, application and spread of technologies; adaptation; research, and the exchange of 
information—while imposing specific obligations on developed countries in these areas to help prevent 
dangerous climate change without perpetuating existing inequalities. Accordingly, the no-harm rule is 
most appropriately seen as a more general expression of the principles and commitments contained in 
the UNFCCC. The analysis of the principles and commitments contained in the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol underlines the importance of this legal framework for international human rights 
protection.  
 The potential importance of the law of State responsibility for legal responses to climate 
change-related infringements with human rights follows from its generality and its potential to 
accommodate various forms of lex specialis. Exploring the inter-relationships between legal 
frameworks leads to the conclusion that the law of State responsibility is applicable to the legal 
framework of the UNFCCC, despite the fact that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both create a 
platform for continuous negotiations. It is important that this law applies to the obligations that emanate 
from the broad principles and commitments of the UNFCCC—both of which are incorporated into the 
operational part of the treaty—as well as to the specific obligation of developed country parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol to meet quantified emission reduction targets. Indeed, the specificity of the provisions 
that give rise to the obligations is immaterial as long as it can be established that the State acted 
contrary to its obligations. This is based on the general principle that the responsibility of a State is 
automatically activated when an operational treaty provision is breached by that State. Similarly, the 
law of State responsibility applies automatically when a State breaches its legal obligations under 
international human rights law. In both cases, the law of State responsibility specifies obligations of 
cessation and reparations that will become binding on the responsible State—obligations that would 
complement their existing primary obligations.  
One practical difference between the respective legal frameworks of the UNFCCC and 
international human rights law is that the framework of the latter entitles individuals and sometimes 
other non-State actors to invoke the responsibility of a State, whereas the UNFCCC does not. 
Moreover, the UNFCCC does not create a body of adjudication. The probable implication is that the 
formal change in the legal relationship between States caused by a breach of the UNFCCC will only 
have a practical effect when another State invokes this law through the traditional framework of State 
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responsibility, ‘as between the States’. This means that the invoking State give notice of a claim of 
State responsibility to the allegedly responsible State.466 Yet the probability that a State would resort to 
this diplomatically crude ‘mechanism’ of State responsibility is low in cases where a breach of 
obligations is not immediately apparent. This creates a potential stalemate where ambiguity as to the 
exact meaning of obligations (normally resolved through judicial interpretation) makes it difficult for a 
State to identify a violation. The loss of binding quantified emission reduction limitation commitments 
for developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol could therefore affect the effectiveness of the 
UNFCCC system significantly, even if those Parties remain bound by the more generic obligations 
under the UNFCCC. At the same time, however, the chances that States will resort to enforcement by 
invoking the responsibility of another State could increase when negotiations do not deliver an 
effective response or when the severity of climate change risks and damage becomes more apparent.467 
An important finding in Chapter 3 is that the specific standards of international human rights law, now 
consolidated through the interpretation of human rights treaties, can help to close the apparently 
widening accountability gap in international climate change law. This is demonstrated through an 
analysis of States’ obligations under specific provisions of international human rights law (Section 3.3), 
after examining the general rules for attributing potentially wrongful conduct to States (Sections 3.1 
and 3.2). This analysis opens the door to conclusions about the potential wrongfulness of action or 
inaction that contributes to negative effects of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights and the 
legal consequences thereof. 
  
                                                
 
466 ILC ARS Arts 43 and 48. Art 43(2) suggests that the invoking State may specify the allegedly wrongful conduct and 
request reparations, but is not required to do so. 
467 In relation to climate change liability generally, Brunnée, Goldberg et al. talk about a ‘risk quadrant’ on which the future 
significance of change liability may depend: on the one axe of the quadrant is the future extent of climate change damage; 
on the other axe is the effectiveness of the regulatory response. See Jutta Brunnée et al., ‘Policy Considerations’ in Richard 
Lord et al. (eds), Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice (CUP 2012) 63. See also, Joyeeta Gupta, 
‘Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change’ (2007) 16 RECIEL 76; 
David B Hunter, ‘The Implications of Climate Change Litigation’ in William CG Burns and Hari M Osofsky (eds), 
Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches (CUP 2009) and Jacob David Werksman, 
‘Could a Small Island Successfully Sue a Big Emitter? Pursuing a Legal Theory and a Venue for Climate Justice’ in 
Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a 
Changing Climate (CUP 2012). On human rights-based climate change litigation specifically see Eric A Posner, ‘Climate 
Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal’ (2007) 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925 (focusing on 
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute and arguing that for principled, jurisdictional and pragmatic reasons ‘it is unlikely that 
American courts can provide remedies that are economically sound and politically acceptable’ [to plaintiffs who argue that 
‘major emitters of greenhouse gases have violated rights to life and health by contributing to environmental and health 
injuries associated with global warming’].  
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Chapter 3: Establishing State Responsibility under Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character 
involve international responsibility.  
 
 
Judge Huber in Spanish Zone of Morocco468 
 
  
                                                
 
468 (1925) 2 RIAA 615, translation; French text, 641. 
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3.1 Attributing Climate Change-Related Conduct to States 
Although international human rights law may sometimes require a modified application of the 
principles of State responsibility, its rules on attribution are overwhelmingly compatible with, if not 
identical to, the rules of attribution contained in the general law of State responsibility.469 The rules on 
attribution exist because States can rarely, if ever, guarantee the conduct of all private persons or 
entities on its territory.470 Understanding how these rules apply to the substantive norms discussed in 
Section 2.1 is essential for getting to grips with questions of State responsibility for human rights 
violations associated with climate change: after all, a large part of the greenhouse gases that cause 
climate change are emitted by entities other than States: corporations that exploit fossil fuels, utility 
companies that produce electricity, enterprises that manufacture products, airlines and car companies 
that allow travel, and producers and consumers who supply and demand these products and services. 
An analysis of the rules of attribution will clarify in what circumstances conduct contributing to climate 
change is directly or indirectly attributable to States, thus paving the way for an analysis of substantive 
rules based on which wrongfulness of State conduct can be established.  
 The rules on attribution are expressed in Articles 4–11 of the ARS. None of these rules contain a 
causal requirement.471 This is a deliberate omission, which was discussed by the ILC in relation to the 
question whether the occurrence of damage or injury should be a precondition for an internationally 
wrongful act. Then Special Rapporteur Ago had put forward the argument that damage or injury should 
be a precondition for wrongful conduct, but only for obligations characterised by Ago as ‘obligations of 
                                                
 
469 One exceptional case is Art 1 of the Convention Against Torture, which specifies that torture is attributed to a State only 
‘when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity’. It may also be argued that the CESCR sought to create a special rule of 
attribution with its notion of ‘minimum core obligations’, the breach of which would be apparent from, for example, a lack 
of access to essential drugs (General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) 
paras 43, 47) or to water facilities and services (General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12) (29 Nov 
2002) UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 para 37). However, in the view of the present author this concept reflects the CESCR (then 
sole) focus on the examination of State reports and is not to be considered a special rule of attribution.  
470 Crawford, ‘The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: a Retrospect’ (n 424) 879. 
471 Art 2 of the ARS does not mention causation at all, and the Commentaries to Part I of the ARS (‘The Internationally 
Wrongful Act of a State’) clarify that the establishment of State responsibility does not necessarily involve establishing 
causation. The Commentaries do mention causation in Part II ('Content of the International Responsibility of a State') in the 
context of reparations that must be made when an internationally wrongful act has already been established: See Crawford, 
The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, Commentaries (n 88) 295. For this 
reason this author respectfully disagrees with Fitzmaurice (n 92) 1018 (stating that the Commentary to Art 31 of the ILC 
ARS ‘describes the link that must exist between the wrongful act and the injury in order for state responsibility to arise as a 
sufficient causal link, which is not too remote’ (emphasis added). 
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result’. Ago proposed making a distinction between those obligations from ‘obligations of conduct’, 
which could be breached irrespective of whether or not damage occurs.472 Yet the distinction proved to 
be a simplistic and, for the purposes of the ARS, superfluous categorisation of obligations. As 
Crawford later pointed out, some ‘conduct-based obligations are breached through a combination of a 
failure to act and the occurrence of a prohibited consequence, whereas other conduct-based obligations 
might be breached without the occurrence of any damage (‘as a matter of pure luck’).473 This led the 
ILC to conclude that the precise requirements for wrongfulness to occur must be determined through 
the examination of the primary rules,474 and hence to the deletion of all references to damage and 
causation from the first part of the ARS.  
The general rule of attribution is now contained in Article 4 (entitled ‘Conduct of organs of a 
State’), which provides that ‘The conduct of any organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, 
whatever position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State’.475 As suggested above, these rules operate 
similarly, if not identically, in international human rights law: the HRC, for example, has found 
violations of the Covenant that were attributable to central government and its legislature, federal 
governments, municipal authorities, judicial authorities, police and security forces and various types of 
State agents.476 The Commentaries clarify that the reference to a State organ in Article 4 extends to 
organs of government ‘of whatever kind or classification, exercising whatever functions, and at 
whatever level in the hierarchy...’.477 The type of conduct that is generally attributable to a State as a 
consequence of these rules includes national legislation, decisions of the judiciary or administrative 
                                                
 
472 Ago (n 422) 132. 
473 James R Crawford, ‘Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ (1999) 10 Eur.J.Int'lL. 435, 441. 
474 This point has been emphasised by other several other authors. See, for example, Léon Castellanos-Jankiewicz, 
Causation and International State Responsibility (Amsterdam Centre for International Law, SHARES Series 2012) and Tol 
and Verheyen (n 17) 1112. 
475 ILC ARS, Art 4(2) clarifies that ‘An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the State’. See also, Richard B Lillich et al, ‘Attribution Issues in State Responsibility’ (1990) 84 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 51, 52 (pointing out that the principle that ‘a 
state may act through its own independent failure of duty or inaction when an international obligation requires state action 
in relation to non-State conduct’ is reflected in all codifications and restatements of the law on State responsibility). 
476 McGoldrick, ‘State Responsibility and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 451) fn 74–83 and 
accompanying text, containing citations. 
477 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 4, para 5. 
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measures.478 The conduct of a person or entity that is not a government agent or organ but nonetheless 
exercises governmental authority must also be attributed to the State (Art. 5).479 This is true even if the 
organ or agent exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions (Art. 7).480 The practice of human 
rights bodies also reflects these special rules; for example, the HRC has considered that the conduct of 
persons or entities empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority is attributable to the 
State.481 Other special rules of attribution are contained in ARS articles on the conduct of organs placed 
at the disposal of a State by another State (Art. 6), the conduct of private actors directed or controlled 
by a State (Art. 8), conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities (Art. 9), 
conduct of an insurrectional or similar type (Art. 10), and conduct acknowledged and adopted by a 
State as its own (Art. 11). 
Verheyen considers that rules contained in Articles 8 and 11 of the ARS are particularly 
relevant for establishing State responsibility in the context of climate change. This is apparently based 
on the rationale that the conduct of emission-producing private actors must be attributed to States in 
order to establish State responsibility for climate change damage. The rule in Article 8 provides that the 
conduct of a person or group of persons acting either on the instruction of, or under the direction or 
control of, a State will be directly attributable to that State.482 Article 11 allows for the attribution of 
conduct of private actors to a State if it ‘acknowledges or adopts the conduct as its own’.483 Verheyen 
argues that a State may exercise effective control over polluting activities carried out by private actors 
(Art. 8) as well as adopting such conduct as its own by ‘approving such private conduct through active 
(permitting) policies’ (Art. 11).484 However, this argument is not convincing: interpreting the rules this 
broadly would make virtually all-private conduct directly attributable to States. It also seems far-
                                                
 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid Art 5. 
480 Ibid Art 7. 
481 McGoldrick, ‘State Responsibility and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 451). 
482 The Commentaries suggest that this rule embodies two rules of custom: the first relating to the conduct of persons acting 
under the instructions of States, such as ‘auxiliaries’ or ‘volunteers’ recruited or instigated by a State to carry out ‘particular 
missions’ abroad, the second relating to private persons acting under the direction or control of a State in situations where 
the State directed or approved of the allegedly wrongful activities. The second rule is based on Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) para 86. See ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 8, 
paras 2–4. 
483 ILC ARS Art 11. Paras 3–4 of the Commentary to Art 11 clarifies that this rule has been applied only in exceptional 
cases, especially those related to State succession (where a successor State adopted conduct of the predecessor State) and in 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgement) 35 (where Iran's subsequent unequivocal and 
unqualified ‘approval’ of the conduct of militants who attacked the US Embassy in Tehran gave the approval retroactive 
effect, thus making this private conduct directly attributable to Iran). 
484 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (n 17) 239. 
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fetched to argue that polluting activities carried out by companies, individuals and other private actors 
are ‘directed’ or ‘approved of’ by States in the sense of Articles 8 and 11 where attribution might be 
established in accordance with the general rule reflected in Article 4. 
It is worth emphasising that the general rule of attribution reflected in Article 4 of the ARS 
allows omissions to be attributed to States (that is, a failure on the part of the State’s organs or agents to 
carry out an international obligation).485. The Commentaries to the ARS stress that ‘Cases in which the 
international responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis of an omission are at least as 
numerous as those based on positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between the two’.486 The 
Commentaries clarify that an ‘act of a State’ ‘must involve some action or omission by a human being 
or group [...] What is crucial is that a given event is sufficiently connected to conduct (whether an act 
or omission) which is attributable to the State.’.487 For example, in Corfu Channel (UK v Albania),488 
Albania was held responsible for the consequences of mines that had been laid in its territorial waters, 
not for the act of laying mines (which was not attributable to it), but based on its failure to mitigate or 
eliminate the danger.489 Therefore the question of attribution of an omission is often evidentially 
indistinguishable from the question whether the State has complied with the substantive obligation.  
The ILC Commentaries stress that the standards for determining whether or not a breach of 
obligation has occurred vary from one context to another ‘for reasons which essentially relate to the 
object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation [...] 
Establishing [these standards] is a matter for the interpretation and application of the primary rules 
engaged in the given case’.490 Sir Ian Brownlie explains that the wrongfulness of an omission that 
causes harm to another State can be established without specifying which organ or agent should have 
carried out the acts. This is based on the understanding that it is often ‘impossible to specify which 
officials or organs were the source of the harm’.491 The lack of distinct attribution of conduct when 
                                                
 
485 This formulation was used in Art 1 of the Outcome Document of the Third Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference, 
reproduced in Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, Vol. II, p. 225, Document A/CN.4/96, Annex 3. 
486 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, Commentaries (n 
88) 35 and Commentary to Art 2 para 4. 
487 Ibid, Commentary to Art 2 paras 5–6. 
488 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
489 Ibid 23 (‘These grave [...] omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania [which] is responsible under 
international law for the explosions which occurred [...] and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from 
them’). 
490 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 2, para 3. 
491 Brownlie (n 283) 151. 
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establishing State responsibility based on its failure to prevent such harm safeguards the effectiveness 
of the international legal system, and can be seen as an application of the principle of effectiveness.492 
Reflecting the importance of this principle in the human rights context, attribution is rarely considered 
separately when the allegedly wrongful conduct is a State’s failure to prevent the violation of a human 
right or rights. At the evidential level, this can be explained by reference to the object and purpose of 
human rights law: human rights norms exist, at least in part, to protect individuals against State 
abuse,493 and the State (in the words of the IACtHR) ‘controls the means to verify acts occurring within 
its territory’.494 At the normative level, it reflects the importance of the principle that a State will 
exercise its legislative, regulatory or other functions in a way that is consistent with its human rights 
obligations. An example is the ECtHR case Young, James and Webster v UK.495 This dealt with 
interference with the right to associate (Art. 11 ECHR) resulting from British Rail policies. The 
applicants claimed that British Rail was controlled by the government and therefore its allegedly 
wrongful conduct was attributable to the State.496 In deciding the case, the Court thought it unnecessary 
to establish whether or not the acts of British Rail were attributable to the State, based on its 
observation that ‘it was the domestic law in force at the relevant time that made lawful the treatment of 
which the applicants complained’.497 The obligation to secure the rights contained in the ECHR (Art. 1) 
involved an obligation to secure those rights in the enactment of national legislation, and thus the State 
was responsible for any breach of the Convention that resulted from the enactment of this national 
law.498 
In relation to climate change, we must emphasise that even if it is difficult to differentiate 
between questions of attribution and breach, this does not affect the basic principle that attributable 
conduct is only wrongful if it breaches an international obligation. This point is important because it is 
precisely the generality of the rule of attribution reflected in Article 4 that means that an extremely 
broad range of conduct linked with climate change may be attributable to States. Firstly, and perhaps 
                                                
 
492 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, Commentaries (n 
88) Commentary to Art 8, para 1. 
493 Dinah Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World’ (2002) 25 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 273. 
494 Velásquez Radríguez v Honduras, para 136. 
495 Young, James and Webster v UK (1982) Series A no 44, 4 EHRR 38. 
496 Ibid para 52. 
497. Ibid para 49. 
498 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
107 
most importantly, a potential source of evidence for establishing attribution is the information reported 
by States themselves to the COP and the CMP. As noted above, this information is submitted in 
accordance with a legal obligation imposed on all State parties to the UNFCCC to ‘Develop, 
periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties [...] national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies’.499 Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
Annex I parties (listed in Annex B) are similarly obliged to account for all greenhouse gas emissions 
occurring within their territory. It is worth emphasising that State parties account for emissions 
produced by public as well as private actors,500 which suggests that the lex specialis of the UNFCCC 
contains a special rule of attribution for reported emission-producing activities of States. At a more 
general level, examples of potentially attributable acts include government interventions such as 
payment of subsidies and tax concessions for coal power plants, exploration and development of fossil 
fuels, and activities that facilitate such exploration and development.501 The export of oil, gas and coal 
are other examples of acts that might be attributable to States, either directly or (more likely) through 
the act of issuing permits and licenses.502 Attributable conduct could also consist of a State’s failure to 
enforce its own national law,503 or to uphold international standards related to environmental 
protection.504  
The scope for attribution is extended even further through the rule that an internationally 
wrongful act may consist of several acts and omissions that cumulatively amount to a breach of 
                                                
 
499 UNFCCC Art 1(a). 
500 Two possibly exceptional cases are aviation and marine bunker fuels, and ‘emissions resulting from multilateral 
operations pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations’. It debateable whether aviation and marine bunker fuels are 
attributable to Annex I States: on the one hand, there is an obligation to report these emissions, but on the other hand, they 
are not included in national totals. UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its 3rd Sess., at 31, Dec. 1–11, 1997, 
UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (25 March 1998). We could argue that this construction signals the limited scope of 
obligations of the UNFCCC, rather than non-attributability of these emissions. This interpretation is supported by Art 2(2) 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which provides that ‘The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively’. This 
provision shows that the exclusion of this category from national totals regards delegation to another treaty regime rather 
than an assumption against attribution. In other words, we could argue that all emissions reported to the Conference of the 
Parties are attributable to the State for the purpose of establishing State responsibility. This does not, of course, in itself 
trigger the international responsibility of the State unless a breach of obligation is established. 
501 Although OECD countries have gradually cut back these subsidies, OECD subsidies for fossil-fuel energy still averaged 
US$20–22 billion per year in 2008. For a comparative discussion see United Nations Development Programme (n 2) 128. 
502 Tomuschat (n 17) 9. 
503 See Okyay et al. v Turkey App no 36220/97 (ECtHR, 12 July 2005). See also, the discussion in Section 3.3. 
504 See Oneryildiz v Turkey App no 48939/99 (ECtHR GC, 30 Nov 2004) para 71. See also, the discussion in Section 3.3. 
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obligations.505 In the ARS, this is expressed in Article 15 which states that State responsibility can arise 
from a ‘breach consisting of a composite act’.506 The breach has to extend over the entire period 
‘starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or 
omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation’.507 Verheyen has 
argued that in accordance with this rule, State responsibility could arise for climate change damage 
‘where the cumulative behaviour of a State does not conform to a standard of care for preventing 
damage or the risk thereof, in the context of the no harm rule’.508 This argument seems convincing, 
with the caveat that the no-harm rule would need to be analysed in conjunction with the lex specialis of 
the UNFCCC when it is applied in the context of climate change. In the context of human rights, the 
rule supports the conclusion drawn in Section 2.2.2 that a ‘contextual analysis’ of a State’s conduct and 
the obligations by which it is bound is the most appropriate method for determining whether a human 
rights violation has occurred. Such an analysis could take account of a range of conduct as attributable 
to the State—from information reported to the COP and CMP to its national legislation and regulatory 
framework, energy subsidies, trade policies and the extent of assistance provided and received in 
accordance with technology transfer and financial obligations—to determine whether all this conduct is 
in accordance with its international human rights obligations. The next section demonstrates that this 
approach is equally suitable for establishing violations in cases of joint or collective conduct. 
  
 
                                                
 
505 Paul and Audrey Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 487 (on the cumulative failure of several public agencies 
including doctors, the police, the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service that amounted to a breach of obligations under 
Art 2 of the ECHR). 
506 ILC ARS Art 15(1). This provides that ‘The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or 
omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act’. 
507 ILC ARS Art 15(2). See also, Ireland v United Kingdom para 159, in which the ECtHR discussed the concept of a 
‘practice incompatible with the Convention’. It found that such a practice ‘consists of an accumulation of identical or 
analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or 
exceptions but to a pattern or system; a practice does not of itself constitute a violation separate from such breaches’. The 
significance of the concept here was its effect on the applicability of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies embodied 
in Art 26 of the Convention. The Court found that the rule did not apply where ‘an applicant State complains of a practice as 
such, with the aim of preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does not ask the Commission or Court to give a decision 
on each of the cases put forward as proof or illustration of that practice’. 
508 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (n 17) 236. 
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3.2 Responsibility or Involvement of Multiple States  
Seeing that anthropogenic climate change is generated by human action and inaction attributable to 
multiple States, it is important to understand how the rules of attribution apply to States acting jointly 
or collectively. Article 47 of the ILC ARS codifies the rule that applies joint or collective conduct, 
stating that ‘Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act’.509 The Commentary to Article 47 
emphasises that the responsibility of other States for the same act does not diminish or reduce the 
responsibility of individual States, reflecting the basic principle that States are individually and 
independently responsible for any breaches of their international obligations. Thus, although Article 47 
is concerned with invoking responsibility rather than establishing it, it implies that conduct, including 
wrongful conduct, can be attributed to multiple States simultaneously.510 This is an important rule of 
attribution, as it implies that State responsibility can arise, for example, from the actions of States 
acting collectively in negotiations and decision-making under the UNFCCC. Reference to the 
‘sameness’ of the wrongful act indicates that the Article does not apply to joint conduct that amounts to 
a different wrongful act for each State (for example, as a result of different obligations of respective 
States). The reason is probably simple, namely that the usual rules of attribution apply to these 
situations. Article 47 can be understood as a clarification to the effect that the usual rules also apply to 
joint wrongful conduct, which is accordingly no more and no less than internationally wrongful acts for 
which States are individually and independently responsible.511 
 Some cases clearly illustrate how the principle of independent responsibility applies in different 
scenarios of joint or collective conduct. The Corfu Channel case is a textbook example of conduct 
involving multiple States, which led to the establishment of a separate internationally wrongful act of 
one State based on its own obligations. As already noted, Albania was held to have committed an 
                                                
 
509 ILC ARS Art 47. 
510 It is worth noting that Art 48(1) of the ARIO suggests that this principle extends to wrongful acts committed by 
international organisations, or by international organisations and one or more States. See Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 63rd session, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
55th session, Supplement No. 10, UN Doc A/66/10 (2011) (ARIO) (‘Where an international organization and one or more 
States or other international organizations are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of 
each State or organization may be invoked in relation to that act’). 
511 Exceptions to this general rule are ‘aid or assistance’ (Art 16) and direction or control (Art 17), which can trigger the 
responsibility of a State for the wrongful conduct of another State. 
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internationally wrongful act, based on its knowledge of the mines and its failure to warn foreign vessels 
so as to prevent the risk of death and injury.512 The fact that another State appeared to have been 
responsible for laying the mines that caused the damage did not affect, let alone diminish, Albania’s 
responsibility.513 The Soering case illustrates that the principle of independent responsibility operates 
similarly in cases of alleged violations of international human rights law involving multiple States: the 
ECtHR held that the United Kingdom was responsible for a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR based 
on the Court’s finding that exposure to the so-called ‘death row phenomenon’, a form of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, was a foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s extradition to the 
United States.514 The fact that the United States, and not the United Kingdom, would be responsible for 
directly inflicting the treatment did not affect the United Kingdom’s responsibility for a violation of its 
own obligation under Article 3.515  
 A case where the rule expressed in Article 47 applies occurred in Certain Phosphate Lands in 
Nauru.516 Here Australia had challenged the admissibility of the claim against it based on the argument 
that its alleged international responsibility was inseparably linked with the responsibility of two other 
States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, over which the Court had no jurisdiction. The ICJ 
rejected Australia’s argument but was willing to consider the case on its merits, emphasising the 
principle of independent responsibility.517 Another example is Mox Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom), 
where the ITLOS order for provisional measures indicated that the parties’ failure to cooperate to 
exchange information and to find measures to prevent harm being caused by the proposed project could 
constitute a violation of the duty to cooperate to ensure the protection of the marine environment.518 
This order not only implies that the violation of obligations to cooperate with other States may give rise 
                                                
 
512 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) p 4. 
513 The UK alleged that the mines had been laid by Yugoslavia, but this was not proven. Ibid., 16–17. See also, James 
Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 335. 
514 Soering v UK. See also, Cruz Varas et al. v Sweden App no 15576/89 (ECtHR 20 March 1991), Vilvarajah and Others v 
United Kingdom App nos 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87 (ECtHR, 30 Oct 1991) and the more recent 
cases Al Nashiri v Poland App no 28761/11 (ECtHR GC, 24 July 2014), and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland App no 
7511/13 (ECtHR GC, 24 July 2014). 
515 Soering v UK para 86 (stating that the fact that the United Kingdom had no power over the practices and arrangements of 
the Virginia authorities could not absolve the United Kingdom from responsibility under Art 3 ‘for all and any foreseeable 
consequences of extradition suffered outside [its] jurisdiction’). 
516 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania). 
517 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, 258–259; ibid 
301. 
518 Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional measures) [2001] 41 ILM 405 (2002).  
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to the ‘parallel’ responsibility of multiple States, but is also one of the clearest illustrations of 
enforceable rights derived from such obligations. 
 In passing, it is worth noting that some human rights scholars have advocated the introduction 
of a principle of joint and multiple liability to address cases of indivisible damage caused by joint State 
conduct, such as regional biofuel policies and agricultural subsidies.519 The ICJ itself stated in Certain 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru that ‘a rule of joint and several responsibility [...] should certainly exist as a 
matter of principle’,520 adding that it should ‘be developed internationally rather than drawn from 
municipal analogies’. The wisdom of this statement is perhaps clear from the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Simma in Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America (Oil Platforms),521 which stated 
that the generic counterclaim of the United States against Iran should have been upheld despite the fact 
that some of the allegedly wrongful acts may have been carried out by Iraq, and not by Iran. Judge 
Simma found that it would be ‘more objectionable not to hold Iran liable than to hold Iran liable for the 
entire damage caused [...] even though it did not directly cause it all’,522 and found that it was possible 
to hold Iran responsible because ‘the principle of joint-and-several responsibility [...] can properly be 
regarded as a “general principle of law” within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the 
Court’s Statute’.523 
In relation to this, at the outset is that Judge Simma used a questionable methodology for 
ascertaining a general principle of law, namely a comparative analysis of relevant tort law in only five 
jurisdictions.524 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we can observe that Judge Simma could have 
reached the conclusion that Iran was responsible for violating the relevant treaty provision without 
resorting to private law analogies. The crux of the matter lies in Judge Simma’s observation that the 
treaty provision, which protected the parties’ freedom of commerce, imposed a prohibition on the 
parties to prevent each other’s use of existing capabilities to engage in commerce, also in the future.525 
                                                
 
519 Discussed in Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation, and the Law of International Cooperation’ (n 154) 311. See also, reports 
and statements of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food; e.g. Contribution of the Special Rapporteur on the right 
to food to the 17th session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-17), 4–15 May 2009, New York, 
available at http:/www.srfood.org (accessed 3 Feb. 2013). 
520 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 554 (citing Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3rd edn. (1979) 456). 
521 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgement) [2003] ICJ Rep 161. 
522 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Simma) para 73. 
523 Ibid para 74. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid para 26. 
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Although Simma did not say so, it is clear from his opinion that he considered that this treaty provision 
could be breached through a pattern of conduct (that is, what Art. 15 of the ARS calls a ‘composite 
act’). This meant that ‘the particular extent to which Iran was responsible for separate acts that were 
potentially wrongful [did not need] to be determined with precision’.526 Instead, what needed to be 
established, according to the judge, was that ‘Iran, because of the Iran–Iraq war, was responsible for a 
significant portion of those actions, and that such actions impaired the freedom of commerce between 
the United States and Iran guaranteed by the 1955 Treaty in ways not justifiable simply because of the 
existence of a state of war’.527 The implicit point here seems to be that the ‘significant portion of those 
actions’ would amount to a composite act that violated the treaty provision that was binding on Iran. 
Simma’s subsequent point that the lack of certainty as to the potential attribution of some specific 
activities to Iran (and not Iraq) constituted an obstacle to establishing responsibility seems to contradict 
his own finding that Iran had breached its obligation through the ‘significant portion of the actions’ in 
which both Iran and Iraq were engaged, and which impaired the freedom of commerce. The flip side of 
this analysis is that if the finding of State responsibility were not actually supported by evidence 
regarding Iran’s responsibility, the finding would not have been justifiable under existing international 
law. 
A point arising again from this analysis is that inconclusive evidence about attribution is not a 
bar to establishing State responsibility, as long as the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that a State 
has breached an international obligation. It is also clear that each State is responsible for its own 
conduct. As was noted in Section 3.1, responsibility could be established not only based on specific 
wrongful acts, but also based on acts and omissions that are wrongful in the aggregate. In this context, 
it is worth recalling from the discussion of substantive norms in Chapter 2 that some rules and 
principles relevant to climate change, such as the precautionary principle, could shift the burden of 
proof to a State or States whose international responsibility is invoked by a beneficiary of the 
obligation or by another State. This means that even the absence of evidence could sometimes 
substantiate or consolidate a climate change-related claim of State responsibility. In such cases, 
questions of attribution may not even arise.528 This conclusion paves the way for an examination of the 
                                                
 
526 Ibid para 60. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Technically speaking, these questions are implicit in the question of whether or not the State has breached the relevant 
obligation. 
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substantive content of States’ obligations related to specific human rights in the light of the facts related 
to climate change. 
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3.3 Establishing a Breach of Obligation 
3.3.1 The Right of Self-Determination529 
The right of self-determination is widely accepted as customary international law,530 and is cited by 
several highly qualified jurists as a norm of jus cogens.531 The principle of self-determination has a 
prominent place in the UN Charter, which sets out as one of the goals of the United Nations, in Article 
1(2), ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’.532 
Furthermore, the right was expressed in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 on the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960, which 
called for immediate steps to provide non-independent territories with complete independence and 
freedom.533 The subsequent Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter reflects universal 
agreement that the right also applies outside the colonial context.534 The right has also been reiterated 
in the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and its successor the Human Rights Council.535 
The first treaty-based expression of self-determination as a legal right is contained in Article 1 common 
to the ICCPR and ICESCR536 with additional expressions contained in two separate articles of the 
ACHPR.537  
                                                
 
529 See also Margreet Wewerinke and Curtis Doebbler, ‘Exploring the Legal Basis of a Human Rights Approach to Climate 
Change’ (2011) 10 CJIL 141, on which parts of Section 3.3 dwell. 
530 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Namibia), ICJ Reports 1971 esp. 31. See also, 
Thomas M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 Am.J.Int.Law 46. 
531. See, for example, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th edn, OUP 1998) 513; Antonio Cassese, 
International Law in a Divided World (OUP 1986) 136; Alexandre Kiss, ‘The Peoples' Right to Self-determination’ (1986) 
7 HRLJ, 174. See also, Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 8 (adding that the 
right to self-determination as a peremptory norm of international law ‘is, however, able to claim validity only in its 
restricted scope of application to peoples under alien subjugation, colonial domination and exploitation in the sense of the 
[...] 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations’ [footnote omitted]. 
532 Charter of the United Nations (1945), Arts 1(2), 55 and 73. 
533 GA Res. 1514 (XV). 
534 UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28), Annex at 121, UN Doc A/5217 (1970). 
535 This is particularly the case with regard to Palestine where an annual resolution on the Palestinians’ right to self-
determination is adopted. 
536 ICCPR Art 1 and ICESCR Art 1 provide that: 1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples 
may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising 
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 The right of self-determination is a right of peoples and applies, first, to all people in non-self-
governing territories or territories that are ‘geographically separate and [...] distinct ethnically and/or 
culturally from the country administering it’.538 In the colonial context, the right of self-determination 
is understood as a right of peoples to be granted independence.539 This implication was recognised by 
the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara,540 and subsequently considered by the HRC as 
applicable to the Western Sahara.541 The text of Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR states, however, 
that the right extends to ‘all peoples’ and accordingly the HRC has clarified that it ‘applies to all 
peoples, and not merely to colonised peoples’.542 Joseph considers that the term ‘peoples’ may be 
broadly defined as ‘a group with a common racial or ethnic identity, or a cultural identity (which could 
incorporate political, religious, or linguistic elements) built up over a long period of time’.543 Although 
the HRC has refrained from proposing a definition of ‘peoples’, its practice suggests that indigenous 
peoples may constitute 'peoples' in the sense of Article 1.544 Presumably, peoples inhabiting particular 
Small Island Developing States threatened with permanent flooding may be considered as beneficiaries 
of the right.545 
 In its General Comment No. 12, the HRC clarifies that ‘the obligations [under Art. 1] exist 
irrespective of whether a people entitled to self-determination depends on a State party to the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
from international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may 
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence, and 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
537 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art 20 describes a political dimension of the right, codifying it as the 
‘unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination’. Art 21 of the Charter contains a distinct resource dimension of 
the right. The interpretation of Arts 20 and 21 as expressing one right, namely the right of self-determination, with Art 21 
expressing an ‘economic or resource dimension’ of this right, was first proposed by Martin Scheinin. See, for example, 
Scheinin, ‘The Right of Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Pekka Aikio and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), Operationalising the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University 2000). 
538 Principle IV, GA Res. 1541(XV), 15 Dec 1960. 
539 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 23. 
540 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep 1975 59. 
541 HRC, (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add. 113. 
542 HRC, Concluding Comments on Azerbaijan (1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add. 38, para 6. Cf Art 20(2) of the ICCPR, 
which provides that the right belongs to ‘colonized or oppressed people’. 
543 Joseph, Schultz and Castan (n 356) 146. 
544 See the discussion in Section 3.3.3. 
545 OHCHR Report on Climate Change and Human Rights (n 36) 41. See also, further references in ch 3 on legal 
obligations. 
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Covenant’.546 This reflects the conclusion drawn in Section 2.2.2 that the objective nature of human 
rights obligations prohibits an interpretation of human rights law that restricts the scope of States’ 
human rights obligations to particular categories of beneficiaries. At the same time, however, the right 
is closely related to State sovereignty. As the submission of the Maldives to the OCHCHR states, ‘For 
many peoples, the right to self-determination manifests in the formation of a sovereign State’ which is 
‘the primary guarantor and source of protection for political, civil, economic, social and cultural 
freedoms’.547 The implication is that the adverse effects of climate change on the right of self-
determination could extend to all other human rights.548  
The dangers posed by climate change to the enjoyment of the right of self-determination are so 
severe that legal commentators have commented that ‘Exercising the right of self-determination and 
protecting the ecosystem from climate change are [...] one and the same [thing]’.549 The most obvious 
threats relate to scientists’ projections that ‘Long-term sea level rise is likely to end the history of many 
of the low-lying islands, even at 2 degrees Celsius warming’.550 The Maldives has stressed these 
dangers in its submission to the OHCHR, noting that about 80 per cent of most of its atolls that 
comprise its territory runs the risk of being inundated by 2100 under conservative scenarios of rising 
sea-levels. Many of the atolls may then already have become uninhabitable due to flooding and storm 
surges, rising temperatures, extreme weather events and the destruction of freshwater resources, 
cultivable land and living space.551 Peoples in other regions may face a similar threat of losing their 
traditional homelands. One example of this is the Inuit people in the Arctic, whose culture is based on 
hunting and food sharing and who are faced with the problems of dramatic social and cultural 
displacement as sea ice melts. Their means of subsistence includes wild animals, which are threatened 
                                                
 
546 General Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art 1) para 6. 
547 Ibid para 41. 
548 On the link between the right of self-determination and other human rights see Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 22. See also, CERD’s General Recommendation 21, which states that there is 
a ‘link with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level’ and that governments should 
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Environmental Fact Sheet No. 21 (2009) 2 available at http://www.airclim.org/factsheets/index.php (accessed 20 Dec. 
2014). 
551 Ibid 41. 
 
 
 
 
117 
with extinction as a result of climate change.552 A rise in sea-levels and other effects of climate change 
have already forced populations from Small Island Developing States and the Arctic and elsewhere 
populations have had to relocate or migrate.553 It has been predicted that by 2050, 25 million to 1 
billion people will have been forced to relocate as a result of climate change, with the highest number 
of migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa.554  
As the OHCHR notes in its report, the disappearance of a State due to climate change-related 
[human] actions ‘would give rise to a range of legal questions, including concerning the status of 
people inhabiting such disappearing territories and the protection afforded to them under international 
law’.555 It is worth noting that legal questions that arise in this context were examined by the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples for four consecutive years, starting in 2003.556 Their report was 
submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2005 by Working Group member Hampson, and 
examined cases where the entire population of a sovereign State is likely to be affected.557 It 
distinguished between States which will disappear entirely; States which will lose a significant 
proportion of their territory, with the remaining territory being uninhabitable or too small to support the 
existing population; and States which are likely to lose a significant proportion of their territory, with 
implications for the existing population.558 The report observed that that ‘In the case of those States 
which are likely to disappear for environmental reasons, there would appear to be no successor State on 
                                                
 
552 United Nations Development Programme (n 2) 82. 
553 Walter Kalin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative 
Gaps and Possible Approaches (UNHCR Division of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series 
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whom obligations can be imposed and eventually the predecessor State will no longer be in 
existence’.559 However, it did not draw any conclusions about State responsibility,560 and even after 
much debate, panel discussions and resolutions adopted by the UN Human Rights Council on human 
rights and climate change it remains unclear which State, if any, would be legally responsible for the 
violation of the right of self-determination and other human rights that might result from the annulment 
of State sovereignty. Presumably as a result of this uncertainty, the OHCHR report states in somewhat 
cautious terms that ‘Sea level rise and extreme weather events related to climate change [which] are 
threatening the habitability and, in the longer term, the territorial existence of a number of low-lying 
island States [...] would have implications for the right to self-determination’.561 It recognises that those 
‘implications’ extend to ‘the full range of human rights for which individuals depend on the State for 
their protection’,562 but again without taking this point to its logical legal conclusion. At the same time, 
the OHCHR considers it ‘clear’ that ‘insofar as climate change poses a threat to the right of peoples to 
self-determination, States have a duty to take positive action, individually and jointly, to address and 
avert this threat’.563 
The OHCHR’s caution is in sharp contrast to the Maldives, which claims in unambiguous terms 
that its people’s right of self-determination will have been violated in a scenario of ‘permanent loss of 
statehood, without a successor State to take its place’.564 Along similar lines, Tiffany Duong has 
contended, citing the example of Tuvalu (Polynesia), that ‘When the ocean drowns Tuvalu, the loss of 
sovereignty and statelessness caused by climate change will violate Tuvalu's rights of self-
determination’.565 The violation of the right occurs, Duong explains, because peoples who are forced to 
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leave their traditional homelands ‘would no longer be able to raise their children as they wish, while 
living in harmony with land and sea and thus maintaining their unique history, geography and 
culture’.566 The facts would seem to indicate a prima facie violation of the right of self-determination, 
thus requiring a close examination of the legal norms that oblige a State to respect and promote that 
right.  
We can distinguish three dimensions of the right of self-determination: a political dimension 
(para. 1); a resource dimension (pars. 1–2), and a solidarity dimension (para. 3).567 The political 
dimension entails the right of all peoples to determine their political status free from national or 
external interference,568 and imposes an obligation on States take into account ‘the freely expressed 
will of peoples’.569 Moreover, it ‘implies that all peoples have the right to determine [...] their place in 
the international community based upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation 
of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition to alien subjugation, domination, and 
exploitation’.570 The resource dimension of the right of self-determination has also been referred to as 
‘economic, social and cultural self-determination’.571 This entails the right of all peoples to pursue 
socio-economic and cultural development free from national or external interference,572 which may in 
some cases equate with a people’s right to a certain territory.573 This is, quite naturally, conditional on 
the existence of a link between the people and the claimed territory. This condition is clear in the 
HRC’s jurisprudence on Article 1, which has emerged through the systematic interpretation of the 
ICCPR in cases related to Articles 27 and 25. One illustration of the HRC’s approach is Diergaardt v 
Namibia,574 where members of the Rehoboth Basters, an ethnic minority in Namibia, claimed 
violations of Article 25 (the right to public participation) and Article 1 (the right of self-determination) 
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due to the ending of the 124-year long existence of Rehoboth as a continuously organised territory after 
Namibia became an independent State.575 The applicants also claimed a violation of Article 27 on the 
basis that their communal land had been expropriated. The HRC stated that ‘the provisions of Article 1 
may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular Articles 25, 
26 and 27’,576 and found no violation of Art. 27, due to the Rhoboth Basters’ failure to demonstrate a 
relationship between the land covered by their claim and the existence of a distinct culture. The 
resource dimension of the right, and the ability of a people to enjoy the benefits of their natural wealth 
and resources, were also central to the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (Ogoni people) v Nigeria,577 where the 
Commission had received evidence that foreign investment had caused serious environmental 
degradation and interfered with a range of human rights (which were found to constitute violations).578 
In finding a violation of Article 21 of the ACHPR (the right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth 
and natural resources), the Commission noted that the development interfered with the substance of the 
right and did not create any material benefits accruing to the local population.579 
 The solidarity dimension of the right in Article 1 is essential in order to guarantee both the 
political and resource dimensions of the right. Recognising this, the HRC has consistently held that the 
obligations under Article 1 are imposed on ‘all States and the international community’580 and that ‘all 
States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate the attainment of and respect for 
the right of peoples to self-determination’.581 These entail obligations to ensure that peoples can 
participate in political processes at all levels,582 but do not entitle one State to use force against another 
allegedly oppressive State.583 In the context of climate change, the right also requires that States take 
account of the material benefits of resource exploitation in dealing with foreign actors. Articles 47 and 
35 of the two Covenants have been interpreted as prohibiting a national State from wasting raw 
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materials ‘at the expense of the interests of the relevant peoples or [in transferring] control over natural 
resources to other States or foreign companies without corresponding compensation for the benefit of 
these peoples’.584 The effect of this provision could be an entitlement and arguably an obligation of 
States to rescind a treaty if it interferes with a peoples’ right of free disposition over its natural 
resources for its own ends.585 Existing treaties that do not meet this criterion ‘may be unilaterally 
rescinded by the other party on the basis of its right of free disposition over its natural resources for its 
own ends’586 because it is clear from Articles 47 and 35 of the respective Covenants that reference to 
‘international law’ in Article 1(2) cannot be understood as introducing a blanket protection of foreign 
investment that is protected through other international agreements.587  
When applied in the context of climate change, the right of self-determination is perhaps best 
understood as the need for international cooperation in decarbonising the global economy in a way that 
ensures peoples’ right to their means of subsistence. In the light of the conclusion drawn in Section 
2.2.3 that account must be taken of the substantive provisions of the UNFCCC for the interpretation of 
human rights norms, it could be argued that the duty to cooperate to promote the right of self-
determination could be meaningfully interpreted together with the duty to promote sustainable 
development contained in Article 3(4). The interpretation entails an obligation to cooperate to ensure 
that the right of all peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development can be 
exercised in a way that does not accelerate global climate change. It is also clear from the above 
analysis (and a consequence of Art. 103 of the UN Charter) that States are prohibited from undertaking 
treaty obligations, and must rescind a treaty, if compliance with the obligations contained in the treaty 
would deprive a people of their right of self-determination. This conclusion is particularly important in 
the context of climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC. Section 3.4 explains that compliance 
with this element of States’ obligations pertaining to the right of self-determination may involve human 
rights impact assessment, to establish how the resource dimension of the right can be reconciled with 
the prevention of dangerous climate change leading to a loss of territory and other potential human 
rights violations.  
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 Finally, we should note that if the right of self-determination is likely to be violated as a result 
of wrongful State action related to climate change, then the positive obligation to protect the right of 
self-determination acquires additional significance: it could imply that States representing a people 
threatened by climate change are obliged to defend the right of self-determination rather than 
‘remaining passive and ultimately defending itself for alleged rights-violating acts and omissions’.588 
Moreover, as a result of the solidarity dimension of the right, all States could be obliged to take action 
to compel a recalcitrant State that violates the right to restore compliance with its obligations to respect 
the right. This point is analysed in Chapter 4, which discusses legal consequences of violations of 
international human rights law. 
 
3.3.2 The Right to Life 
Without human life, human rights are meaningless.589 Thus, the HRC has called the right to life ‘the 
supreme right’,590 and has insisted that no derogation from it is permitted even in times of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation.591 Some of the most prominent treaty obligations to 
respect the human right to life are found in Article 6 of the ICCPR592 and its Second Optional 
Protocol.593Additional provisions are in Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR),594 Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),595 Article 2 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
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on Human Rights or ECHR) and its Sixth and Twelfth Protocols (ECHRP6 and ECHRP12),596 Article 
5 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab CHR),597 and Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC).598 It also appears in Article 3 of the UDHR,599 and Article I of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM).600 The right to life generally provides 
protection against arbitrary deprivation and requires that States take appropriate steps to protect the 
right to life. In the specific case of the protocols to the ICCPR and the ECHR, the death penalty is 
prohibited. The right to life has been singled out as a right that is part of customary international law 
and that creates obligations erga omnes.601 The right has been considered by highly qualified jurists as 
having the character of a jus cogens norm under international law.602 The beneficiaries of the right to 
life are human beings. Article 6 of the ICCPR, for example, stipulates that the right to life is an innate 
right of every human being.603  
The enjoyment of the right to life is affected by climate change because some of its adverse 
effects are known to be life-threatening or fatal. Natural disasters linked to climate change such as 
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tropical cyclones, hurricanes, heavy storms and heatwaves, are on the rise throughout the world. The 
increased burden of disease, droughts and floods are other adverse effects of climate change that pose a 
direct threat to human life and health.604 A report published in August 2009 by the Global 
Humanitarian Forum reveals that every year climate change is responsible for the death of over 
300,000 people, and seriously affects the livelihoods of 325 million people. The report estimates that 
the livelihoods of another four billion people are at risk of being affected by climate change, while for 
500 million people the impacts of climate change are potentially life-threatening.605 In another report, 
leading scientists estimate that climate change has already caused up to 150,000 deaths per year or 
5,500,000 DALY's per year by the year 2000.606 The heatwave that struck Europe in 2003 — an event 
that scientists have attributed to global warming — is considered to be ‘directly responsible for tens of 
thousands of deaths from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases’.607 
The OHCHR report on the relationship between climate change and human rights cites 
evidence from the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report in its discussion of adverse effects of climate 
change that interfere with the right to life. The report states that: 
 
A number of observed and projected effects of climate change will pose direct and indirect 
threats to human lives. [The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC] projects with high 
confidence an increase in people suffering from death, disease and injury from heatwaves, 
floods, storms, fires and droughts. Equally, climate change will affect the right to life through 
an increase in hunger and malnutrition [...] Climate change will exacerbate weather-related 
disasters which already have devastating effects on people and their enjoyment of the right to 
life, particularly in the developing world.608  
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The impacts of climate change on the right to life were also spelt out in the December 2005 
Inuit petition to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.609 This described how climate 
change-induced changes in ice and snow were jeopardising individual Inuit lives: as sea ice gets 
thinner, freezes later in the year and thaws earlier, this causes injury and loss of life. Fish and wildlife 
which are the Inuit's primary food sources, become scarcer and more difficult to catch, and sudden, 
unpredictable storms increase the risk of fatal accidents for hunters. Furthermore, the melting summer 
ice has made the seas rougher, and threatens the lives of hunters in boats.610 The possible and actual 
impacts of climate change on the right to life have further been set out in information submitted by 
States that fed into the OHCHR study on climate change and human rights. For example, the 
submission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the OHCHR explains how flooding and the 
increased scale, intensity and frequency of sea surges and other extreme weather events could lead to 
injury and loss of life.611 It also states that ‘The potential for severe flooding could result in permanent 
inundation, especially in those areas with small land masses, leading to forced migration or loss of 
life’.612 
In its General Comment No. 6 on the Right to Life, the HRC states explicitly that the right to 
life ‘is a right which should not be interpreted narrowly’.613 This reflects the position of all human 
rights bodies with respect to the scope of the right to life. For example, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has stated that the ‘fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every human 
being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented from 
having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence’.614 Moreover, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights declared that the link between the right to life and a safe 
and healthy environment in SERAC v Nigeria. In this case the Commission found a violation of the 
right to life where ‘The pollution and environmental degradation to a level humanly unacceptable has 
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made it living in the Ogoni land a nightmare’.615 Consequently, the right is understood by 
commentators as protecting the ability of each individual to ‘have access to the means of survival; 
realize full life expectancy; avoid serious environmental risks to life; and to enjoy protection by the 
State against unwarranted deprivation of life’.616  
The HRC’s views on EHP v Canada made it clear that environmental harm is recognised as a 
valid cause for action under Article 6 of the ICCPR.617 The communication was submitted by an 
individual on her own right and, as chairperson of an environmental organisation, ‘on the behalf of the 
present and future generations of Port Hope, Ontario, Canada’.618 The author claimed that the storage 
of radioactive nuclear waste near a residential area constituted a threat to the life of present and future 
generations of Port Hope, specifying that excessive exposure to radioactivity was a known cause of 
cancer and genetic defects, and that constitute health hazards for Port Hope residents including alpha, 
beta, and gamma emissions, and radon gas emissions above the approved safety levels.619 Although the 
HRC declared the communication inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of national remedies, 
it made an important statement insofar as it recognised that the communication ‘[raised] serious issues 
with regard to the obligation of States parties to protect human life (Article 6(1))’.620  
 The text of Article 6(1) generates two categories of obligations: a prohibition of the arbitrary 
deprivation of life, and an obligation to take positive measures to ensure that right, particularly 
measures to ensure its protection in law.621 The prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of life is 
interpreted as creating obligations for State parties to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security 
forces, whilst requiring States to take measures to prevent and punish the deprivation of life by non-
State actors.622 Nowak considers that ‘the term “arbitrarily” aims at the specific circumstances of an 
individual case and their reasonableness (proportionality), making it difficult to comprehend in 
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abstracto’.623 However, the context of the ICCPR makes it clear that the deprivation of life resulting 
from a ‘distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ automatically amounts to ‘arbitrary 
deprivations’. Furthermore, because ‘arbitrariness’ is interpreted broadly, obligations to prevent the 
arbitrary deprivation of life and to ‘ensure’ the right may well overlap.  
 The positive obligations of States under the Covenant include an obligation, stipulated in 
Article 2(2), to take the necessary steps to adopt such laws or other measures to give effect to the rights 
recognised in the Covenant.624 The text of Article 6(1) of the ICCPR again stipulates that States must 
protect the right to life ‘by law’. Accordingly, the HRC has found that the law’s protection is required 
against a wide variety of threats, including infanticide committed to protect a woman’s honour,625 
killings resulting from the availability of firearms to the general public,626 and the ‘production, testing, 
possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons’.627 At the European level, the ECtHR holds that 
the States’ legislative and administrative framework must protect against a wide variety of threats to 
human life.628 In Oneryildiz v Turkey it held that this obligation applies in the context of public or 
private activities which pose a risk to human life, including environmental harm.629 The Committee has 
stressed that the legal requirement to protect the right to life is unqualified and of immediate effect.630 
According to Nowak, a violation of the obligation to protect the right to life by law can be assumed 
‘when State legislation is lacking altogether or when it is manifestly insufficient as measured against 
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the actual threat’.631 Ramcharan considers that ‘deaths resulting from a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human 
environment’ could amount to a violation of the right to life.632 
The positive obligations of States under the right to life not only include, but go beyond, an 
obligation to take legislative measures.633 Demonstrating what Nowak calls a ‘resolute application of 
the premises derived from Art. 6’,634 the HRC has taken the view that the right requires that States take 
‘measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to 
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics’.635 This requirement is in accordance with the general obligation 
of States ‘to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the Covenant’.636 More specifically, it reflects the HRC’s understanding that these 
positive obligations, will only be fully met if States protect individuals against violations by its agents 
as well as violations committed by private persons or entities likely to prejudice the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights.637 Moreover, ‘There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant 
rights as required by Article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result 
of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities’.638 
Similarly, in the landmark IACtHR case Velásquez Radríguez v Honduras,639 the State’s failure to take 
action to prevent a violation, or to respond to it, constituted a violation of the right to life.640 The Court 
ruled that State responsibility for the violation had arisen ‘not because of the act [of abduction and 
killing] itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as 
required by the Convention’.641 It is worth noting that the notion of ‘due diligence’ has been 
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incorporated into various instruments dealing with violence against women,642 and applied in cases 
involving alleged violations of the right to life in cases of domestic violence.643 The effect of applying 
the notion was to safeguard the effectiveness of the human rights regime: it placed the burden of proof 
squarely on the State, requiring it to demonstrate that it had taken all necessary measures to prevent 
domestic violence and to protect the applicant against abuse by a private person.644 Moreover, the 
burden of acquiring information on potential risks to human life rested with the State.645  
 ECtHR jurisprudence, starting with Osman v UK,646 suggests that the standard of care required 
in relation to a risk, of which the State had actual or presumed knowledge, is one of reasonableness: 
‘The Court does not accept [...] that the failure to perceive the risk to life in the circumstances known at 
the time or to take preventive measures to avoid that risk must be tantamount to gross negligence or 
wilful disregard of the duty to protect life. [...] Such a rigid standard must be considered to be 
incompatible with the requirements of [the right to life]. ...[H]aving regard to the [fundamental] nature 
of [the right], it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be 
reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to 
have knowledge’.647 In Budayeva v Russia the ECtHR summarised States’ obligations to protect human 
life against environmental risks as ‘a positive obligation to take regulatory measures and to adequately 
inform the public about any life-threatening emergency, and to ensure that any occasion of the deaths 
caused thereby would be followed by a judicial inquiry’.648 In Oneryildiz v Turkey, the Court relied on 
its vast body of jurisprudence on environmental hazard cases under Article 8 of the Convention, 
providing for the right to private and family life.649 This finding was reiterated in Guerra v Italy650 
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where the Court found that the State had human rights obligations due to its failure to communicate 
essential information to the applicants ‘that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and their 
families might run if they continued to live in Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to danger in 
the event of an accident at the factory’.651 
 The case of Tatar C. v Roumanie652 suggests that States’ obligations to address a ‘serious and 
substantial risk’ to life caused by environmental pollution overlap substantially with ‘due diligence’ 
obligations arising from the precautionary principle (which is incorporated into Art. 3(1) of the 
UNFCCC and customary international law; see Section 2.1). The case concerned pollution that 
allegedly caused asthma in the applicants. The issue before the Court was that the evidence was 
inconclusive on causation (that is, regarding the existence of a causal link between pollution and the 
asthma of the applicants). The Court found in favour of the applicants, finding that no proof of 
causation was needed to establish a violation of Article 8 that had been brought about through the 
State’s failure to prevent environmental pollution.653 It stressed that even in the absence of scientific 
probability regarding a causal link, the existence of a serious and substantial risk to health and well-
being of the applicants imposed on the State ‘a positive obligation to adopt adequate measures capable 
of protecting the rights of the applicants to respect for their private and family life and, more generally, 
to the enjoyment of a healthy and protected environment’.654 Because it is the ECtHR’s position that its 
reasoning in relation to States' obligations under Article 8 ‘is applicable a fortiori in respect of Article 
2’,655 we can safely assume that when environmental disturbance poses a serious and substantial risk to 
human life, this will impose even stronger obligations on States to avert that risk.  
 From Tatar C. v Roumanie, and more generally from the interpretative practice of human rights 
bodies pertaining to the right to life, it appears that obligations to ensure this right overlap with, but go 
further than, ‘due diligence’ obligations under the no-harm rule and the UNFCCC. This means that 
States are not only obliged to assess potential risks to human life, but must also respond to any ‘serious 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
decision in Lopez Ostra v Spain App no 16798/90 (ECtHR, 9 Dec 1994) (finding a violation of Art 8 where the State had 
tolerated and promoted the establishment of a plant in a residential area that caused serious pollution and health problems to 
the inhabitants). 
650 Guerra v Italy App no 14967/89 (ECtHR, 19 Feb 1998) Reports 1998-I, no 64. 
651 Ibid para 60. The factory concerned was a fertilizer plant that produced toxic emissions. 
652 Tatar C. Roumanie App no 67021/01 (ECtHR, 5 July 2007). 
653 Ibid para 84. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Oneryildiz v Turkey, para 84. 
 
 
 
 
131 
and substantial’ risk with measures ‘designed to secure respect’ for human rights,656 and ‘capable of 
protecting [those rights]’. This interpretation shows that States do not have the discretionary powers to 
prioritise policy objectives such as the protection of particular industries over measures that would 
avert the serious and substantial risks posed by climate change to human life. Since the right to life is 
non-derogable, the obligation to assess risks and take adequate measures to protect it applies to all 
States at any time. 
 
3.3.3 The Right to Enjoy a Culture 
The right of minorities to enjoy their own culture is based on Article 27 of the UDHR, which provides 
that everyone has the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community.657 Article 27 of the 
ICCPR provides a specific right of minorities to enjoy their own culture,658 while Article 15 of the 
ICESCR expresses the universal right ‘to take part in cultural life’.659 Furthermore, Article 13 of the 
American Declaration provides the right to take part in the cultural life of the community,660 while 
Article 14 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) provides for the universal right to 
take part in the cultural and artistic life of the community.661 An almost identical provision is contained 
in Article 17 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.662 The International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) singles out ‘the right to equal 
participation in cultural activities’ as one of the rights that States must guarantee and which can be 
enjoyed without discrimination.663 The CRC provides the right to participate in all aspects of social and 
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cultural life.664 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families (CMW) provides the right of access to, and participation in, cultural 
life,665 and CEDAW Article 13 obliges States to guarantee the equal enjoyment between men and 
women of the right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life.666 
Finally, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) also provides the right of 
persons with disabilities to take part on an equal basis with others in cultural life.667  
 Article 27 of the ICCPR has proven to be one of the most important binding provisions for the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights,668 and is therefore potentially significant for indigenous 
peoples or other communities with a distinct culture which are directly exposed to the negative impacts 
of climate change. Nowak points out that this right was purposefully formulated as an individual right, 
but with the phrase ‘in community with the other members of their group’ in order to ‘maintain the idea 
of a group’,669 making it an individual right with a collective element.670 The CESCR specifies that the 
beneficiaries of the right are individuals, but that the right may be exercised either by a person as an 
individual, in association with others, or within a community or group, as such.671 Its importance for 
indigenous peoples is partly due to the HRC’s recognition of a strong link between Article 1 and 
Article 27, starting with its decision in Lubicon Lake Band v Canada,672 where it decided to consider 
the merits of the complaint concerning the right of self-determination, a right not cognisable under the 
Optional Protocol,673 under Article 27. This article has since provided an indirect way to invoke the 
provisions of Article 1. A significant part of the jurisprudence of the HRC on Article 27 now reflects 
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the simultaneous expression of the right of self-determination, which means that the standards 
identified here must be understood as adding substance to the above discussion on the right of self-
determination. 
The adverse effects of climate change on the right to enjoy a culture are partly linked with the 
impacts on the right of self-determination. Before discussing some of these effects, it is important to 
note that for the purpose of human rights law, ‘culture’ is understood as a ‘broad inclusive concept 
encompassing all manifestations of human existence’ which includes ‘natural and man-made 
environments’ and ‘the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals 
and communities express their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build their 
world view representing their encounter with the external forces affecting their lives’.674 The HRC 
clarified in Ilmari Länsman v Finland675 that under Article 27, minorities or indigenous groups have the 
right to the protection of traditional activities such as hunting, fishing or reindeer husbandry.676 It noted 
the ‘spiritual significance’ to the complainants’ culture of Mount Riutusvaara, (where the activities that 
allegedly interfered with the complainants’ right were carried out), as well as the potential negative 
effects of a disturbed environment on the quality of slaughtered reindeer.677 In Apirana Mahuika v New 
Zealand,678 the HRC reaffirmed that economic activities may come within the ambit of Article 27, if 
they are an essential element of the culture of a community.679 It recalled its finding in Ilmari Länsman 
that Article 27 does not only protect traditional means of livelihood of national minorities and that 
accordingly, the fact that a minority uses modern technology to adapt its traditional means of livelihood 
to a modern way of life does not prevent it from invoking Article 27 to protect those means.680 In 
Apirana Mahuika, it found that the Maori people’s right to enjoy the benefits of commercial fishing 
came within the scope of Article 27.681 This broad conception of culture is important for potential 
victims of climate change: as Hohmann notes in a discussion of the Inuit People petition to the IACHR, 
the process of identification of victims of human rights violations comes with the risk that potential 
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victims’ culture is represented as static. The HRC’s insistence that the right to enjoy one’s culture 
cannot be determined in abstracto but has to be placed in context682 prevents human rights litigation 
from becoming an obstacle to innovation and change, which would have potentially detrimental effects 
on people’s adaptive capacity.683 
 The enjoyment of the right to enjoy culture is most obviously affected by climate change where 
‘culture’ involves a close relationship of indigenous peoples with territory or land.684 Anthropologists 
have found that this relationship is reflected in many indigenous cultures and in indigenous languages: 
for example, in the Cook Islands Maori—a language spoken by inhabitants of islands that face 
inundation—‘enua’ means ‘land, country, territory, afterbirth’; in Futuna ‘fanua’ means ‘country, land, 
the people of a place’; and in Tonga, ‘fonua’ means ‘island, territory, estate, the people of the estate, 
placenta’ and ‘fonualoto’, ‘grave’.685 As Batibasaqa, Overton and Horsley point out, in several 
Polynesian languages ‘pro-fanua is both the people and the territory that nourishes them, as a placenta 
nourishes a baby’.686 For indigenous peoples around the world, their lands are often part of fragile 
ecosystems that are threatened or already damaged by the negative impacts of climate change, and 
often located in economically and politically marginal areas.687 The damage to ecosystems comes with 
considerable risk that indigenous cultural heritage, often developed over generations in close 
connection with a particular natural environment, may be damaged or lost.688 Indigenous peoples 
themselves have sometimes pointed out that their ties with a certain territory or land are not only 
important but also dynamic and flexible. Certain indigenous cultures are characterised by continuous 
migration: one example is the village of Tabara in north-eastern Papua New Guinea, which has a 
history of fusion, division and migration extending over 130 kilometres.689 However, many migrants 
continue to feel a linkage with their indigenous land, even after having lived elsewhere for considerable 
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periods of time.690 The loss or uninhabitable character of an indigenous territory breaks such 
connections and threatens the cultural identity of a people. Indeed, some indigenous people or peoples 
reject migration as a form of adaptation to climate change because they consider the ties to their 
territory as an essential part of their culture.691 
These observations are confirmed by the submissions made by Small Island Developing States 
to the OHCHR, which emphasise the links between the right of self-determination and traditional 
culture. For example, the submission made by the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) rejects the 
‘potential enforcement of an assertion that a low-lying, remote developing island nation can simply 
“adapt” to the physical loss of its homeland and nationhood by removing the population to a foreign 
nation’ as ‘perhaps, itself a violation of the fundamental human right to nationhood’.692 The submission 
explains that the Marshallese are known for their strong emphasis on traditional culture which values 
cooperation and sharing. It specifically explains that in accordance with its customary system of land 
tenure, land is ‘not viewed as interchangeable real estate, but instead as a foundation of national, 
cultural and personal identity and spirit’.693 The submission concludes that ‘The reclassification of the 
Marshallese as a displaced nation or, loosely defined, as “climate refugees”, is not only undesirable, but 
also unacceptable as an affront to self-determination and national dignity’.694 
 A closer examination of the HRC’s jurisprudence sheds light on the precise requirements of the 
right to enjoy culture which, when violated, would result in State responsibility. It must be noted here 
that Article 27 is the only right protected under the ICCPR that is negatively formulated in the treaty 
text. However, the HRC has consistently held that Article 27 imposes positive obligations on States. In 
the view of the Committee, Article 27 requires ‘positive legal measures of protection and measures to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect 
them’.695 It explains that ‘Positive measures of protection are [...] required not only against the acts of 
the State party itself, whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also 
against the acts of other persons within the State party’.696 The interpretation of the right as giving rise 
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to negative and positive obligations mirrors the interpretation of parallel rights protected under other 
human rights treaties. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified a close linkage between 
Article 30 CRC and Article 27 ICCPR in its General Comment on indigenous children and their rights 
under the Convention.697 This Committee has stated that States must refrain from interfering with the 
right and instead take positive measures to protect it against the acts of public authorities and against 
the acts of other persons within the State party.698 The protective measures themselves must be 
participatory.699 Along the same lines, the CESCR has interpreted the right to take part in cultural life 
(Art. 15 ICESCR) as requiring ‘both abstention (i.e., non-interference with the exercise of cultural 
practices and with access to cultural goods and services), and positive action (ensuring preconditions 
for participation, facilitation and promotion of cultural life, and access and preservation of cultural 
goods)’.700  
To give effect to the substantive and procedural dimensions of the right, the HRC’s assessment 
of States’ compliance with obligations has focused on both the consequences of States’ acts and the 
omissions and decision-making process through which the alleged violation materialised. Scheinin 
describes the test as a ‘combined test of participation by the group and sustainability of the indigenous 
economy’.701 Examples of this test are found in the HRC views on a series of cases against Finland 
brought by members of the indigenous Sami people, concerning their traditional reindeer herding 
culture.702 In Ilmari Länsman v Finland,703 the HRC suggested that the right contains a substantive 
aspect that States are obliged to protect:  
A State may understandably wish to encourage development or allow economic activity by 
enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not to be assessed by reference to a margin of 
appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken under Article 27. Article 27 
requires that a member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his own culture. Thus, 
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measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be compatible with the 
obligations under Article 27.704 
This triggered the question of ‘whether the impact of the quarrying on Mount Riutusvaara is so 
substantial that it does effectively deny the authors the right to enjoy their cultural rights in that 
region’.705 In considering this question, it examined the impacts of quarrying activities that had already 
taken place as well as any future activities that may be approved by the authorities. In Jouni Länsman v 
Finland,706 another case concerning reindeer herding in Finland alleging violation of Article 27, this 
time for logging activities, the HRC made it clear that both logging that had already taken place as well 
as ‘such logging as has been approved for the future and which will be spread over a number of years’ 
needed to be considered. In relation to both past and future activities, the question was whether the 
logging was ‘of such proportions as to deny the authors the right to enjoy their culture in that area’.707  
In both cases the HRC found no violation of Article 27. In Ilmari Länsman v Finland it 
concluded that in the amount that had already taken place, the quarrying did not constitute a denial of 
the complainants’ right to enjoy their own culture considering that the complainants and their interests 
had been considered during the proceedings leading up to the granting of the quarrying permit,708 and 
that based on the evidence, the reindeer herding in the area did not appear to have been adversely 
affected by the quarrying that had already taken place. It also considered the compatibility of approved 
future activities based on evidence submitted by the respondent State which showed, in the view of the 
HRC, compliance with its obligations: it appeared from the evidence that the State’s authorities had 
‘endeavoured to permit only quarrying which would minimise the impact on any reindeer herding 
activity in Southern Riutusvaara and on the environment’.709 More specifically, the respondent State 
had been able to prove that reindeer husbandry was protected by national legislation,710 and that the 
obligations imposed by Article 27 had been observed in the permit proceedings.711  
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Jouni E. Länsman was also decided on the basis of evidence of the State's compliance with its 
obligations. There was no agreement as to the evidence of the long-term impacts of the logging 
activities. Consequently, the HRC concluded that it could not find a violation of Article 27 on this 
basis. However, it went on to consider a range of other factors before concluding that there had been no 
violation. First, it noted that that the authorities had clearly consulted the community to which the 
complainants belonged in drawing up logging plans. Second, it found that in the consultation the 
community did not react negatively to these plans. Third, the State had been able to prove that the 
authorities had completed the process of ‘weighing [up] the complainants’ interests and the general 
economic interests in the area’ during the decision-making process. Fourth, the HRC noted that the 
national courts had considered specifically whether the proposed activities constituted a denial of rights 
under Article 27. Having considered these four factors, the HRC concluded that it was ‘not in a 
position to conclude, on the evidence before it, that the impact of logging plans would be such as to 
amount to a denial of the authors' rights under Article 27 or that the finding of the Court of Appeal 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, misinterpreted and/or misapplied article 27 of the Covenant in the light 
of the facts before it’.712 
In Apirana Mahuika v New Zealand,713 the HRC clarified its notion of the test it was applying 
in order to assess whether or not an alleged violation of Article 27 had occurred. It stated that ‘the 
acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of a 
minority depends on whether the members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they will continue 
to benefit from their traditional economy’.714 The case concerned a settlement between New Zealand 
and the Maoris to regulate all Maori fishing rights and interests, partly in replacement of an existing 
treaty between the State and the Maori. The complainants had not been part of an extensive process of 
negotiations on the settlement.715 However, the facts demonstrated that New Zealand had engaged in a 
process of broad consultation before going on to legislate and had paid specific attention to the 
sustainability of Maori fishing activities. The Maori were given access to a great percentage of quotas 
under the settlement, and thus effective possession of fisheries was returned to them. With regard to 
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commercial fisheries, the settlement established a control system in which Maori shared not only the 
role of safeguarding their interests in fisheries, but also their effective control. As regards non-
commercial fisheries, the Crown obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi continued, and regulations 
were made to recognise and provide for customary food gathering. Based on these facts, the HRC was 
unable to find that the cultural rights of the complainants had been denied. It then went on to consider 
the participation limb of the test. As with the Länsman cases, the authorities had proven that special 
attention had been paid to the cultural significance of the traditional activities of the complainants. The 
HRC held that by engaging in the process of broad consultation before legislating, and by paying 
specific attention to the sustainability of Maori fishing activities, the State had taken the necessary steps 
to ensure that the settlement and its enactment through legislation were compatible with Article 27.716 
The HRC concluded all the above cases with a statement that basically warned the respondent 
State that compliance with Article 27 was a continuous process involving systematic consideration of 
the impact of the State’s activities and the activities of private actors on the enjoyment of cultural rights 
by minorities. In Ilmari Länsman it even suggested that the very activities that were subject of the 
communication could give rise to a violation in different circumstances: it stated that if mining 
activities in the Angeli area were approved on a large scale and significantly expanded by those 
companies to which permits had been issued, then this might constitute a violation of the complainant’s 
right under Article 27. It reiterated that ‘future economic activities must, in order to comply with 
Article 27, be carried out in a way that the authors continue to benefit from reindeer husbandry’,717 and 
that the State party was ‘under a duty to bear this in mind when either extending existing contracts or 
granting new ones’.718 Similarly, in Apirana Mahuika the Committee clarified that in the further 
implementation of the relevant legislation the State eas obliged to bear in mind that ‘measures affecting 
the economic activities of Maori must be carried out in a way that the authors continue to enjoy their 
culture, and profess and practice their religion in community with other members of their group’.719 It 
went even further in Jouni E. Länsman, by adding that,  
The Committee is aware, on the basis of earlier communications, that other large-scale 
exploitations touching upon the natural environment, such as quarrying, are being planned and 
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implemented in the area where the Sami people live. Even though in the present communication 
the Committee has reached the conclusion that the facts of the case do not reveal a violation of 
the rights of the authors, the Committee deems it important to point out that the State party 
must bear in mind when taking steps affecting the rights under Article 27, that though different 
activities in themselves may not constitute a violation of this article, such activities, taken 
together, may erode the rights of Sami people to enjoy their own culture.720  
These views do not just indicate the broader objective of compliance with human rights obligations, but 
are also a clear demonstration of an application of the principle embodied in Article 15 of the ARS (i.e. 
that a violation may consist of a composite act or practice). It is clear from the jurisprudence discussed 
here that obligations arising under Article 27 (which often echo the norms embodied in Art. 1) are 
positive and negative, thus presumably overlapping in part with the obligations under the rights to life, 
health and self-determination. In other words, all these rights could be taken to impose obligations on 
States to take legislative and other measures to achieve the standards of protection required under each 
of these rights. The participation dimension of the right under Article 27 is to be read in conjunction 
with Article 1 of the Covenant, and may therefore point towards an obligation to ensure that affected 
people are able to participate in decision-making on climate change at all levels. Although States may 
have acted in accordance with Article 27 and Article 1 obligations by admitting indigenous peoples 
organisations as observers (with some participation rights) to international climate negotiations under 
the UNCCC,721 the extent to which this meets the requirements of participation in decision-making has 
not yet been analysed. 
It is important to note that the interpretation of Article 27 by the HRC is indicative of a 
minimum level of protection guaranteed under Article 27. In the context of the Covenant this can be 
understood as the ‘core’ of the right which must be protected at all times.722 Given the effects of 
climate change on the ability of minorities to benefit from culturally significant activities, the approval 
of activities that cause these effects could lead to a finding of State responsibility for a violation of the 
right. 
 
                                                
 
720 Jouni E. Länsman et al. v Finland para 10.7. 
721 On public participation in international climate change negotiations, see for example Michele Betsill, ‘Environmental 
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3.3.4 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
The Preamble to the WHO Constitution adopted in 1946 recognises that the ‘enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being’.723 A more often 
cited expression of the human right to health is found in Article 12 of the ICESCR,724 and in special 
human rights treaties such as the ICERD,725 the CEDAW,726 the CRC,727 ILO Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989),728 the CMW,729 and the 
CRPD.730 
 At the regional level, the right to health is contained in Article 16 of the ACHPR731 and 
reiterated in an ACHOR Protocol on violence against women,732 and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child.733 In the Inter-American context the right is contained in Article 10 of the 
Protocol of San Salvador,734 and in the European context both the European Social Charter (ESC)735 of 
the Council of Europe as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the European Union736 
                                                
 
723 Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) (adopted 22 July 1946, entered into force 7 April 1948) 14 UNTS 
185 (Constitution of the WHO). 
724 ICESCR Art 12. The provision reads as follows: 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the 
States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The 
provision for the reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness. 
725 ICERD Art 5(e)(iv). 
726 CEDAW Arts 11(1)f, 12 and 14(2)b. 
727 CRC Art 24. 
728 ILO Convention No. 169 (adopted at the 76th General Conference of the International Labour Organization on 27 June 
1989, entered into force 5 Sept. 1991) 1650 UNTS 384 (‘ILO Convention No. 169’) Arts 7, 20, 25, and 30. 
729 CMW Art 28. 
730 CPRD Arts 25 and 26. 
731 Art 16, ACHPR provides that ‘Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health’. 
732 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa (adopted by the 2nd Ord. Sess. of the Assembly of the 
African Union, Maputo on 13 Sept. 2000, entered into force 25 Nov 2005) AU Doc CAB/LEG/66.6 (‘Protocol to the 
ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa’) Art 14. 
733 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 Nov 1999) OAU 
Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (‘African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’) Arts 14, 11(2)(h). 
734 Protocol of San Salvador, Art 10 provides that ‘Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the 
enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being ... [and that] ... In order to ensure the exercise of the 
right to health, the States Parties agree to recognize health as a public good....’ 
735 European Social Charter (adopted 18 Oct. 1961, entered into force 26 Feb. 1965) 529 UNTS 89; revised and adopted as 
European Social Charter (entered into force 7 Jan. 1999) ETS No. 163 (‘ESC’) Arts 11 and 13. 
736 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (adopted 7 Dec. 2000, entered into force 1 Dec. 2009) reprinted in 
Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 Dec. 2000 (OJ C 364/01) (CFR) Art 35. 
 
 
 
 
142 
contain the right to health. The Arab CHR of the League of Arab States also recognises the right to 
health.737 Finally, the Organization of Islamic States (OIC) has endorsed the human right to health in 
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.738 The human right to health is now generally 
accepted as part of customary international law.739 This conclusion is based on the widespread 
ratification of human rights treaties and other instruments containing the right to health, and on the 
commitment of governments to the provision of health care services pursuant to national legislation.740 
The CESCR has emphasised that although ‘the right to health is not to be understood as a right 
to be healthy’,741 it nonetheless creates States’ obligations.742 The CESCR has emphasised that ‘Health 
is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights’.743 The text of 
Article 12 of the CESCR (and of Art. 24, CRC) make it clear that the general scope of the right extends 
beyond the provision of health care, and includes provision for the general conditions for health such as 
‘adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the 
population’s exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other 
detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health’.744 
Mirroring the language of Article 25(1) of the UDHR, the right to health is defined in Article 12(1) of 
the ICESCR as a right of ‘everyone’. The CESCR has confirmed that the right is a right of ‘Every 
human being’.745 In accordance with Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the ICESCR the enjoyment of the right 
should be non-discriminatory.746 It is significant that commentators consider that this may mean 
‘providing equal opportunities when past developments have caused serious inequalities to arise’.747  
In its study on climate change and human rights, the OHCHR notes that ‘Climate change is 
projected to affect the health status of millions of people, including through increases in malnutrition, 
                                                
 
737 Arab CHR, Arts 38–39. 
738 See Art 17 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted at the 14th Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, Res. No. 49/19-P (1990). See also, Art 15 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam (adopted in June 
2005 at the 32nd Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, not yet in force) OIC Doc OIC/9-
IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep. Final (2004).  
739 Kinney (n 154) 1464–67 and 1475. 
740 Ibid 1466. 
741 General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) para 8. 
742 Ibid paras 30–45. 
743 Ibid para 1. 
744 Ibid para 15. 
745 Ibid. 
746 General Comment No. 14: Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Life (Article 6) para 35. 
747 Asbjørn Eide, ‘The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina 
Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Eonomic, Social and Cultural Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 144. 
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increased diseases and injury due to extreme weather events, and an increased burden of diarrhoeal, 
cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases. Global warming may also affect the spread of malaria and 
other vector borne diseases in some parts of the world’.748 The report goes on to note that ‘Non-climate 
related factors, such as education, health care [and] public health initiatives are critical in determining 
how global warming will affect the health of populations. Protecting the right to health in the face of 
climate change will require comprehensive measures, including mitigating the adverse impacts of 
global warming on underlying determinants of health and giving priority to protecting vulnerable 
individuals and communities’.749 Hunt has also drawn attention to the impacts of climate change on the 
right to health in his capacity as a Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
Physical and Mental Health; a post created by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2002.750 In his 
report to the 62nd General Assembly he lists several impacts of climate change on the right to health, 
including a decline in dependable access to water; disruption in natural ecosystems; increases in the 
range and season of disease-spreading vectors; and various adverse health impacts of droughts and 
floods.751 He claims that ‘The failure of the international community to take the health impact of global 
warming seriously will endanger the lives of millions of people across the world’.752 
Rising temperatures and sea levels, droughts, desertification, heatwaves and extreme weather 
events753 indeed have significant impacts on the right to the highest attainable standard of health and 
related human rights. Globally, an estimated 1.8 billion people run the risk of having to live in a water-
scarce environment by 2080 as a consequence of climate change.754 Water-borne and vector-borne 
diseases such as cholera, malaria, hantavirus, dengue fever, scrub typhus and schistosomiasis are 
expected to increase as a result of temperature and geographic changes that are causally linked with 
                                                
 
748 OHCHR Report on Climate Change and Human Rights (n 36) para 32 (footnotes omitted). 
749 Ibid para 34 (footnotes omitted). 
750 UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. No. 2002/31 (2002). 
751 Paul Hunt, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc A/62/214 (8 August 2007) ’ 45379 1, 22 (paras 100–101). 
752 Ibid para 102. 
753 These impacts are described in several studies. See, for example, The Informal Taskforce on Climate Change of the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee and The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies 
and Risk Management Practices, “Critical Elements for Adaptation to Climate Change. Submission to the UNFCCC Ad hoc 
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climate change.755 Africa and Asia are the world regions worst affected by climate change impacts on 
heat and cold-related illnesses, estimated to have caused 35,000 additional deaths a year in 2010.756 
Several climate-sensitive infections are already resurfacing757 together with conditions which are 
increasingly conducive for mosquitoes, and the increased transmission risks and highland epidemics.758 
The World Health Organisation (WHO)’s World Malaria Report 2011 notes that thirty-five countries in 
central Africa bear the highest burden of cases (over 80 per cent) and deaths (over 90 per cent).759 The 
population at risk of malaria in Africa is projected to grow by 170 million by 2030,760 and vulnerable 
groups such as children,761 the elderly, and pregnant women762 will be hardest hit. The vulnerability of 
these groups is also high in relation to cholera. The WHO attributes this increase in significant part to 
the increasing occurrence of extreme weather events which undermines transmission pathways.763  
Farming societies at lower latitudes will face decreasing crop productivity even from small 
local temperature increases. Africa is generally recognised as the world’s most vulnerable region in 
terms of climate change impacts on agricultural produce764 and fishery losses.765 This is due to ‘the 
range of projected impacts, multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity’.766 In West, East and Sub-
Saharan Africa the median temperature increase is expected to be between 3º C and 4º C, roughly 150 
per cent of the global mean temperature rise.767 Experiments within higher emission scenarios even 
project levels of warming for the period 2070–2099 of up to 9º C for North Africa (Mediterranean 
coast) in June to August, and up to 7º C for Southern Africa in September to November.768 Droughts in 
                                                
 
755 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report’ 
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(n 755) 446. 
763 World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization, Atlas of Health and Climate (2012) at 14. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa are occurring more frequently and lasting longer.769 Crop yields could drop across 
large regions of sub-Saharan Africa by as much as 50 per cent by 2020.770 Studies carried out in 2011 
show that a temperature rise of just 1º C. (much less than what is currently projected even under the 
most optimistic scenarios) could cut yields from three-quarters of Africa's entire maize crop by at least 
20 per cent.771 These impacts increase the risk of malnutrition: the estimated result of droughts and 
rising temperatures in Africa is that tens of millions more individuals are likely to be exposed to the 
risk of food insecurity and the health consequences of malnutrition.772 
The obligations arising from the right to health are understood as including ‘immediate 
obligations ... [to] ... guarantee that the right will be exercised without discrimination of any kind’ and 
to take steps ‘towards the full realization’ of the right that ‘must be deliberate, concrete and targeted 
towards the full realization of the right to health’.773 To clarify the content of States’ obligations, the 
CESCR has used a respect-protect-fulfil typology of obligations that arise from the right to health.774 It 
understands the obligation to ‘respect’ the right as ‘an obligation of States to respect the freedom of 
individuals and groups to preserve and to make use of their existing entitlements’.775 States are 
therefore obliged to ensure ‘the effective implementation of the obligations arising from other human 
rights provisions: the right to property, the right to work with an adequate income, and/or the right to 
social security’,776 and to guarantee and uphold the collective land rights of indigenous peoples.777 The 
CESCR has interpreted the right to health as requiring respect for the right to health of a people within 
a State’s territory and in other States,778 entailing an obligation ‘to refrain from unlawfully polluting 
air, water and soil, e.g. through industrial waste from State-owned facilities’.779 Commentators consider 
that the right could be violated ‘if a state encroaches upon people's health by, for example [...] engaging 
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770 World Health Organization, Protecting Health from Climate Change: Connecting Science, Policy and People (n 755) 20. 
771 Ibid. 
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773 General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) para 30. 
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in [...] [environmental] activities detrimental to people’s health’780 and, in the context of climate 
change, by actively engaging in ‘activities that harm the composition of the global atmosphere or 
arbitrarily interfere with healthy environmental conditions’.781 The obligation to protect the right to 
health involves ‘the preservation of existing entitlements or resource bases’, including regulation782 and 
through legal or political means, in accordance with the UN Charter and applicable international law.783 
States must prevent ‘encroachment on the land of indigenous peoples or vulnerable groups’,784 ‘ensure 
food availability, regulation of food prices and subsidies, and rationing of essentials while ensuring 
producers a fair price’,785 and prevent private enterprises from engaging in environmental pollution 
‘especially when it contaminates the food chain’.786 The literature claims, correctly in the view of this 
author, that States’ obligations to protect the right against infringements by private actors entails an 
obligation to regulate private actors in order to achieve and uphold emission limitation and reduction 
standards,787 and to adopt and implement ‘laws, plans, policies, programmes and projects that tackle the 
adverse effects of climate change’.788 Indeed, the CESCR has interpreted the right to health as requiring 
that States ensure that international instruments ‘do not adversely impact upon the right to health’.789 
This again implies an obligation to assess the impacts of potential climate agreements on the enjoyment 
of human rights before concluding such agreements and refraining from concluding agreements that 
lead to infringements of the right or a impaired enjoyment of that right.  
 The ACHPR decision in SERAC v Nigeria illustrates how a violation of the right to health can 
arise from a State’s failure to regulate private actors engaged in polluting activities.790 This decision, 
and the CESCR’s interpretation of Article 12 of the ICESCR, illustrate how the right to health requires 
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States to provide beneficiaries of the right with information about serious health risks. Indeed, the 
State’s failure to produce basic health and environmental impact assessments was a significant factor in 
establishing a violation of the right to health.791 This requirement relates both to the prevention of 
environmental harm and to the ability of beneficiaries to protect themselves against associated health 
risks. This dimension is closely related to what the CESCR describes as the obligations to ‘fulfill’ the 
right to health; a positive obligation that is triggered ‘whenever an individual or group is unable, for 
reasons beyond their control’ to enjoy the right ‘by the means at their disposal’. It also mentions 
‘victims of natural or other disasters’792 as persons who may need additional protection. It basically 
requires that the State ‘be the provider’, which ‘can range anywhere from a minimum safety net, 
providing that it keeps everyone above the poverty line appropriate to the level of development of that 
country, to a full comprehensive welfare model...’793 According to the CESCR, States must give 
‘sufficient recognition to the right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by 
way of legislative implementation’,794 and must allocate ‘a sufficient percentage of a State's available 
budget [...] to the right to health’.795 States are required to adopt measures against environmental and 
occupational health hazards,796 and a coherent national policy to minimise the risk of occupational 
accidents and diseases, which must be formulated, implemented and periodically reviewed.797 National 
policies to reduce and eliminate air, water and soil pollution should be formulated and implemented.798 
The right to health must be given ‘due attention in international agreements’ and may require, in the 
view of the CESCR, ‘the development of further legal instruments’. States are also required to 
‘facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries, wherever possible 
and [to] provide the necessary aid when required’.799 This is interpreted as an obligation on high-
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income States to facilitate access to essential health service as well as assistance to adapt to climate 
change in low-income States.800 Once again, the parallel obligations contained in the UNFCCC could 
serve as a bottom line in the interpretation of these obligations.  
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3.4 Conflict Between Rights 
The analysis of rights has confirmed what has long been observed in the analysis of human rights 
jurisprudence, namely that there are ‘more extensive obligations on States than are immediately 
obvious from a superficial perusal of the text’. In particular, compliance with human rights obligations 
may involve more than just regulation, and require ‘actual expenditure and the deployment of resources 
to ensure that the right can be freely exercised “without interference from private individuals”’.801 In 
the worst case scenario this could mean ‘considerable trouble and expense as a result of an obligation 
to advance particular social or economic policies which [the government of a particular State] may not 
wholly support’.802 Indeed, even negatively formulated rights trigger obligations to take measures that 
are ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting human rights 
obligations’.803 At the same time, rights can conflict, especially in the context of a global problem that 
is entwined with virtually all aspects of the modern society. Humphreys is concerned that conflicting 
rights could undermine the potential of international human rights law to protect human beings against 
adverse effects of climate change, and sustains that ‘it is foreseeable that some [economic rights 
holders] will invoke the human right to property or peaceful enjoyment of their possessions to prevent 
or reduce action on climate change [...]’.804 This raises the question of how the content of States’ 
human rights obligations should be determined in cases of conflicting rights related to climate change. 
The fact that artificial entities such as corporations do not have rights under international human rights 
treaties means that this question can only be answered by reference to States’ obligations owed to 
peoples and individuals.805 At the same time, States’ human rights obligations extend to beneficiaries 
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everywhere irrespective of their location or nationality806 insofar as beneficiaries are affected by the 
State’s instrumentalities (see Section 2.2.2). Situations of conflicting rights at any level, national or 
global, must therefore be resolved through an analysis of the States’ sovereign capacity to prevent the 
violation of a right but without violating other human rights in the process.807 This analysis necessarily 
involves an analysis of the scope of States’ obligations related to the substantive rights at stake, in view 
of their object and purpose.  
 It is important to recall that the limitations of certain rights are spelt out in detail. For example, 
imposing the death penalty in certain cases, killing during armed conflicts and the use of reasonable 
force by law enforcement agents are identified as the only possibly lawful limitations on the right to 
life. These specific limitations contrast with the much broader limitations permitted in relation to 
economic and social rights. In relation to the right to property, it is important to note that it has possibly 
the widest range of potentially permitted limitations of all human rights.808 However, States’ discretion 
to interfere with the enjoyment of a right is again limited in cases where the interference 
simultaneously interferes with other rights. This reflects the conclusion of the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights that ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated’,809 already alluded to in Section 2.1. 
 There are plenty of examples of how established limitations of human rights affect States’ 
obligations in cases where rights conflict. A good example is the ECtHR case Mastromatteo v Italy,810 
in which the ECtHR carried out a risk assessment to establish whether obligations to protect the right to 
life had been complied with. The case considered the compatibility of a prisoner release scheme with 
Article 2 of the ECHR and arose from a claim that the State had violated its positive obligations to 
protect the right to life as a result of the risk created by prisoners who were released through the 
scheme. The Court scrutinised the key features of the scheme—including statistical evidence on the 
behaviour of prisoners granted early release—and extrapolated from these that the authorities could not 
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have foreseen that the release of this particular prisoner would pose a real threat to life.811Accordingly, 
it found no violation. It is worth noting that the case was decided solely with reference to the States’ 
obligations to protect the right to life: neither the government in its submissions, nor the Court in its 
judgement referred to a potential conflict between the applicant’s right to life and the prisoners’ right to 
liberty. This is based on the understanding that the right to liberty can be limited through criminal law 
which, in the light of the evidence, made the continued interference with the right that would have 
occurred if the prisoner had remained in presumably lawful detention.812 Based on this presumption, 
the question before the Court centred on the extent of the interference with the right to liberty that was 
required to protect the right to life. In the context of climate change, apparent conflicts between rights 
could also be easy to resolve where it is clear from the context that one right (e.g. the right to property) 
is subject to broad permitted limitations, whereas another right (e.g. the right to life) is not. 
Mastromatteo v Italy also confirms that analyses of relatively complex evidence can be used to clarify 
the content of positive obligations. This in turn indicates a potential for reliance on existing scientific 
evidence of climate change-related risks to human life, well-being and culture to establish the content 
of States’ obligations to prevent and avert those risks.  
 Treaty texts provide further guidance on how to deal with situations of conflicting rights. For 
example, as noted above, Article 47 of the ICCPR and Article 35 of the ICESCR provide that nothing 
in the Covenants ‘shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize 
fully and freely their natural wealth and resources’. The jurisprudence of the HRC furthermore suggests 
that States' obligations under Article 1 can influence the interpretation of other Covenant provisions, 
and the case of Gillot v France demonstrated that Article 1 may be invoked not just to reinforce other 
rights, but also to justify limitations to the exercise of the rights of individuals where the limitation is a 
reasonable measure to promote the collective right of self-determination.813 This interpretation reflects 
                                                
 
811 Ibid 76. 
812 The case of Tim de Christopher illustrates, however, that the criminal law can also be abused to restrict the right to 
liberty of peaceful protestors. On this case see http://www.peacefuluprising.org. 
813 Marie-Hélène Gillot et al. v France (Communication No. 932/2000) para 3.16. This finding is significant in view of the 
Committee's position that Art 1 cannot be invoked by individuals in communications submitted under the individual 
complaints procedure. General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art 27) para 3.1; HRC, Ivan Kitok v Sweden 
(Communication No. 197/1985) HRC para 6.3; Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada), para 13.3; Marshall v 
Canada (Communication No. 205/1986) (also known as Second communication by Mikmaq Tribal Society v Canada) para 
5.1 and Apirana Mahuika et al. v New Zealand para 9.2. This restrictive approach has been criticised: Nowak, for example, 
asserts that in spite of the fact that the Covenant is formulated "more individualistically" than some other human rights 
treaties, ‘both the travaux préparatoires and the purpose of [the Covenant provisions] show [...] that the choice of the word 
“individual” does not necessarily rule out that certain collectivities (religious societies, associations, parties, trade unions, 
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the principle that measures ‘aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of 
[human rights] may constitute a legitimate differentiation under the Covenant, provided that they are 
based on reasonable and objective criteria’.814 It is also clear that under international human rights law, 
‘positive action [required to promote a right] must be consistent with the States' obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations and under international law: in particular, States must refrain from 
interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby adversely affecting the exercise of the right 
to self-determination’.815 
Another relevant principle for dealing with potentially conflicting rights is the principle of non-
discrimination. International human rights law permits and sometimes requires ‘some sort of privileged 
treatment [...] in order to achieve real equality’.816 This broader objective of achieving substantive 
equality, as manifested and operationalised through the principle of non-discrimination, is particularly 
important in the context of climate change. The principle basically prescribes that a State may have to 
treat right-holders who are in different positions differently, if treating them similarly would perpetuate 
inequalities.817 Human rights jurisprudence shows that the principle is capable of creating positive 
obligations in relation to all human rights.818 The CESCR has emphasised that in the context of the 
right to health, the non-discrimination principle entails an obligation for States to take affirmative 
measures particularly to ensure this right for women, children and adolescents, the elderly, persons 
with disabilities and indigenous peoples.819 In Lubicon Lake Band v Canada,820 the HRC held that 
‘historical inequities and certain more recent developments’ threatened the way of life and culture of 
the Lubicon Lake Band in violation of Article 27,821 thus indicating that the combination of historical 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
minorities) may rely on the Covenant's rights of relevance to them and enforce these by means of an “individual 
communication”’). Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 14. 
814 General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art 27) para 6.2. This principle was decisive in the HRC's Views on 
a communication concerning an alleged violation of Art 25 (public participation). The HRC found that State conduct that 
limited the right of public participation of certain citizens could be justified where this limitation was a reasonable measure 
to promote the collective right of self-determination. Marie-Hélène Gillot et al. v France, para 3.16. 
815 General Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art 1) para 6. 
816 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 662. 
817 See also, United Nations Development Programme (n 2) 147 (suggesting that developed States that do not respect the 
CBDRRC principle act contrary to their international commitments on poverty reduction). 
818 See generally Curtis Francis Doebbler, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Law (CD Publishing 2007). 
See also, de Schutter et al. (n 144) 1086; and Miriam Alfie Cohen, ‘Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human 
Rights Treaties: United States' Violation of Its International Obligations’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 
249. 
819 General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) paras 21–27. 
820 Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada. 
821 Ibid para 33. 
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inequities and developments that perpetuate those inequities can constitute a breach of human rights 
obligations. States acquire positive obligations to protect minorities because equality ‘cannot be 
achieved by mere State obligations of non-interference, since experience shows that minorities, and 
indigenous peoples in particular, are not only threatened by government action but equally by other, 
more dominant [...] groups, by businesses and similarly powerful private actors’.822 Indeed, the analysis 
in Section 3.3.3 has shown that international human rights law requires affirmative measures to protect 
peoples and members of minorities with a distinct culture, also through consultation on measures that 
may interfere with these traditional economies. These interpretations suggest that differentiation 
between beneficiaries of human rights may potentially be used in any situation of conflicting rights that 
exists or emerges as a result of climate change and associated effects on the distribution of public and 
private resources. 
The decision of the European Committee on Social Rights (‘the Committee’) on a complaint 
against France in a discrimination case is a useful illustration of how compliance with ‘best effort’ 
obligations that arise from the overarching prohibition of discrimination can be assessed in cases where 
realisation on the right places a considerable burden on a State’s resources. The case, Autism-Europe v 
France, arose from a complaint that France was failing to take sufficient measures to guarantee 
equality in access to education for individuals suffering from autism, in violation of the right of persons 
with disabilities to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community (Art. 
15), the right of children to education and training (Art. 17(1)), and the prohibition of discrimination 
(Art. E, Part V). After noting that ‘failing to take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective 
advantages that are open to all are genuinely accessible by and to all’823 the Committee found that the 
substantive rights and the prohibition of discrimination were ‘so intertwined as to be inseparable’.824 It 
found a violation of the three provisions in question based on the ratio that the Charter required States 
[T]o take not merely legal action but also practical action to give full effect to the rights 
recognised in the Charter. When the achievement of one of the rights in question is 
exceptionally complex and particularly expensive to resolve, a State Party must take measures 
that allows it to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable 
progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of resources. States Parties must be 
                                                
 
822 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (n 166) 662. 
823 Autism-Europe v France Complaint No. 13/2002 (4 Nov 2003) para 27.  
824 Ibid para 47.  
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particularly mindful of the impact that their choices will have for groups with heightened 
vulnerabilities. 825 
The decision in Autism-Europe v France illustrates an important point, namely that positive obligations 
arising from the prohibition of discrimination can be exercised in a way that reconciles the immediate 
nature of those obligations with concurring obligations and in so doing ensures the realisation of 
potentially competing rights. This reflects a standard that could be meaningfully used to reconcile 
States’ obligations to protect peoples and individuals against the adverse effects of climate change with 
co-existing obligations to protect the equal rights of those who have obtained negligible benefits from 
emission-producing activities.826 Autism-Europe v France shows how obligations identified using such 
a standard are enforceable, and more specifically that the right not to be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of rights can be violated ‘when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail 
to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different’.827  
 We should note, however, that evidential difficulties almost inevitably arise in determining the 
scope of States’ obligations when conflicts between rights involve beneficiaries within the State’s 
territory as well as a potentially never-ending number of beneficiaries abroad. Part of the answer lies in 
acknowledging that ‘Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs’ it is often ‘for the 
national authorities to make the initial assessment both of the existence of a problem of public concern 
warranting measures [that may limit the enjoyment of a particular human right]’.828 As indicated in 
Chapter 1, some States have already presented evidence of the actual and potential adverse effects of 
climate change on human life and well-being to the attention of other States in international forums 
such as the UN Human Rights Council. In relation to this evidence, it remains unclear what the precise 
obligations of each State are in connection with the risk climate change poses to the enjoyment of 
human rights—a question that involves considering to what extent States may need to restrict the 
enjoyment of rights within their own territory to prevent the violation of rights in other countries. The 
significance of ‘systemic integration’ is perhaps most apparent in relation to this question, as the 
                                                
 
825 Ibid para 53.  
826 The estimated 1.3 billion individuals without access to electricity and 2.6 billion people without clean cooking 
conditions could be considered as particularly disadvantaged groups entitled to positive measures in the context of climate 
change mitigation. See International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2013 (n 117). 
827. Autism-Europe v France, para 52, quoting from Thlimmenos v Greece App no 34369/97 (ECtHR, 6 April 2000) ECHR 
2000-IV para 44.  
828 Case of James et al. v United Kingdom (1986) Series A no 98, para 46. See also, Handyside v UK (1996) Series A no 24, 
1 EHRR 737, para 48. 
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content of a State’s otherwise unspecific human rights obligations vis-à-vis beneficiaries of human 
rights everywhere may be illuminated by reference to the principle of CBDRRC.  
 The principle of CBDRRC and the provisions of Article 4 of the UNFCCC which 
operationalise it ensure that the objective of preventing dangerous climate change is met without 
exacerbating existing inequalities. The key point here is that although the principle of CBDRRC 
applies exclusively to relations between States, it shares with international human rights law the 
objective of achieving substantive equality.829 Accordingly, CBDRRC could function as an application 
of the human rights principle of non-discrimination in inter-State relations, making it a form of 
affirmative action to correct historical inequities to ensure the equal enjoyment of rights at the global 
level. This application is consistent with the express prohibition of discrimination based on nationality 
under international human rights law and its interpretation as requiring States to take positive steps to 
eradicate discrimination. This was highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing, 
Raquel Rolnik, when she stated that as a result of States’ obligations to protect the right to adequate 
housing and the principle of non-discrimination, ‘Industrialized countries must lead in reducing 
emissions levels and support developing countries in pursuing low-carbon development paths’.830 
Similarly, Hunt and Khosla have argued that in light of the ‘irony for many developing countries [...] 
that, while they have contributed the least to the process of climate change, they are the ones most at 
risk from its consequences, and least able to cope’831 developed States have ‘a human rights duty, 
arising from non-discrimination and equality, to take reasonable steps to stop and reverse climate 
change’.832 This makes the erosion of the CBDRRC-based accountability framework established under 
the Kyoto Protocol extremely important from an international human rights law perspective. 
  
 
                                                
 
829 Cordonier Segger et al. (n 204) 57 (explaining that differentiated responsibility ‘aims to promote substantive equality 
between developing and developed States within a regime, rather than mere formal equality’ whereby ‘the aim is to ensure 
that developing countries can come into compliance with particular legal rules over time — thereby strengthening the 
regime in the long term’). 
830 UN HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard 
of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in This Context, UN Doc A/64/255 (6 August 2009) para 70.  
831 United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, Address to High-Level Event on Climate Change, 24 Sept. 2007, 
quoted in: Hunt and Khosla (n 781) 250. 
832 Ibid. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In view of the fact that it is private actors, not States, who are the main emitters of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases, it is significant that a failure to take certain action can be attributed to a State under 
the general rule of attribution, insofar as the State was required to take that action. International human 
rights law indeed creates positive obligations to adopt measures ‘in the sphere of the relations of 
individuals between themselves’.833 This is the case not only for the rights to life and to the highest 
attainable standard of health, but also for rights of self-determination and the right to enjoy a distinct 
culture (and even where the right is negatively formulated in the treaty text). The bottom line set by 
human rights law is that the human environment remains suitable for sustaining human life and that it, 
in Shelton’s words, ‘does not deteriorate to the point where internationally guaranteed rights such as 
the rights to life, health, property, family and private life, culture and safe drinking water are seriously 
impaired’.834 The action required of each State can be determined using a contextual analysis that takes 
account of factual circumstances and environmental norms and standards that are already binding on 
the State. An important premise of this thesis is that this involves, as a minimum, compliance with 
existing legal obligations under the UNFCCC and that the differentiation of States’ obligations in 
accordance with CBDRRC is imperative to avoid perpetuating historical inequalities in the enjoyment 
of rights. 
 It is significant that States’ positive obligations to protect against threats to human life and 
health835 include obligations to establish a legislative and administrative framework that provides 
effective protection against a wide variety of threats.836 This is particularly clear from the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR on the right to life: it has found violations of the right to life in virtually all cases where 
allegedly life-threatening environmental damage constituted a breach of the States’ domestic 
environmental legislation.837 The ECtHR’s finding in Oneryildiz v Turkey that a failure to uphold 
                                                
 
833 X. and Y. v Netherlands para 23. 
834 Dinah Shelton, ‘The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals’ in Romina Picolotti and 
Jorge D Taillant (eds), Linking Human Rights and Environment (University of Arizona Press 2003) 22. 
835 See generally Knox (n 60) and Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Health & Environmental Protection: Linkages in Law & 
Practice (Background Paper for the World Health Organization, 2002). 
836 See, for example, Okyay et al. v Turkey App no 36220/97 (ECtHR, 12 July 2005). See also the cases cited in n 628. 
837 Shelton, ‘Litigating a Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change’ (n 27) 224 (with references, noting that ‘the Court will 
hold the state to the level of environmental protection it has chosen and nearly always finds a violation if the state fails to 
enforce its own laws’). 
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international norms related to environmental protection could amount to, or be evidence of, a human 
rights violation is particularly significant.838 Indeed, it suggests that breaches of international 
environmental legislation could trigger legal consequences under international law insofar as the breach 
simultaneously contravenes a State’s obligations under international human rights law.839 It is 
conceivable that similar consideration is given to provisions of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
which, when fully implemented, would protect human life, well-being, traditional culture or even the 
existence of entire nations. This integrative approach is based on the assumption that compliance with 
human rights obligations involves, at a minimum, upholding existing legislation that offers legal 
protection against serious and substantial risks to the enjoyment of human rights.  
 The ECtHR’s approach to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction illustrates the operation of this principle where legal protection is provided by an 
international treaty: the ECtHR has systematically considered States’ compliance with relevant 
provisions of the treaty in child abduction cases related to Article 8 of the ECHR.840 One legal scholar 
has even observed that ‘the Court looks so closely into the Hague Convention that it is sometimes 
difficult to tell whether the judges are applying the European Convention on Human Rights or the 
Hague Convention’.841 In the context of this thesis, the most interesting element of this approach is that 
apparent violations of the Hague Convention almost automatically lead to a violation of Article 8 of the 
ECHR.842 The general principle that States are obliged to respect and uphold laws and entitlements that 
provide human rights protection reflected in this approach is clearly embedded in the substantive 
human rights norms discussed above. The legal protection created by the UNFCCC consists primarily 
in its principles and commitments. As Mayer points out, ‘the very reason for the existence of a law of 
climate change [is] the guarantee of an equal right of all nations, all individuals, to enjoy their 
existence’.843 This is perhaps most apparent from its ultimate objective of preventing dangerous climate 
change and associated adverse effects on human beings, coupled with the understanding that the 
protection of the Earth’s climate is a prerequisite for human life and well-being. The principles of 
precaution, equity and CBDRRC strengthen this objective in a way that is consistent with the object 
                                                
 
838 Oneryildiz v Turkey, para 71. 
839. See, for example, E.H.P. v Canada. 
840 See, for example, Carlson v Switzerland App no 49492/06 (ECtHR, Nov 2008) para 76. 
841 Rietiker (n 327) 273. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Benoît Mayer, ‘Climate Change and International Law in the Grim Days’ (2013) 24 Eur.J.Int'lLaw. 947, 965. 
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and purpose of human rights norms. Indeed, the principle of precaution reinforces the requirement that 
States exert best efforts in ensuring human rights based on the best available scientific evidence.  
 Because the UNFCCC framework constitutes legal protection against a dangerous situation that 
would undermine the enjoyment of human rights, a breach of the UNFCCC almost certainly coincides 
with a violation of international human rights law. The doctrinal basis for this argument lies in the 
interpretation of human rights norms — which specifically require States to protect human rights 
through the rule of law — in accordance with their object and purpose, the principle of effectiveness 
and in conjunction with States’ legal duty to cooperate to realise human rights. The result of this 
interpretation is potentially enhanced accountability for States’ compliance with international 
obligations to prevent dangerous climate change and associated human rights violations.844 Judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies with a mandate to interpret human rights treaties could take account of States’ 
existing commitments to take action in accordance with an ultimate objective of preventing dangerous 
climate change when considering questions of State responsibility for human rights violations related to 
climate change. This would allow such bodies to clarify the meaning of otherwise open-textured 
provisions of international human rights law in a way that not only gives effect to the principle of 
effectiveness, but also upholds the practice of international human rights bodies to hold States to 
account for non-compliance with the standards they have set for themselves. The ultimate objective of 
the UNFCCC and the obligations that flow from it are important because protection of the Earth’s 
climate system is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of a range of human rights which States are required 
to protect under international human rights law. CBDRRC could assist human rights bodies in 
developing interpretations of obligations in line with States’ historical contributions to climate change 
and their capacity to realise not only the rights of their own people but also the rights of non-nationals 
abroad, serving as indicators of minimum standards which States have already agreed to uphold. More 
specific standards for protection could be ascertained through the interpretation of human rights 
                                                
 
844 As suggested in the Introduction, this integrative promotes accountability and enforcement. As an illustration, reference 
can be made to legal scholars' observations that if Parties to the Kyoto Protocol would fail to meet their targets during the 
first commitment period and thus violate their treaty obligations, these Parties may avoid accountability under the Kyoto's 
compliance system simply by withdrawing from the Protocol. Rajamani, ‘Addressing the ‘Post-Kyoto’ Stress Disorder: 
Reflections on the Emerging Legal Architecture of the Climate Regime’ (n 235) 282. This action would not, of course, 
affect the government's accountability at the domestic level. This seems particularly relevant in the case of Canada, where 
environmental groups already sued the government for failing to fully fulfil its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Friends of the Earth v Minister of the Environment Court File No. T-1683-07 (filed 19 Sept. 2007). The argument that there 
is an implicit link between the Kyoto Protocol and human rights—even the right to life—that is being protected by the 
limits on greenhouse gases could provide State and individual victims of climate change with avenues for raising such 
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treaties, both at human rights bodies’ own initiative and when invited to do so in the context of 
negotiations or litigation.845 The application of the principle of effectiveness—which features 
prominently in international human rights jurisprudence—may even make it imperative to consider the 
legally binding provisions of the UNFCCC as minimum ‘standards of care’ required of individual 
States under international human rights law. 
 Conversely, the lex specialis on climate change must be interpreted in accordance with 
international human rights law. This follows from the analysis of the relationship between different 
branches of international law in Section 2.2.3. This concluded that substantive human rights obligations 
are binding on all States as ‘horizontal’ norms that influence the interpretation of other treaties and 
even invalidate instruments that are not in accordance with those obligations. International human 
rights obligations may accordingly be understood as creating thresholds of minimum acceptability,846 
or as ‘levels of protection for individual rights which can be regarded as the minimum acceptable 
outcome’847 in international climate change negotiations and the interpretation of the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol. In this context, perhaps the most pressing question is what is required of States 
collectively to comply with their respective obligations to protect human rights against dangerous 
climate change.848 This involves determining what is ‘dangerous’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Convention849 and accordingly what it takes for each State to ‘take precautionary measures’ to ‘prevent 
[...] dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ in accordance with international 
human rights obligations. Although the evidence created by the IPCC provides key evidence related to 
Article 2, it only started to focus specifically on vulnerability relatively recently and appears to lack the 
                                                
 
845 Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 367) 76 (proposing that 
the content of ‘extraterritorial’ obligations can be ascertained through a contextual assessment of ‘facts and events that 
allegedly constitute a violation’). 
846 Caney (n 13) 69ff. 
847 OHCHR Report on Climate Change and Human Rights (n 36) 28. 
848 The question of environmental impacts assessment for climate change-related activities received considerable attention 
after the Federated State of Micronesia (FSM) requested a transboundary environmental impact assessment of a proposed 
coal power plant in the Czech Republic. See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, Director, Office of Environment & Emergency 
Management, to Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic, Request for a Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) proceeding from the plan for the modernisation of the Prunerov II power plant (Dec. 3, 2009), available 
at http: //www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/case-documents/cz/FSM.request.TEIA.pdf. For an academic analysis see 
Maketo Robert et al., ‘Transboundary Climate Challenge to Coal’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), 
Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (CUP 2012).  
849 Simon Caney is one author who has proposed that the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC must be understood as 
prohibiting action that causes ‘climate change that systematically undermines the widespread enjoyment of human rights’. 
See Caney (n 13) 69. 
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methodological tools to assess all risks relevant to human rights protection.850 More comprehensive 
analyses are needed not only to assess how direct impacts of climate change affect the enjoyment of 
specific human rights, but also to determine, as the OHCHR puts it, ‘how a given distribution of burden 
affects the enjoyment of human rights’.851 This may require the integration of human rights indicators 
into the more sophisticated of forecasting models.852 Forecasting models would also need to consider 
the consequences of specific policies such as reforestation, biofuel substitution, carbon trading and 
various forms of adaptation for the enjoyment of human rights.853 These models could draw on existing 
frameworks for human rights impact analysis, based on benchmarks and indicators,854 and use data 
collected through other processes, such as data related to health, food security and human 
development.855 However, new methodologies need to be developed to link macro-level trends with 
micro-level observations, including anecdotal evidence or judicial decisions that reveal human rights 
violations.856 In light of the apparent differentiated impacts of climate change, there is also a pressing 
need for further data, including in particular disaggregated data, to help provide a better insight into the 
consequences of mitigation and adaptation scenarios for the enjoyment of rights by disadvantaged 
groups.857 
The evidential complexities in assessing how human rights are affected by State action related 
to climate change not only require ex ante assessments, but also call for more consideration of the 
                                                
 
850 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report’ 781. The IPCC defines ‘vulnerability to climate change’ as ‘the degree to which [geophysical, biological and socio-
economic] systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts’. 
851 OHCHR Report on Climate Change and Human Rights (n 36) para 88. 
852 Humphreys, Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide (n 31) 7. 
853 For an example of a potentially suitable model see global macroeconometric model E3MG (energy-environment-
economy) developed at the University of Cambridge, at 
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854 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and 
Implementation (HR/Pub/12/5, New York and Geneva, 2012). 
855 For an analogous discussion, see Olivier de Schutter et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Human Development and Human 
Rights: Framing the Issues’ (2009) 3 HR&ILD 137. 
856 See, for example, Scott and Rajamani (n 212) 469ff (highlighting potentially detrimental impacts of EU aviation tax 
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discussed in relation to trade and investment. For a discussion see Olivier de Schutter et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investment, 
Human Development and Human Rights: Framing the Issues’ (n 855). 
857 The need for aggregated data has been articulated by the CEDAW Committee in a Statement on Gender and Climate, 
which draws attention to the ‘differential impacts’ of climate change and calls for the equal participation of women in 
climate negotiations, for States to ensure ‘Safety nets and insurance for social protection’, and for states to produce ‘sex-
disaggregated data, gender-sensitive policies and program guidelines to aid Governments’ in ensuring human rights. It 
concludes that ‘Gender equality is essential to the successful initiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
climate change’. UN CEDAW, Statement of the CEDAW Committee on Gender and Climate Change, adopted at 44th 
Session held in New York, USA, from 20 July to 7 August 2009. 
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UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as providing minimum standards of legal protection. The treaties’ 
reporting system and specific obligations significantly ease the burden on actors responsible for 
interpreting human rights norms who are faced with climate change-related claims. In relation to the 
Kyoto Protocol, it could of course be argued that its role in protecting human beings against the adverse 
effects of climate change is ambiguous at best, given that commitments have been low in comparison 
with mitigation needs. Based on these considerations, we can argue that States could choose to ‘kill 
Kyoto softly’858 or put it to sleep, without affecting legal protection of actual or potential victims of 
climate change.859 However, this argument misses the point that the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
shed light on what emission reductions human rights law requires at a minimum from States that are 
historically responsible for climate change. The existence of these quantified minimum standards is 
important for creating accountability in an area of law where it is not easy to distinguish between the 
individual contributions of States to climate change and its adverse effects from overall trends. 
Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol’s system of compulsory reporting and rigorous compliance 
monitoring makes it relatively easy to prove that a State has failed to comply with its obligations, if this 
is indeed the case. And its compliance system not only helps to achieve a transparency objective by 
facilitating the ‘measurement, reporting and verification’ of emissions attributable to States, but also 
has the capacity for instigating sanctions on States that fail to meet their quantified emission reduction 
targets.860 The erosion of this part of the UNFCCC framework is therefore significant for the protection 
of human beings against risks created by climate change, despite the fact that its precise significance 
for individual human beings is hard to pinpoint or demonstrate.  
It is not clear how the agreement currently being negotiated will compare with the Kyoto 
Protocol in terms of the fulfillment of States’ legal obligations to protect human rights. In this context, 
we must recall that conduct that appears to breach the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol—such as a 
State’s failure to participate in good faith in negotiations to agree on a subsequent commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol, as required under Article 3(9) of the Protocol—could consolidate claims of 
wrongful conduct under international human rights law, even if wrongfulness of the act itself is 
difficult to establish.  
                                                
 
858 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly?’ (2008) 57 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 909. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The primary responsibility for propagating law-consciousness lies with the State. 
 
     
        Christopher G Weeramantry861 
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As the thesis has demonstrated, international human rights law could provide an exclusive or 
complementary basis for State responsibility claims related to climate change. It has also emphasised 
that international human rights law creates erga omnes obligations, based on the ‘legitimate interest’ of 
the international community as a whole in compliance with these obligations. In a similar vein, the 
substantive obligations derived from the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (and parallel customary 
norms, such as the no-harm rule, the precautionary principle and the right to sustainable development) 
are most appropriately characterised as obligations to the international community as a whole.862 The 
characterisation of these obligations as erga omnes affects the legal consequences when they are 
breached, including the rights of States to invoke responsibility and the content of ‘secondary’ 
obligations incurred by the responsible State as a result of the breach. This was recognised by the HRC 
in its General Comment 31, in which it not only commends that violations of Covenant rights by any 
State Party ‘deserve the attention’ of all other State Parties, but also stresses that drawing attention to 
possible breaches of Covenant obligations and calling on other State Parties to comply with their 
obligations should ‘far from being regarded as an unfriendly act, be considered as a reflection of 
legitimate community interests’.863  
 The ARS codify the entitlement of a State that is specifically affected by the breach of an erga 
omnes obligation to invoke the responsibility of the violating State. This confirms that States with 
populations whose human rights have been violated as a result of wrongful conduct contributing to 
climate change could, in principle, invoke the responsibility of the violating State or States. The ARS 
make it clear that when there is a plurality of injured States, each is entitled to invoke responsibility.864 
However, the claim of a wrongful act connected with climate change specifically affecting a particular 
State or States necessarily raises questions about the ‘attribution’ of specific impacts to anthropogenic 
climate change. The evidence reviewed in Section 1.3 suggests that States whose populations are 
affected by long-term effects of climate change, such as rising sea levels and the melting of permafrost, 
would have no difficulty in establishing that they were specifically affected by wrongful conduct that 
contributed to climate change. Yet meeting the ‘specifically affected’ standard may be more difficult 
for States whose populations are primarily affected by the amplification of pre-existing risks or 
                                                
 
862 See Section 2.3.1 supra. 
863 HRC, General Comment No. 31 para 2. Cf. Tomuschat (n 17) 14 (suggesting that recognising the erga omnes nature of 
the obligations contained in the UNFCCC ‘would mean that every individual State could possibly bring a claim against 
every other State’ which he considers to be ‘not a sensible proposition’). 
864 ILC ARS, Art 46 and Commentary. See also, Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 513) 545ff. 
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vulnerabilities. These may be the increased risk of drought, disease or extreme weather events. The 
extent to which States are specifically affected by the breach depends on the evidence and 
interpretation of the ‘specifically affected’ criterion in the context of the alleged violation.  
 The ARS recognise, however, that States with a ‘wider, more diffuse interest in performance of 
the [erga omnes] obligation’865 could also be ‘injured States’ as regards the right to invoke 
responsibility. This is the case when the breach is ‘of such a character as to radically change the 
position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with regard to the further performance of 
the obligation’.866 It is important to note that the rule does not apply automatically to any breach of 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole: as Crawford points out, it is restricted to 
breaches which affect the ‘structure of the whole regime’ such as breaches of disarmament treaties or 
specific regimes for environmental protection.867 A breach of obligations to prevent dangerous climate 
change derived from the UNFCCC almost certainly comes into this category: the irreversibility of the 
changes to the Earth’s climate system resulting from the breach means that the ultimate objective of 
preventing dangerous climate change will become more difficult to achieve, and perhaps even 
unachievable, as a result of the breach. It therefore appears that at least all State Parties to the UNFCCC 
would be able to invoke the responsibility of another State or States for such a breach as ‘injured 
States’. In a similar vein, one State’s breach of its own obligations to prevent climate change-induced 
human rights violations will affect the capacity of virtually all other States to guarantee minimum 
levels of human rights protection, thus arguably entitling those States to invoke the responsibility of the 
violating State as ‘injured States’. The right to invoke responsibility for wrongful conduct related to 
climate change is, presumably, not even confined to ‘injured States’ in this broader sense: the ARS 
suggest that where the obligation breached is of an erga omnes nature, all States could invoke 
responsibility based on the presumption that in light of the nature of the obligation, invocation will be 
in the collective interest.868  
                                                
 
865 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 513) 546. 
866 ILC ARS, Art 42 (suggesting that if the obligation breached is not owed to the State itself but to the international 
community as a whole, a State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State if the violation specifically affects that 
State or ‘is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with 
respect to the further performance of the obligation’). 
867 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 513) 547. 
868 ILC ARS, Art 48. See also, Gormley (n 601) 146. Malgosia Fitzmaurice states that ‘Even considering that Article 48 
probably represents, at least in part, progressive development rather than existing customary law, it constitutes an important 
development’. Fitzmaurice (n 92) 1021. 
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 In relation to the legal consequences of wrongful conduct (or what the ARS call the ‘content’ of 
State responsibility), the first point to note is that legal consequences will arise even if the breach has 
not caused any verifiable injury, or if the link with injury cannot be approximated or proven. This 
follows from the basic principle that a State that commits an internationally wrongful act ‘must, so far 
as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed had that act not been committed’.869 The emphasis on restoring the 
situation to what it was before the wrongful act was committed reflects the broader objective of 
compliance with obligations,870 which is emphasised in the ARS through the codification of the 
continued duty of performance,871 and of the duty to cease the wrongful act (if it is ongoing)872 in two 
separate articles. The Commentaries emphasise that compliance with these obligations is a prerequisite 
to the restoration and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach.873 The duty of cessation 
further comprises an obligation to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition where 
the circumstances require, which may be described as a positive reinforcement of future 
performance.874 International human rights law also recognises that adequate and effective remedies for 
violations ‘serve to deter violations and uphold the legal order that the treaties create’.875 The duty of 
cessation is therefore an important part of remedies for human rights violations and characterised by 
the HRC as ‘an essential element of the human right to a remedy’ that entails an obligation ‘to take 
measures to prevent the recurrence of a violation’, including through changes in the State Party’s laws 
or practice if necessary.876  
                                                
 
869 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) 47. 
870 The PCIJ added that ‘restitution in kind, or if that is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which 
restitution in kind would bear; the award if need be of damages of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered 
by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles which serve to determine the amount of 
compensation for an act contrary to international law'. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France) 10, para 48. 
871 ILC ARS, Art 29.  
872 ILC ARS, Art 30(a). The treatment of cessation as a distinct legal consequence of an internationally wrongful acts is a 
relatively novel development: previously cessation was considered as part of the remedy of satisfaction. See also, Shelton, 
Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 90), and Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text, Commentaries (n 88) 68, para 114 and Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public 
International Law (n 26) 567. 
873 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 30, para 1. 
874 ILC ARS, Art 30(b) and Commentary to Art 30, para 1. 
875 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 90) 99. 
876 HRC, General Comment No. 31, paras 16–17. This states that in general, the purposes of the Covenant would be 
defeated without an obligation integral to Art 2 to take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the Covenant. 
Accordingly, in cases under the Optional Protocol the Committee has frequently included in its Views the need for 
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 The consequences for States that incur this obligation based on climate change-related wrongful 
conduct could be drastic, particularly where the violation involves not a single act or omission, but a 
series of wrongful acts. To meet its obligation of cessation, a State may need to make changes to 
significant parts of its laws, regulatory system, conduct in international negotiations and levels of 
assistance requested from, or provided to, other States in order to restore compliance with the violated 
obligation. The ACHPR’s finding on remedies for the range of human rights violations is established in 
SERAC v Nigeria which illustrates that the duty to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition may reinforce existing procedural rights: Nigeria had incurred a ‘secondary’ obligation to 
provide ‘information on health and environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory and 
decision-making bodies to communities likely to be affected by oil operations’.877 In relation to the 
evidence, it is worth noting that compliance with the obligation to end damaging conduct does not 
necessarily require the identification of victims: the obligation relates to State conduct already 
identified as wrongful, and thus the evidence relied upon to establish the breach will usually be 
sufficient to determine what cessation entails for a particular State or States.  
 The duty to make full reparations for the injury caused by the wrongful act878 is closely related 
to the question of causation: it requires the identification of victims and triggers evidentiary questions 
related to the scope of injury for which reparations must be made. Article 33(1) clarifies that the duty to 
make reparations may be owed to the international community as a whole, while Article 33(2) 
specifically acknowledges that the content of responsibility ‘is without prejudice to any right, arising 
from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other 
than a State’.879 Injury is understood as including any material or moral damage caused by the act880 
and includes ‘the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act’ rather than ‘any and all 
consequences’ flowing from it.881 This makes it clear that there must be a link between the wrongful act 
and the injury in order for there to be an obligation of reparation. However, the causal requirement 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
measures, beyond a victim-specific remedy, to be taken to avoid a recurrence of the type of violation in question. Such 
measures may require changes in the State Party's laws or practices. 
877 SERAC and Another v Nigeria para 69. 
878 ILC ARS Art 31(1).  
879 This marks a significant breakthrough, as it departs from the traditional principle that injuries suffered by individuals are 
legally suffered by the State of nationality, and it is the State that claims reparations for these injuries. See, for example, 
Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania). See also, HRC, General Comment No. 31, para 16. Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay para 14. 
880 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 31, para 5.  
881 ARS, Commentary to Art 31, para 10.  
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inherent in the link is not the same in relation to every breach,882 and can be established even when the 
wrongful conduct was only one of several factors that contributed to the injury.883 Where the obligation 
breached relates to the prevention of harm, the link between injury and the breach is likely to involve 
consideration of the extent to which the harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the action 
taken.884 The link between the emission of greenhouse gases, climate change and certain adverse 
effects, such as rising sea levels, is indisputably foreseeable as a result of the legal definitions contained 
in the UNFCCC and based on the UNFCCC reports. As regards specific injury suffered, the evidence 
cited in Sections 1.3 and 3.3 indicates that a broad range of climate change-related risks and harm 
could be considered as reasonably foreseeable consequences of climate change and the human 
activities that are known to cause it. Moreover, in the light of the principle of effectiveness, it is 
appropriate to shift at least part of the risk of uncertainty or lack of proof to the State where it can be 
established with a reasonable degree of certainty that specific injury has occurred as a result of global 
warming.885 This supports the proposition of a commentator who states that the correlation between 
greenhouse gas emissions, atmospheric chemistry and global warming has probably ‘been 
demonstrated with sufficient confidence that it seems unlikely that an adjudicator would require a 
complainant, in order to obtain relief, to demonstrate what would not be possible — that a specific 
emission of greenhouse gases by State S directly caused the specific impact in State I’.886 All this 
means, that existing evidence (including that reviewed in Sections 1.3 and 3.3) may well be sufficient 
to substantiate claims for reparation for climate change-related State conduct that constitutes a violation 
of international human rights law. As the science of attribution evolves, the chances that the victims of 
such wrongful conduct will be able to ascertain their entitlement to reparations should increase. 
Moreover, where State responsibility is invoked through individual complaint procedures under human 
rights treaties, victims have usually been identified in a claim’s admissibility stage. This means that a 
link between State conduct and the individual’s situation will already have been established once a case 
reaches the reparations stage.887  
                                                
 
882 Ibid.  
883 See, for example, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgement). 
884 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 90) 99, 89. 
885 Ibid 50, 317 (stating that the burden of uncertainty or lack of proof may sometimes shift to the State to uphold the 
deterrent function of remedies for human rights violations). 
886 Werksman (n 467) 412. 
887 The ‘victim requirement’ is one of the admissibility criteria that need to be met before a particular judicial or quasi-
judicial human rights body can consider the merits of an international complaint for an alleged human rights violation. For 
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 Once the duty to make full reparations has been triggered, the scope of the injury has to be 
established. This will be a fact-sensitive exercise which will require significant interpretation of 
complex evidence related to risks and probabilities. However, the law of State responsibility does 
provide some clear road signs for determining the nature and amount of reparations due. The first is the 
principle that no reduction or attenuation of reparation will be made for any concurrent causes.888 The 
duty to make reparations is similarly unaffected by a responsible State’s ability to pay,889 or by a 
claimant’s inability to determine the quantity and value of the losses suffered.890 That is, the duty of the 
responsible State to make full reparations for the injury is unqualified in general international law.891 In 
the light of the principle that the beneficiaries of human rights obligations are the ultimate holders of 
the right to ‘full reparations’, the unqualified nature of the duty to make those reparations then means 
that the general law of State responsibility accommodates States’ obligations to ensure the right to a 
remedy. The understanding of this right as a substantive human right implies that the focus of the duty 
to make reparations for a breach of international human rights law lies squarely on restoring the rights 
of victims, insofar as victims of the violation can be identified. Where it is not certain whether an 
individual qualifies as a victim of the breach, uncertainty could be addressed in accordance with the 
human rights principle in dubio pro libertate et dignitate and the principle of effectiveness. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
example, Art 34 of the ECHR provides that only complainants who are directly affected by the alleged breach of the ECHR 
have a right to complain about the violation before the ECtHR. Art 1 of the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR and Art 2 of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR contain a similar requirement. 
888 See, for example, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgement). 
889 See Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 513) 481 (noting that some ILC members had suggested to 
include the responsible State’s ability to pay as a factor that should be taken into account when determining reparation due, 
but that this suggestion was not taken on board because ‘there was a feeling that as the expression ‘full reparation’ had 
appeared in the Draft Articles and had not been criticized to a significant extent by governments, the expression should be 
retained’). 
890 Mentes et al. v Turkey Reports, Judgements & Decisions ECtRH 1997-VIII 2693 para 106 (stating that there should be 
some pecuniary remedy, but ‘since the applicants have not substantiated their claims as to the quantity and value of their 
lost property with any documentary or other evidence, the Government have not provided any detailed documents, and the 
Commission has made no findings of fact in this respect, the Court’s assessment of amounts to be awarded must, by 
necessity, be speculative and based on principles of equity’). 
891 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 31, para 12 (stating that ‘international practice and the decisions of international tribunals 
do not support the reduction or attenuation of reparation for concurrent causes’). See also, Crawford, State Responsibility: 
The General Part (n 513) 496. This is also clear from the cases discussed in Section 3.2 involving States incurring 
independent responsibility to make reparations for the entirety of the injury despite the fact that other States had also 
contributed to the same injury. 
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Furthermore, irrespective of whether or not victims can be identified, the content of the obligation must 
reflect the aim of re-establishing the status quo ante.892 
 Perhaps the most pressing legal question raised by States’ duties to make full reparations for 
wrongful conduct connected with climate change concerns the likelihood that the consequences of a 
duty to make full reparations exceed what the responsible State can (reasonably or actually) bear on its 
own. This probability is clear from the cases discussed in Section 3.2, all of which involved multiple 
States to which the same injury could be ascribed and one State (potentially) incurring responsibility to 
make reparations for the entire injury: in Corfu Channel, the establishment of Albania’s responsibility 
led to an unqualified obligation to make full reparations for the damage caused by the presence of 
mines in its waters, despite the fact that it was acknowledged that another State had probably laid the 
mines. In other words, Albania was held fully responsible for repairing the damage that appeared to be 
caused in part by the wrongful conduct of another State. In a similar vein, in Soering the United 
Kingdom incurred an unqualified obligation to make full reparations for damage done to the applicant 
by the United States, a non-party to the ECHR. And in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru the dispute 
was settled with Australia paying for the full settlement; however, the two other States that were 
allegedly responsible for the same wrongful act agreed to pay Australia a contribution to the 
settlement.893  
 The latter example of burden-sharing reflects good practice rather than an existing rule: such a 
rule or principle for apportioning responsibility for reparations between responsible States is currently 
lacking (except for the basic principle of equity, quoted in Art. 47(2) of the ARS, that an injured State 
may not recover, by way of compensation, more than the damage it has suffered).894 The principle of 
effectiveness is particularly relevant in this case: the duty to make reparations may be interpreted 
accordingly as obliging States that incur an unbearable or disproportionate burden of reparations to 
work proactively to meet their obligation. The most obvious avenue is negotiations or cooperation with 
other responsible States, as in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru. Where such negotiations or 
cooperation fail, the first responsible State may need to invoke the responsibility of another State (or 
States) and to trigger ensuing obligations to make reparations for the same injury. The advantage of the 
                                                
 
892 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) pp. 43, 232; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v DRC) ICJ (30 Nov 2010); 
Velásquez Radríguez v Honduras. 
893 UK Agreement, 24 March 1994, in UKMIL (1994) 65 BY 625. 
894 ILC ARS, Art 47(2).  
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rule contained in Article 47 of the ARS is that it entitles the first responsible State (as a non-injured 
State) to invoke the responsibility of other responsible States for wrongful conduct contributing to 
injury. This then triggers the obligation to make reparations which could be due to the same victims. 
We can speculate that reliance on this rule by one responsible State could trigger a ‘race to the top’. 
This may even occur if claims are triggered by a responsible State’s motivation to share an otherwise 
massive burden for reparations (capped at the amount of injury actually suffered). For any subsequent 
successful claim would entail the task of ascertaining whether or not the wrongful conduct had been 
stopped and, if the wrongful conduct is ongoing, articulating duties of cessation. This would help 
consolidate the limits of States’ discretion in areas that affect the Earth and its inhabitability for human 
beings. 
 We can observe that States’ obligations towards victims could create a new situation of 
potentially conflicting rights, especially where these obligations involve making reparations for 
significant damage that has already been done. This case could be addressed through the application of 
the substantive norms and principles that are routinely applied in human rights cases to reconcile the 
rights of victims with those of other beneficiaries.895 The nature of this exercise has led commentators 
to characterise the practice of human rights bodies of resorting to remedies as ‘the area of judicial 
activity that most clearly embodies the tension between the ideal and the real’.896 The wide range of 
remedies awarded for human rights violations (including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and 
measures of satisfaction such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and, 
more importantly, changes in relevant laws or practices) reflect the potential for constructing remedies 
that are consistent with the object and purpose of international human rights law.897 It is not the nature 
of climate change-induced human rights’ violations but the potential scale of injury ascribable to 
climate change-related wrongs that creates the most significant legal, evidential and practical questions 
regarding reparations for those violations. The severity and scale of damage and, in the human rights 
context, the virtually limitless number of potential victims of any established violation, means that the 
effectiveness of international laws pertaining to climate change is hinged on the extent to which States 
exercise their right to invoke responsibility (as injured or non-injured States) and cooperate to give 
effect to the victims’ right to a remedy and to restore the rule of law.  
                                                
 
895 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 90) 99. 
896 Paul Gewirtz, ‘Remedies and Resistance’ (1983) 92 Yale L.J. 585. 
897 HRC, General Comment No. 31 para 16. 
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 In this regard, we should note that wrongful conduct that amounts to ‘serious breaches of 
obligations under peremptory norms of general international law’ has specific legal consequences that 
go beyond the rights of invocation and obligations to cease the wrongful act and make full reparations 
for the injury.898 These consequences include a duty not to recognise the situation created by the breach 
as lawful;899 a duty not to provide aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation;900 and a duty 
of all States to cooperate to bring the breach to an end through lawful means.901 It is significant that in 
its Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ not only recognised the duties of cooperation and non-recognition as 
customary international law, but also implied that these obligations extend to all serious breaches of 
erga omnes obligations.902 Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change for the 
enjoyment of human rights, it is conceivable that wrongful conduct that is one of the concurrent causes 
of climate change will trigger obligations of non-recognition and cooperation for all other States. We 
should emphasise that whether or not a State’s conduct amounts to a ‘serious breach’ depends on 
                                                
 
898 ILC ARS, Arts 40 and 41. Art 40(1) defines a ‘serious breach’ of an obligation under a peremptory norm as involving ‘a 
gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation’. A peremptory norm can be understood in 
accordance with Arts 53 and 64 of the VCLT as norms that are ‘mandatory and imperative in any circumstances’. See 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’ (1958) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 40. 
Some have argued that the scholarly attention for the jus cogens concept has been disproportionate to its actual influence. 
See Weil (n 154) 432 and Christian Tomuschat, ‘Reconceptualizing the Debate on Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes: 
Concluding Observations’ in Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the 
International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 436.  
899 The Commentaries to Art 41 stipulate that ‘waiver or recognition induced from the injured State by the responsible State 
cannot preclude the international community interest in ensuring a just and appropriate settlement’. 
900 Art 40 ILC ARS. See also Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text, Commentaries (n 88) Commentary to Art 41 paras 4, 9 (explaining that the second paragraph of Art 40 provides for an 
obligation of abstention which comprises two obligations, namely not to recognise the situations created by the serious 
breaches as lawful and, secondly, not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation). 
901 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 40, para 3 (explaining that the obligation arises from substantive rules of conduct that 
prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat that it presents to the survival of States and their 
peoples and the most basic human values). 
902 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory para 159 (‘Given the character 
and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not 
to recognise the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [..]. They 
are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It is 
also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, 
resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is 
brought to an end’). Cf ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 41(1), para 3 (stating that ‘paragraph 1 [...] may reflect the 
progressive development of international law’, but adds that ‘in fact such cooperation, especially in the framework of 
international organizations, is carried out already in response to the gravest breaches of international law and is often the 
only way of providing an effective remedy’). In particular, commentators have argued that the rule contained in Art 41(1) 
has been construed too narrowly by the ILC, given that under customary international law ‘the same consequences follow 
from any serious breach of any customary international law obligation designed to protect fundamental values of the 
international community as a whole’. See Antonio Cassese, ‘The Character of the Violated Obligation’ in James Crawford, 
Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 416. 
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substantive obligations which are, as highlighted in this thesis, differentiated. Furthermore, it must be 
stressed that international law, including substantive human rights norms, limits States’ discretion in 
responding to serious violations.903 Maintaining these limits is important because the wrongful conduct 
could be of such scope and quality that non-recognition would have severe economic and political 
consequences for the recalcitrant State or States, thus creating a risk of knock-on effects on the 
enjoyment of human rights.904 These risks reinforce the importance of the duty to cooperate, which 
requires ‘a joint and coordinated effort by all States to counteract the effects of these breaches, 
[possibly] in the framework of a competent international organization, in particular the United 
Nations’.905 In relation to climate change, cooperation designed to bring an ongoing serious violation to 
an end could take place under the auspices of the COP to the UNFCCC, given that the wrongful 
conduct would almost certainly constitute a violation of that treaty. Another appropriate forum for the 
required cooperation could be the UN Human Rights Council. One potential role for quasi-judicial 
human rights treaty bodies could be to deduce specific standards from existing human rights principles 
to ensure that the potentially massive burden of reparations for human rights violations related to 
climate change is shared equitably between responsible States. This could be done, either at their own 
initiative or in response to a claim (under one of the inter-State complaint procedures) by a State that 
has incurred responsibility against another State that allegedly contributed to the same injury through 
the same or related wrongful conduct. 
 This concludes my analysis of the inter-relationship between three branches of international law 
and their potential applicability to State conduct contributing to dangerous anthropogenic climate 
change. The analysis reveals how international courts and human rights bodies can play a significant 
role in establishing State responsibility for climate change-related violations of human rights law when 
                                                
 
903 See, for example, Art 1 of the 1966 Covenants. See also, Margo Kaplan, ‘Using Collective Interests to Ensure Human 
Rights: an Analysis of the Articles of State Responsibility’ (2004) 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev 1902. See also, the ILC ARS’ 
Commentary to Art 40, which refers to the ICJ’s Namibia Advisory Opinion where the Court stressed that ‘The non-
recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any 
advantages derived from international cooperation’. See ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 41(1), para 10. 
904 Some members of the HRC have suggested that States’ obligations under Art 1(3) of the ICCPR to promote the right to 
self-determination may include the termination of diplomatic relations with States that violate this right. See McGoldrick, 
The Human Rights Committee (n 450) 251–52 (noting instances where individual HRC members questioned governments 
with regard to their diplomatic relations with Israel (in the context of its occupation of Palestinian territories) and with South 
Africa (in the context of the apartheid regime). 
905 ILC ARS, Commentary to Art 41(1) para 2. 
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provided with sufficient and relevant evidence.906 Competent organs of the United Nations and 
individual States must ensure that the wrongful conduct of recalcitrant States that disrupts the Earth’s 
climate system, and that prevents the full enjoyment of rights as a result of this conduct, are brought to 
a stop. An integrative approach to the three legal frameworks thus could significantly enhance the 
potential of international law to govern State behaviour in a way that reduces the risks to human beings 
posed by climate change. 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                
 
906 Relevant evidence could include, for example, the study by Elzen et al., referred to in Section 1.3 (n 128 and 
accompanying text), which sheds light on States’ contributions to climate change and the extent to which historical and 
ongoing emissions are linked to the fulfilment of basic needs. 
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